Analyzing software using unintentional electromagnetic emanations from computing devices by Callan, Robert Locke









of the Requirements for the Degree
Doctor of Philosophy in the
School of Electrical and Computer Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
December 2016
Copyright c© 2017 by Robert L. Callan






School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Tushar Krishna
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Milos Prvulovic, Co-Advisor
School of Computer Science, College
of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Alessandro Orso
School of Computer Science, College
of Computing
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Moinuddin K. Qureshi
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Professor Raheem Beyah
School of Electrical and Computer
Engineering
Georgia Institute of Technology
Date Approved: November 8, 2016
I dedicate this thesis to my parents Bob and Kathee Callan, to my brother Casey
Callan, and to my girlfriend Christine Godwin.
I would have quit long ago without their patience, love, and support.
iii
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
I would like to thank my advisors, Dr. Alenka Zajic and Dr. Milos Prvulovic, for
the opportunity to work on this interesting topic. Their time, ideas, feedback, and
support made the completion of this thesis possible.
I also would like to thank my thesis committee: Dr. Alessandro Orso, Dr. Moin-
uddin K. Qureshi, Dr. Tushar Krishna, and Dr. Raheem Beyah. Their time and
inputs were essential in improving this thesis.
iv
TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF TABLES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vi
LIST OF FIGURES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii
DEDICATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xii
SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xiii
I INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1 Motivation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2 SAVAT: A Practical Methodology for Measuring the Side-Channel
Signal Available to the Attacker for Instruction Level Events . . . . 2
1.3 FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emanations . . . 4
1.4 ZOP: Zero-Overhead Profiling via EM Emanations . . . . . . . . . . 4
1.5 Detection of Unknown Code on Internet of Things Devices at a Distance 6
1.6 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
1.7 Thesis Outline . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
II BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.1 Side Channel Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
2.2 The EM Side Channel . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
2.4 Identifying and Quantifying Side Channel Information Leakage Signals 12
2.5 Spectral Properties of Amplitude Modulated Non-Ideal Carriers . . . 14
2.6 EM Side Channel Information Leakage on Complex Devices . . . . . 16
2.7 Emerging EM Emanations Applications Beyond Side Channel Attacks 17
2.8 Traditional Program Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
III A PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING THE SIDE-
CHANNEL SIGNAL AVAILABLE TO THE ATTACKER FOR
INSTRUCTION-LEVEL EVENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
v
3.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
3.2 The SAVAT Metric . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
3.3 Methodology for Measuring SAVAT in Real Systems . . . . . . . . . 26
3.4 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
3.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
3.5.1 SAVAT Laptop and Desktop Measurements using a 20 cm
Loop Antenna . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
3.5.2 SAVAT Laptop, Desktop, and FPGA Comparison Measurements 42
3.5.3 Characterization of SAVAT Reliability and Repeatability . . 45
3.5.4 Impact of the Alternation Frequency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
3.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
IV FASE: FINDING AMPLITUDE-MODULATED SIDE-CHANNEL
EMANATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
4.2 Unintentional AM Carriers in Computer Systems . . . . . . . . . . . 56
4.3 Methodology for FASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59
4.4 Experimental Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 67
4.5 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69
4.5.1 Switching Voltage Regulators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
4.5.2 Memory Refresh . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 75
4.5.3 DRAM Memory Clock . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
4.5.4 Testing the Laptop Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
4.6 Automating FASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 79
4.7 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
V ZOP: ZERO-OVERHEAD PROFILING VIA EM EMANATIONS 89
5.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 89
5.2 Relating Time Domain EM Emanations to Program Behavior . . . . 91
5.3 The ZOP Approach . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
5.3.1 Training 1 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
vi
5.3.2 Training 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
5.3.3 Profiling . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 102
5.3.4 Profiling Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.3.5 Usage Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 109
5.4 Experimental Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 110
5.4.1 ZOP Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 111
5.4.2 Evaluation Setup . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
5.4.3 Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
5.5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117
VI DETECTION OF UNKNOWN CODE ON INTERNET OF THINGS
DEVICES AT A DISTANCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.1 Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 119
6.2 Adapting ZOP to Detect Malware . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 120
6.3 ZOP Whole Program Path Prediction Accuracy on NIOS and PIC32
Processors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 122
6.4 Quantifying Signal Quality as a Function of Antenna, Frequency, and
Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125
6.5 Detecting Unknown Code at a Distance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 137
6.6 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 140
VII RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK . . . . 142
7.1 Research Contributions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 142
7.2 Future Research Directions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 144
APPENDIX A — THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIDE CHAN-
NEL ENERGY AND MICROBENCHMARK SPECTRAL POWER
146
APPENDIX B — DISCRETE FOURIER SERIES . . . . . . . . . . 152
REFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
VITA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 162
vii
LIST OF TABLES
1 x86 instructions for our A/B SAVAT measurements. . . . . . . . . . . 32
2 NIOS instructions for our DE1 FPGA A/B SAVAT measurements. . . 33
3 Measured FPGA, laptop, and desktop systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
4 SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the Lenovo X61 laptop. . . . . . . 38
5 SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the DELL Latitude C610 laptop. 38
6 SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the HP Pavilion tx2000 laptop. . 39
7 SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the Dell Optiplex 7010 desktop PC. 39
8 SAVAT collected 10 cm above the NIOS processor on the DE1 FPGA
board with the 4cm coil probe. Values are in zepto-Joules. . . . . . . 44
9 SAVAT collected 10 cm above the Lenovo X61 laptop with the 4cm
coil probe. Values are in zepto-Joules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
10 SAVAT collected 10 cm above the Dell 7010 desktop with the 4cm coil
probe. Values are in zepto-Joules. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45
11 FASE measurement parameters. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 68
12 Devices for the automated FASE measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . 83
13 Statistics for the SIR benchmark profiled by ZOP. . . . . . . . . . . . 112
14 A comparison of ZOP’s whole program path prediction performance on
the PIC32 and NIOS processors for the replace benchmark measured
using the marker edit distance ratio. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 123
viii
LIST OF FIGURES
1 Sinusoidal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal. . . . . . . . . . . 14
2 Sinusoidal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal. . . . . . . . . . . 14
3 Non-ideal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal. . . . . . . . . . . 15
4 Non-ideal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal. . . . . . . . . . . 16
5 A naive approach for measuring SAVAT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
6 Our methodology measures the (a) signal difference by (b) alternating
the signals then filtering and measuring the resulting periodic signal
at the alternation frequency. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
7 The A/B alternation pseudo-code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
8 The A/B alternation pseudo-code induces emanations at a specific ra-
dio frequency by alternating half-periods of A and B activity. . . . . . 30
9 Measurement setup for the 20 cm loop probe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
10 FPGA (left), laptop (center), and desktop (right) measurement setups
for the 4 cm coil probe. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
11 Power spectrum of ADD/LDM instruction pair at 79 kHz and 80 kHz. 35
12 Comparison of power spectra for LDM/LDL1 on DE1 NIOS (FPGA),
Lenovo X61 laptop, and Dell 7010 desktop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 43
13 SAVAT measurement precision. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14 SAVAT comparison for two identical desktop (DELL Optiplex 7010)
systems. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
15 The effect of the alternation waveform duty cycle on observed SAVAT. 48
16 The effect of instruction ordering on observed SAVAT. . . . . . . . . 50
17 Comparison of SAVAT at different frequencies for the DELL Optiplex
7010 desktop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51
18 Comparison of SAVATs at different frequencies for NIOS on the DE1
FPGA board. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
19 Comparison of SAVATs at 40 kHz and 60 kHz for the NIOS DE1
FPGA, the Lenovo X61 laptop, and the DELL Optiplex 7010 desktop. 53
20 The same non-ideal carrier and arbitrary side-band signal as Figure 4
with noise and other sources present. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 58
ix
21 Pseudo-code to generate the A/B alternation activity. . . . . . . . . . 60
22 The micro-benchmarks do each of activities A and activity B for half
the alternation period, resulting in a periodic component at the alter-
nation frequency falt. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 61
23 A carrier at fc and its right and left side-bands generated by memory
activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
24 Ideal FASE spectral pattern illustrating an AM carrier at fc. . . . . . 64
25 Simplified spectrum representation of the harmonics of the LDL2/LDL1
activity for the Intel Core i7 desktop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 66
26 FASE results for the Intel Core i7 desktop and main-memory (LD-
M/LDL1) modulating activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 71
27 A switching regulator related carrier at fc and its right and left side-
bands generated by on-chip activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
28 FASE results for Intel Core i7 desktop and L2 cache (LDL2/LDL1)
modulating activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 73
29 DRAM clock spectrum with 0% (LDL1/LDL1) and 100% (LDM/LDM)
memory activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 76
30 DRAM clock spectrum with 50% (LDM/LDL1) memory activity. . . 77
31 FASE results for the AMD Turion X2 laptop and main-memory (LD-
M/LDL1) modulating activity. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
32 Output of the heuristic for the 1st and -1st harmonics of falt for two
carriers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
33 Output of the heuristic function for an SSC DRAM clock signal. . . . 82
34 Easy to detect spectral pattern at fc + falti caused by an AM carrier
at fc=1.6MHz on the Samsung Galaxy S5 smartphone. . . . . . . . . 82
35 Setup for the automated FASE measurements. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
36 Distribution of the neural network scores. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 84
37 Difficult to detect frame at fc − falti for an AM carrier at fc=511kHz
on the Lenovo laptop. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 86
38 Examples of waveforms collected by measuring EM emanations pro-
duced by several executions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 94
39 High-level view of our approach. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96
x
40 Workflow of ZOP. (Note that we repeat some elements to reduce clut-
ter, improve clarity, and better separate the different steps of the ap-
proach; that is, multiple elements with the same namerepresent the
same entity.) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97
41 Uninstrumented putsub() function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 98
42 Instrumented putsub() function. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
43 Marker graph for the putsub() example. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 100
44 Estimating path timing in uninstrumented training executions using
waveform time warping. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103
45 Predicting an execution path through putsub() by matching training
waveform segments to an execution waveform. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
46 Example of path prediction through tree search. . . . . . . . . . . . . 106
47 Average accuracy per benchmark. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 114
48 Number of training examples vs accuracy for print tokens, schedule,
and replace. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 116
49 A function which had poor static path coverage in the replace benchmark.124
50 Magnitude of processor clock harmonics 1 through 43 as carriers and
as modulated by 100 KHz SAVAT LDM/LDL1 activity. . . . . . . . . 127
51 A diagram illustrating an IQ plot for an unintentionally modulated sig-
nal with two synchronous components (one modulated, one not mod-
ulated) with the same frequency but different phases. . . . . . . . . . 130
52 IQ plots for the modulated 31st clock harmonic with several antennas
and orientations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 131
53 IQ plots for several harmonics using the 18 dBi panel antenna with
horizontal orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 132
54 Demodulated and normalized time domain signals for several harmon-
ics using the 18 dBi panel antenna with horizontal orientation. . . . . 133
55 IQ plots for 10 repeated runs of the same benchmark and inputs for
the 31st harmonic at 60 cm (top) and 300 cm (bottom) using the 18
dBi panel antenna with horizontal orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 133
56 A plot of the magnitudes of the positively and negatively correlated
signal features as a function of distance using 18 dBi panel antenna
with horizontal orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 135
xi
57 A plot of the magnitudes of the positively and negatively correlated
signal features as a function of demodulation bandwidth using 18 dBi
panel antenna with horizontal orientation. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
58 Histograms of the number of executions with a given minimum corre-
lation for the executions with unknown code (red) and containing only
known code (blue). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 139
xii
SUMMARY
This thesis develops methods to identify, quantify, and use information leaked
in Electromagnetic (EM) emanations from a broad range of computing devices in a
general (i.e. not application specific) way by synthesizing techniques from the fields
of electromagnetics, computer architecture, and software engineering. Computers
emit EM radiation (emanations) as a side effect of the voltage and current variations
required to perform computation. Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC) research
does systematically characterize and analyze such EM emanations, but EMC testing
only identifies and quantifies EM emanations for the purpose of designing and testing
computing systems to ensure emissions don’t interfere with communications signals
or other devices. Therefore EMC ignores any information embedded in the emissions
and treats all emanations as unwanted “noise” whose level must be minimized. Until
recently, the study of information embedded (i.e. leaked) in this EM noise was limited
to the leakage of sensitive information for security applications such as cryptoanalysis.
Cryptography researchers have developed techniques that analyze EM emanations to
extract secret cryptographic keys from computing devices as the devices perform en-
cryption operations. These techniques generally are ad-hoc and application specific,
as the goal is to demonstrate and fix weaknesses in existing cryptographic hardware
and software implementations. These weaknesses can often be found without thor-
oughly understanding their electromagnetic and computer architectural causes.
Aside from cryptoanalysis, EM emanations provide information about a system’s
operation that may be useful in other applications. A number of emerging applica-
tions make use of EM emanations to extract new types of information from computing
xiii
devices. For example, EM emanations can be used to determine or verify the execu-
tion path through a program for program profiling, debugging, and malware detection.
These new applications require a more general approach that can be rapidly and auto-
matically applied to numerous and diverse types of programs and computing devices.
This approach requires automatic and systematic identification, quantification, and
analysis of information embedded in EM emanations. Toward this goal, our research
has developed (1) a methodology for quantifying the side channel signal created by
single instruction differences in a computer programs, (2) a method for identifying
existing signals within computing devices which are unintentionally amplitude mod-
ulated by program activity, (3) a method for profiling computer programs via EM
emanations with zero hardware and software overhead, and (4) a method for detect-
ing the presence of unknown code during executions of a known computer program





Previous research has thoroughly studied how program activity on computing devices
can leak sensitive information. At first such research was conducted only in secret [56],
and then publicly to address the leakage of information from CRT displays [95], and
next resurged again in the field of side channel cryptoanalysis [57]. Recent research has
demonstrated that EM emanations leak information about a very wide range of system
activities and that this leaked information might be useful for many new applications
such as profiling, malware detection, and debugging. These new applications differ
from the typical cryptoanalysis side channel attack scenario in several ways. First,
system designers employ countermeasures against side channel attacks that weaken
the signal, increase noise, and weaken the link between the emanations and leaked
information. In these new applications, however, the monitored system is not hostile
and so no countermeasures are present, making the extraction of useful information
from EM emanations less difficult. Second, the structure of information needed for
the new applications is more complex and varies from application to application and
from problem instance to problem instance. Side channel attacks typically attempt to
extract a secret key (a set of a few hundred bits which are used repeatedly to encrypt
or decrypt data), whereas the new applications attempt to extract more complex
information, such as the execution path through a program. Finally, the reward for
demonstrating a successful side channel attack against a single device is relatively
high. In comparison, the reward for demonstrating these new applications of EM
emanations on a single device and single program is lower.
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These differences show that the new applications require a different approach.
While an application specific and effort intensive approach makes sense for side chan-
nel attacks, the new applications can take advantage of stronger (unguarded) signals
but also must systematically characterize hardware and software differences between
problem instances and must automatically carry out many of the steps which could
be done manually during side channel attacks. In order to be viable, analyses for
these new applications must also be automatically applicable across a wider variety
of devices, software types, and types of information to be extracted. These analyses
therefore require systematic and automated identification, quantification, and usage
of EM emanations.
1.2 SAVAT: A Practical Methodology for Measuring the
Side-Channel Signal Available to the Attacker for In-
struction Level Events
Previous studies of the information embedded in EM emanations have focused al-
most exclusively on how emanations can be used to compromise a device’s security.
Specifically, EM emanations have been used in a variety of side channel attacks to
circumvent traditional security protections and access controls in many different types
of computing devices. Unlike traditional attacks that exploit vulnerabilities in what
the system does, side channel attacks access information by observing how the sys-
tem does it. Computation generates many types of electronic and microarchitectural
activities. Side channel attacks identify some physical or microarchitectural signal
(i.e. the side channel signal) that leaks desired information about system activity or
the data being processed, and then analyze that signal as the system operates. Much
work has been done to prevent particular side channel attacks, either by severing
the tie between sensitive information and the side channel signal, or by trying to
make the signal more difficult to measure. As attacks are found system designers
modify and improve systems to reduce and remove very specific types of information
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leakage (most commonly the leakage of cryptographic keys). This makes such work
very application specific and focused on a perpetual cycle of developing attacks and
defenses for increasingly specific vulnerabilities. With each iteration of attack and
countermeasure, the information leakage becomes weaker or harder to extract, making
the attacks and countermeasures increasingly sophisticated and application specific.
Furthermore, the countermeasures are often applied after the attack methods have
been discovered. Other approaches to defending against side channel attacks include
adding metal shielding and introducing large amounts of random electronic noise to
the system. These approaches are typically applied globally to the whole system,
making them expensive and power hungry. The technique we propose, SAVAT, dif-
fers from all these approaches because it is both proactive (i.e. can be used before an
attack occurs) and allows fixes which can be targeted locally at the leaking circuitry
or code.
Information leakage can be quantified at many levels of granularity, ranging from
differences in emanations across phases of a program’s execution down to information
leakage caused by specific hardware components such as transistors. However, in
order to identify specific leaking circuits or parts of a computer program, a level of
granularity is required that simultaneously exposes the contributions of both hardware
and software, i.e. the instruction level. SAVAT quantifies information leakage at the
instruction level and develops benchmarks which can be used to quantify information
leakage from specific instructions and system activities such as arithmetic operations
or memory accesses. We also present measurements demonstrating the usefulness,
reliability, and repeatability of SAVAT, as well as a theoretical model showing that
SAVAT does measure values that can be used to quantify how single instruction
differences affect side channel signals in the time domain.
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1.3 FASE: Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Em-
anations
Information leakage in computing devices can be caused by many different system
components and occurs across the EM spectrum, and leakage signals are obscured by
noise created by other system components and signals from the external environment
such as radio broadcasts, wireless communications, and power equipment. Many of
the most useful leakage signals are generated by system components that generate
strong periodic signals (carriers) which are modulated by the information of interest.
In order to effectively use (or minimize) the information embedded in these modu-
lated EM emanations, it is necessary to determine system activities that modulate
these carriers, determine the frequency range and strength of the leaked signals, and
determine the modulation mechanisms causing the leakage. FASE presents a method
for finding existing computer system signals that are amplitude modulated by a spe-
cific type of system activity. We will also present measurements showing the types
of signals FASE can find, and present an algorithm for automatically finding leakage
signals using FASE.
1.4 ZOP: Zero-Overhead Profiling via EM Emanations
Applications that analyze software via EM emanations must be automatically ap-
plied to arbitrary computer programs running on computing devices. Zero-Overhead
Profiling (ZOP) is one such application. ZOP uses EM emanations to generate path
profiles for computer programs without using any instrumentation during profiling.
A program profiler dynamically analyzes a program to collect statistics about the
program’s behavior. Path profiling counts the number of times a specific static path
occurs in the execution of a program. This type of profiling is used to identify the
most commonly executed paths (or regions) of a program. This information is very
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useful for code optimization and performance analysis. Path profiling is usually im-
plemented by either adding instrumentation to the profiled program that counts the
executions of each desired path as the program runs, or by using dedicated hardware
features to record this information.
Using instrumentation can provide perfectly accurate profiling information (i.e.
the exact number of times a particular static path occurred), but the instrumen-
tation code adds some runtime and space overhead to the original program which
is undesirable. Runtime overhead can change the control flow of a program if that
program interactions with the real world (e.g. has realtime deadlines, is part of a
cyberphysical system, etc.). This makes profiling such systems challenging, especially
when the goal is to observe the system “in the field” without disturbing it. ZOP,
in contrast, uses zero instrumentation and requires no hardware features, making it
especially desirable for these scenarios, and desirable in any scenario where overhead
is unacceptable or undesirable. The tradeoff for zero overhead is that ZOP is not per-
fectly accurate, though ZOP’s accuracy is high enough for most profiling usage cases.
We show how ZOP uses a training phase to develop a model of how EM emanations
can be related to program behavior, specifically how we can extract example EM
waveforms that correspond to short sections of program execution by observing EM
emanations while the program is running a set of training inputs, and how based on
EM emanations alone we can systematically uses these training waveforms to predict
a program profile over a separate set of program executions. We demonstrate ZOP on
three small control-flow oriented benchmarks, showing that ZOP can profile control
flow with high accuracy. We also characterize how training input coverage affects
ZOP’s performance.
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1.5 Detection of Unknown Code on Internet of Things De-
vices at a Distance
Detection of previously unseen malware is a challenging problem, particularly on
Internet of Things devices. Such devices are vulnerable to malware because their
functionality requires them to be connected to the internet. They are difficult to
secure because they have limited hardware and software resources, diverse software
and hardware environments are used in their development, and because updating
such devices is difficult. IoT devices can be attractive for malicious purposes such as
Distributed Denial of Service attacks because they are produced and deployed in large
volumes. These properties make monitoring and verifying control via EM emanations
attractive, particularly since there is an airgap between the monitor and the monitored
device, making it impossible for an attacker to circumvent the protections even if all
device’s software is compromised.
ZOP can be used to detect unseen malware by predicting the control flow through
the program, while simultaneously keeping track of the confidence of its predictions
over the course of the program. When the monitored system only runs known code,
ZOP’s prediction confidence will be high through the entire run of a program since
the observed waveform behavior should match the training waveform behavior well.
If, however, unknown code (e.g. malware) runs on the device, new program activity
(and therefore new waveform behavior) will be observed, and ZOP’s confidence in its
predictions will drop. Therefore, we can predict the presence of malware by observing
the confidence of ZOP’s predictions.
This application will also require the monitoring device to be separated from the
to-be-monitored devices so that numerous devices can be monitored by a single mon-
itor, and so that the monitoring is unobtrusive. This work also presents some more
detailed characterization of the EM emanations used by ZOP, specifically presenting
a method for quantifying ZOP signal quality, and showing how antennas and distance
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affect the signals used.
1.6 Research Contributions
The research contributions of this thesis are
• SAVAT, a practical methodology for measuring the side-channel signal available
to the attacker for instruction-level events [24]
• A comparison of SAVAT values across laptops, desktops, and an FPGA-based
processor [23]
• Measurements demonstrating SAVAT’s utility, reliability, repeatability, and va-
lidity [21]
• FASE, a method for finding amplitude-modulated side channel EM emana-
tions [25]
• An algorithm for automating FASE [98]
• ZOP, a method for path profiling computer programs with zero hardware and
software overhead [22]
• A demonstration of detecting unknown code on an IoT device at a distance of
3 meters
1.7 Thesis Outline
The remainder of this thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 describes previous and
current related research and explains how this work relates to that research. Chap-
ter 3 describes the SAVAT methodology for quantifying an individual instruction’s
contribution to side channel signals, demonstrates the usage of SAVAT on laptops,
desktops and an FPGA-based processor, and shows SAVAT’s reliability, repeatability,
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and theoretical validity. Chapter 4 describes FASE, a method for finding amplitude-
modulated side channel EM emanations and develops an algorithm for automating
FASE. Chapter 5 describes ZOP, a method for path profiling computer programs
with zero hardware and software overhead. Chapter 6 presents more detailed charac-
terization of the EM emanations used by ZOP and how they can be used to detect
unknown code, specifically presenting a method for quantifying signal quality, and
showing how antennas and distance affect the signals used. Finally, Chapter 7 sum-





This chapter reviews previous research into the uses of unintentional EM emanations.
Previous studies of unintentional EM emanations mostly focused on security, specifi-
cally side channel attacks. We also review electromagnetic compatibility testing and
previous work to identify and quantify side channel signals, as well as previous work
on the emerging uses of EM emanations outside of side channel attacks. Finally we
review traditional approaches to program profiling.
2.1 Side Channel Attacks
Traditional security vulnerabilities take advantage of security flaws in an algorithm or
its implementation. In contrast, side channel attacks circumvent traditional security
protections and access controls by taking advantage of the observable “side effects” of
computation processes. Computations have side effects that are observable through
many channels. A few such channels are power consumption [14,44,57,64], sound [10,
26, 85], behavior under faults [17, 42], performance of shared caches [12, 94, 100], and
branch predictors [2].
Computations in electronic circuits draw currents which often depend on the data
being processed, and these currents generate EM emanations. These currents can
depend directly on the data being processed. For example a data value of 0 may
draw less current than a data value of 1, but additional data dependent emanations
may be more subtle. For example, accessing array element A[X] may cause a cache
hit or cache miss depending on the data value X. Since a cache miss draws much more
current than a cache hit, and so the EM emanations caused by these currents will
be different as well. As another example, consider an encryption algorithm (such as
9
RSA) that performs a different computation depending whether a secret key bit is 0
or 1. Since different computations generate different EM emanations, we may be able
to infer the secret key bit’s value if we can determine which computation occurred by
observing EM emanations. Therefore the differences in instruction execution caused
by different data values may generate much stronger EM side-channel emanations
than the data values themselves, particularly for high performance processors with
highly optimized microarchitecture.
The quintessential side channel attack is Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [57].
DPA is a side channel attack carried out on a device’s power signal to extract the secret
key used for encryption in algorithms such as the Advanced Encryption Standard.
DPA treats the computing system as a black box where the observed emanations
are a direct yet unknown function of the secret key bits. Therefore DPA is suited
for directly relating observed emanations to a relatively small number of secret bits
where the relationship between the emanations and secret bits is unknown and the
leakage signal may be very weak due to countermeasures.
A number of methods have been developed that exploit side-channel signals to
extract sensitive information. Simple microcontrollers such as those used in smart-
cards have been shown to be vulnerable to numerous side channel attacks such as
differential power analysis. Previous work has also quantified side-channel signals
generated by processor instructions using knowledge of the processor’s pipeline to
determine exactly when a test instruction is executing to extract a signature for each
instruction type, though this technique requires sampling the side-channel signals at
many times the processor clock frequency [35,43,78].
In general, side channel attacks are carried out by 1) identifying some physical or
microarchitectural “signal” that “leaks” desired information about system activity or
the data it processes, and then 2) monitoring and analyzing that signal as the system
operates. Much work has been done to prevent particular side channel attacks, either
10
by severing the tie between sensitive information and the side channel signal, or by
trying to make the signal more difficult to measure. However, such work mostly
focuses on preventing a particular side channel attack in a very specific piece of code,
such as a cryptographic kernel. Quantifying side channel exposure in general has not
been well studied, and when it has been studied, the measurements use granularity
which is either very coarse (e.g. program phases) or very fine-grain granularity (e.g.
at the transistor level).
2.2 The EM Side Channel
This work primarily investigates the electromagnetic emanations side channel. It
is easy to verify that electronic circuits within computing devices generate electro-
magetic radiation that somehow depends on the activity on the device [5, 34]. The
security risks due to the EM side channel have been reported in the open litera-
ture as early as 1966 [51] but descriptions of specific risks, eavesdropping techniques,
and mitigation strategies followed slowly. EM emanations from CRT monitors create
particularly strong signals, exposing the monitor’s contents to attackers hundreds of
meters away [56,95].
Differential Power Analysis (DPA) [57] was a major breakthrough in side channel
analysis, and opened up many attack possibilities, including new attacks on crypto-
graphic implementations. Researchers have adapted DPA to use EM emanations to
compromise the security of many types of devices [5] from keyboards [97] to smart-
cards [39, 55] to desktop computers [41].
2.3 Electromagnetic Compatibility (EMC)
EM interference/compatibility (EMI/EMC [50], [73]) techniques offer a systematic
approach to the search for emanations sources. Although there has been significant
research and applied work to reduce EM emanations for EMC, that work is mostly
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focused on interference a system can cause in other devices and in radio communica-
tions. EMC techniques therefore find all emanations sources, not just those that leak
information. This means that EMC cannot be directly used to identify and quantify
leakage sources because typical computing devices have thousands of EM emanation
sources but only a few that leak information. Most solutions to EMC problems also
alleviate EM side-channel leakage, but some EM side-channel countermeasures hin-
der EMC compliance. For example, adding metal shielding for EMC compliance also
attenuates EM side-channel signals, but transmission of jamming signals masks EM
side-channel signals while negatively affecting EMC. Because EM emanations (such
as clocks and switching regulator power signals) are subject to EMI regulations [36],
spread-spectrum clocking and other techniques are used to spread the resulting EM
emanations over a range of frequencies [46] to minimize the maximum emanation
strength. Recent findings have shown that EM signals from computer systems can
still be detected in side-channel attacks [83] at significant distances even for EMC
compliant systems.
2.4 Identifying and Quantifying Side Channel Information
Leakage Signals
Strategies for quantifying potential side channel exposure at the microarchitectural
and architectural levels are still not well understood. The Side-Channel Vulnerability
Factor (SVF) [32, 33] measures how a side channel signal correlates with high-level
execution patterns (e.g. program phase transitions). While this metric allows over-
all assessment of the “leakiness” of a particular system and application over a given
side channel, it provides limited insight to (1) computer architects about which ar-
chitectural and microarchitectural features are the strongest leakers, and to (2) soft-
ware developers about how to reduce the side channel leakiness of their code. Other
work [35, 43, 78] has quantified side-channel signals generated by processor instruc-
tions using knowledge of the processor’s pipeline to determine exactly when a test
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instruction is executing to extract a signature for each instruction type. These tech-
nique can not be applied to complex devices such as smartphones and laptops because
the techniques (1) require detailed knowledge of the device’s microarchitecture, (2)
only work for devices with very simple architecture and microarchitecture, (3) don’t
address external memory interfaces and (4) require sampling the side-channel signals
at many times the processor clock frequency.
Before EM information leakage can be mitigated or exploited, EM emanations
that have some dependence on the information of interest must first be identified.
Many EM attacks identify a range of frequencies where EM emanations depend on a
secret key bit, then demodulate the signal at those frequencies or filter out unusable
frequencies [40,65,89]. Many side channel attack descriptions only briefly or implicitly
address the underlying mechanisms that cause information leakage because finding
information carrying signals and determining their causes are separate processes,
and because secret information can be extracted without knowing what causes the
information leakage. However, both the root cause of information leakage and the
leakage mechanism must be determined to mitigate leakage. This knowledge is also
extremely useful for developing new applications of EM emanations.
Numerous EM emanations side channel leakage evaluation methods and coun-
termeasure techniques have been proposed [39, 47, 48, 60, 77, 81–83, 90, 91] including
the use of asynchronous circuits [38], low-cost shielding (e.g. metal foil) [74], and
transmission of jamming signals [75]. These leakage evaluation methods and coun-
termeasures rely on ad-hoc approaches that find a rudimentary relationship between
EM emanation signals and secret key bits by observing program activities in the time
or frequency domains over many key values. Since these approaches are based on
the leakage of secret keys, they are specific to cryptography applications and do not
identify the circuits or computer architecture mechanisms causing the leakage.
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2.5 Spectral Properties of Amplitude Modulated Non-Ideal
Carriers
Unintentional AM signals in computer systems have some properties not typically
found in traditional uses of AM signals (i.e. telecommunications). To understand
why FASE is needed and how it uses generated modulation patterns to identify AM-
modulated signals, a review of the general properties of AM modulation and the
irregularities of “accidental” side-channel transmission is needed.
fc
fc − falt fc + falt
Figure 1: Sinusoidal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal.
Figure 1 shows the spectrum of an ideal carrier signal (at frequency fc) that is
modulated by an ideal sinusoidal signal at frequency falt. In addition to the carrier
signal, this spectrum has strong “side-band” signals offset by falt, i.e. at frequencies
fc− falt and fc + falt. This would be the spectral pattern to look for when a periodic
signal has a perfectly stable frequency and is modulated by a pattern of activity with
a fixed period of Talt = 1/falt with no variation in timing but these ideal conditions
are rarely present in unintentional signals.
Figure 2: Sinusoidal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal.
Figure 2 shows the spectrum of an ideal sinusoidal carrier modulated by an realistic
baseband signal. The two side-band signals now correspond to the spectrum of the
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modulating activity. The tallest spike in each side-band signal corresponds to the
dominant periodic behavior of that activity and the smaller “bumps” in each side-
band signal indicate other common periods of repetitive activity.
Figure 3: Non-ideal carrier modulated by a sinusoidal signal.
Figure 3 shows a non-ideal carrier modulated by an ideal signal. The spectrum for
the carrier is now spread around its nominal value and this spreading is also present in
the two side-band signals. Even though the falt sinusoid is perfectly stable, the side-
bands at fc−falt and fc+falt will “inherit” the instability of fc. Many periodic signals
are spread out in this manner in computer systems. For example, spread-spectrum
clocking results in deliberate spreading of the clock signal’s frequency. Additionally,
many periodic activities (e.g. voltage regulator switching) do not require precise tim-
ing, so they often use less stable (cheaper/simpler) oscillators. Combining a non-ideal
carrier (Figure 3) with a non-ideal modulating activity (Figure 2) produces the spec-
trum in Figure 4. These non-idealities are typical for program-generated repetitive
behavior: for a given task, the time each repetition of the task takes is not always
the same, but there are often several commonly-occurring execution times among the
repetitions. For example, in multi-processor or SMT systems the repetitions of a loop
may take longer or shorter depending on timing variations due to resource contention
with other running threads.
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Figure 4: Non-ideal carrier modulated by an arbitrary signal.
2.6 EM Side Channel Information Leakage on Complex
Devices
Research interest in EM side channel attacks on processors increased with the adop-
tion of smartcards (e.g. EMV “chip” credit/debit cards). Smartcards have processors
operating at speeds less than 30 MHz and usually execute a single cryptographic
program. EM emanations resulting from this program activity can leak information
about embedded cryptographic keys [5, 39]. These processors have extremely simple
architecture and micro-architecture such as 8-bit and 16-bit data widths, no branch
prediction, no data or instruction caches, and small on-chip RAM with deterministic
single cycle memory access times.
Despite the ubiquity of cryptographic applications in servers, desktops, laptops,
and smartphones there are relatively few published applications of EM emanations
targeting complex computing devices such as multi-core, multi-threaded processors
with out-of-order execution and external memory interfaces. Attacking such devices is
difficult because performance optimizations make emanations more difficult to analyze
and because many side-channel attacks require capturing signals at a sampling rate
much faster than device’s clock rate, which is impractical for GHz clocks [41]. Despite
these difficulties, it has been shown that information can be transmitted several meters
by EM emanations [34], even in the presence of significant countermeasures (metal
shielding, walls, etc.) [102], and cryptographic keys can be extracted from modern
computers using EM side-channel analysis [41]. From an EMC perspective, these
more powerful systems require more sophisticated components (such as processor
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and external DRAM memory), larger currents, longer wires, and higher switching
frequencies, which all create stronger EM emanations. Therefore the information
leakage in these systems may be significant yet difficult to measure and analyze.
2.7 Emerging EM Emanations Applications Beyond Side
Channel Attacks
Recent work has proposed using side channel EM emanations for several new applica-
tions such as disassembling a running program based on EM emanations alone [35,88],
instruction profiling for security [67], and also verifying control flow to detect the in-
sertion of malware or other intrusions [15,66,68]. These existing approaches typically
focus on identifying individual instructions (which does not work on complex de-
vices for reasons described in Section 2.4) and do not address predicting control flow
through entire realistic programs.
Several other works have shown that some system behaviors in complex devices
can be recognized on long timescales. For example, web pages loaded by a device can
be distinguished [30], and malware can be detected [29] by observing current fluctua-
tions in a power outlet. These approaches treat the leakage mechanism connecting the
desired information about the system to the EM emanations as a black box, similar
to cryptographic side channel attacks such as DPA. Extracting complex and abstract
information about program behavior is difficult with this black box approach. For
example, the control flow through a program can be determined or verified by deter-
mining whether each branch encountered is taken or not taken. This in itself requires
detailed analysis and knowledge of the structure of the program being analyzed, and
this structure is different for every different program analyzed. Furthermore, in order
to determine the path taken we also need to determine the time at which each branch
occurs which requires further knowledge of the time required to execute each basic
block in the program.
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2.8 Traditional Program Profiling
Program profiling information is used for code optimization (e.g. [31]), testing and
debugging (e.g. [27]), and software maintenance (e.g. [37]). Unfortunately, obtaining
code profiles, and in particular path profiles, requires code instrumentation, which is
invasive and comes at the cost of high runtime overhead. The path profiling algorithm
proposed by Ball and Larus [11], for instance, is an efficient (acyclic) path profiling
technique that forms the basis of many other path profilers. This technique was
reported to impose an average runtime overhead of 50%, with as much as a 132%
overhead in the worst case. Other studies (e.g. [18, 96]) also report similarly high
overhead.
A number of techniques have been proposed by researchers to reduce the over-
head of profiling. Many of these approaches try to extend or modify Ball and Larus’s
technique. Selective path profiling techniques (e.g. [7, 18, 63, 96]) aim to reduce the
overhead of path profiling by selecting a given set of paths, based on the observa-
tion that only a subset of program paths are normally of interest. Targeted path
profiling [54] is another related approach that tries to reduce the execution overhead
by not instrumenting the regions in the code where information could be obtained
using edge profiling. Pertinent path profiling [13] is yet another technique that ad-
dresses the high overhead problem by optimizing the data structures used for profiling.
Sampling-based instrumentation approaches (e.g. [9, 92]) use a different approach to
reduce the cost of instrumentation and infer profiling information from a sample of
runtime events. Finally, partitioned path profiling [3] proposes the idea of parallel
path profiling, which profiles a program by evenly distributing the number of probes
into multiple cores.
Despite all the work done so far to reduce the runtime overhead of instrumentation
based program profiling, profiling still comes at a non-negligible cost in terms of
overhead. Although this overhead is tolerable in some cases, it is not always so
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(e.g. for embedded devices with limited resources or real-time systems). Moreover,
instrumentation is an intrusive technique that can change some aspect of a program’s
dynamic behavior of such code, especially in the case of complex, real-time, and/or
multi-threaded systems.
Some systems have hardware features to assist in profiling [8,52,53,86], but these
features cannot completely eliminate software overhead; even hardware-accelerated
profiling must somehow record profiling information, which necessarily affects the
programs being profiled. External hardware tracers and debuggers [62] can profile
without software overhead but require significant processor hardware support to col-
lect and transmit traces off-chip. Using EM emanations, profiling has no in-system
hardware requirements, which is particularly appealing for applications where any
overhead, instrumentation, or modification is unacceptable and for systems where
hardware profiling support is unavailable.
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CHAPTER III
A PRACTICAL METHODOLOGY FOR MEASURING
THE SIDE-CHANNEL SIGNAL AVAILABLE TO THE
ATTACKER FOR INSTRUCTION-LEVEL EVENTS
3.1 Overview
This chapter presents a metric, the Side-Channel Signal Available to the Attacker
(SAVAT, [24]), which does not present or imply a specific side-channel attack, but
instead provides direct quantitative feedback to programmers and hardware designers
about which instructions (or combination of instructions) have the greatest potential
to create side-channel vulnerabilities. For this purpose, it is best to analyze informa-
tion leakage due to instruction execution because analyzing emanations at the circuit
level (e.g. wires, transistors, and gates) does not address the effects of system archi-
tecture and software, and because analyzing emanations at the program or program
phase level [32,33] does not provide direct feedback to pinpoint leakage sources. SA-
VAT overcomes the difficulties in measuring information leakage in complex systems
by generating controlled EM emanations to isolate the differences between instruc-
tions one pair at a time, and then measuring and analyzing these emanations in the
frequency domain.
SAVAT measures the side channel signal created by a specific single-instruction
difference in program execution. In other words, SAVAT quantifies the signal made
available to a potential attacker who wishes to decide whether the program has exe-
cuted instruction/event A or instruction/event B. This level of granularity is neither
too fine-grained nor too coarse, and therefore is useful to both computer architects
(SAVAT tells which microarchitectural features create strong leakage signals) and to
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software developers (SAVAT allows them to systematically aggregate the leakages
caused by single instruction differences throughout a program).
We also measure EM side-channel energy among several common instructions from
a laptop, a desktop, and an FPGA at several different frequencies. We show that the
SAVAT measurements performed at different frequencies result in comparable SAVAT
values, up to a frequency dependent scale factor. We also confirm several expectations.
First, the SAVAT values for a given instruction pair are much smaller on the FPGA
compared to personal computers, as might be expected based on differences in power
and performance levels in the systems. Second, between instruction pairs we observe
similar trends across all devices. By comparing results between different systems,
vulnerabilities that are consistent across several processor generations and among
manufacturers can be determined, allowing designers and programmers to focus on
the most endemic vulnerabilities.
To summarize, this chapter presents:
1. SAVAT, a new metric that quantifies the side channel signal caused by differ-
ences in code execution at the instruction level,
2. A practical methodology for measuring SAVAT on real machines,
3. A derivation proving that the methodology does measure SAVAT given a sim-
plified yet realistic processor and emanations model, and
4. SAVAT measurements for the EM emanations side channel for a small set of
instructions for laptops, desktops, and an FPGA-based processor demonstrating
SAVAT’s utility, reliability, and repeatability.
3.2 The SAVAT Metric
Assume an attacker has access to a program’s source code or executable and can
observe EM emanations from the victim’s system while this program is running.
21
The attacker attempts to extract sensitive information by recording EM emanations
from the victim system while the program is running. The attacker then uses these
recorded signals to infer which instructions are executed, and then infers sensitive
data from knowledge of the executed instructions. The difficulty with which the
attacker can obtain the sensitive information depends on both (1) program activity:
the information-dependent difference created at the instruction level, and (2) the side
channel signal’s dependence on these instruction-level differences.
The SAVAT metric quantifies this second property for a system. This allows
(1) programmers to change their code to avoid creating high-SAVAT instruction-
level differences that depend on secret information, and (2) computer architects and
microarchitects to focus their side channel mitigation efforts on high-SAVAT instruc-
tions. Most side channel mitigation techniques are expensive, especially if applied
very broadly. For example, circuit-level techniques that mask input-dependent varia-
tions in overall activity do so by performing more activity overall: when actual inputs
require little activity, additional unnecessary activity is performed to match what hap-
pens for high-activity values. This minimizes variations in power consumption, EM
activity, etc. The costs of these techniques are high: large increases in chip area (for
dummy-activity circuitry), execution times that always match the worst case inputs,
and power consumption that always equals the peak power consumption.
To develop a targeted approach to identifying information leakage, we will create
a model that assumes that information leakage through side channels occurs when the
instructions executed depend on sensitive information, and that this instruction-level
difference creates a side channel signal that is available to the attacker. A program
with input-dependent behavior will generate data-dependent activity in the proces-
sor and possibly also in the off-chip memory and other system components. This
data-dependent activity will create signals in various side channels. Data-dependent
activity in the system cannot be avoided: even if the program’s control flow does not
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depend on the value of the input, and if the circuitry of the processor is designed
such that every operand value results in the exact same overall number of bit-flips in
transistors and wires, there will be at least some transistors or wires whose switch-
ing activity is input-dependent. This difference in transistor/wire activity creates a
difference in various physical side channel signals, such as EM emanations, power
consumption, etc. Process variations, physical location of the circuit, etc. allow side
channel signals to be created even if the circuitry is designed to minimize the operand-
dependent variations in overall activity – these techniques can dramatically reduce
the magnitude of data-dependent signal variation but cannot completely eliminate
them. But this does not mean that these and other techniques are ineffective – they
force attackers to use more expensive, bulkier, and less widely available snooping de-
vices, to run more risk of discovery (e.g. if they get closer to collect the weak EM
emanations), and/or to need more data points and collect signals longer for the same
amount of extracted information.
Many attacks rely on instruction-level differences in execution caused by data-
dependence on sensitive information. For example, modular exponentiation in RSA is
typically implemented in a way that results in testing the bits of the secret exponents
one at time, and multiplying two large numbers (e.g. 2048 bits) whenever such a
bit is 1. This entire multiplication can thus be viewed as the difference in execution
caused by sensitive information (a bit of the exponent). This example also shows
that, although the signal leaked by a single-instruction difference can be small, a
practical attack may accumulate many of these single-instruction differences – an
entire large-numbers multiplication in this example.
As another example, suppose an attacker can isolate (in the recorded EM signal)
the time offset of a single branch instruction in the program, and suppose that this
branch instruction is taken or not taken depending on a sensitive data bit. The
attacker observes the side channel signal for a time period immediately following the
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branch. The executed instructions and/or data following the branch may be different
depending on whether the branch is taken, and so the recorded signal may be different
when the branch is taken or not taken. Using this signal difference, an attacker may be
able to determine whether the branch is taken (and therefore determine the sensitive
bit) using a procedure such as DPA. If we call the voltage signal corresponding to
a taken branch sa(t) and the signal for the branch not taken sb(t), then we can
estimate the total side-channel energy available to the attacker to determine whether





where the sa(t) and sb(t) voltages are measured across a resistance R, and t = (0, Ts)
is the time interval after the tested branch where sa(t) and sb(t) differ depending on
whether the branch is taken. Many other data dependent dependent activities cause
such differences. For example, a signal difference may be created when a cache hit or
miss occurs depending on sensitive data.
We can then rephrase the problem of quantifying this type of side channel vulner-
ability as calculating SAVAT(sa, sb) for a given victim program and inputs without
directly measuring sa(t) and sb(t). With some simplifying assumptions it is possible
to calculate SAVAT(sa, sb) by adding up all the single instruction differences between
sa(t) and sb(t). For example, if sa(t) and sb(t) are the same except that the proces-
sor executes instruction B at some time te during sb(t), while the processor executes
instruction A at te during sa(t), then SAVAT(sa, sb) = SAVAT(A,B). Section 3.3
presents a methodology for measuring SAVAT(A,B) reliably using inexpensive equip-
ment, and Appendix 7.2 presents a derivation showing that this methodology does
measure SAVAT(A,B) given a set of realistic assumptions.
SAVAT quantifies the overall signal that is made available to the attacker through
the side channel as a result of a single-instruction variation: executing a different
instruction because of a control-flow decision, having or not having a cache miss,
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etc. The SAVAT is a pairwise metric: it measures the signal made available to the
attacker when we execute instruction/event A instead of executing instruction/event
B (or vice versa). For example, the ADD/MUL SAVAT is the overall side channel
signal available to the attacker to determine whether we have executed an ADD
or a MUL instruction, the LDM/LDL2 SAVAT is the overall amount of the side
channel signal that tells the attacker whether we had a L2 hit or an off-chip memory
access for a load instruction, etc. We also define the single-instruction SAVAT as the
maximum of the pairwise SAVATs where both events in the pair are generated using
the same instruction. For example, the SAVAT for a load instruction is the maximum
of pairwise SAVATs: LDM/LDM, LDM/LDL2, LDM/LDL1, etc.
How many single-instruction differences need to be accumulated to mount a suc-
cessful attack depends on the SAVAT values between these instructions – huge SAVAT
values enable attacks even when sensitive data creates a seemingly small difference
in execution, e.g. the attacker may need fewer such “loud” instructions. Single in-
struction differences in execution may be accumulated in two ways: (1) repetition:
the same single-instruction difference may be re-created many times, and the attacker
can use the overall difference that is created, and (2) combination: entire sequences
of different instructions can be executed. Our measurement methodology will ex-
ploit repetition to obtain signals that can be more reliably measured, then divides
the large measured signal by the number of repetitions to determine the contribution
of a single instance. Combination is not directly addressed in this work – while we
believe that the sum of single-instruction differences can act as a good estimate for
the combined signal, this estimate is imprecise because instructions can be reordered
and their execution may overlap. A more accurate SAVAT measurement of signal
differences created by executing different sequences of instructions can be performed
by using those entire sequences as A/B activity in the measurement. However, this
approach does not scale well to longer sequences: pairwise SAVAT measurement for N
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individual instructions requires O(N2) measurements, pairwise measurement among
all possible two-instruction sequences constructed from these N instructions requires
O(N4) measurements, etc. One approach to this combinatorial explosion is to clus-
ter instruction opcodes using SAVAT as the distance metric, then explore sequences
using instruction class representatives. Another approach would be to derive a good
model of the interaction among instructions in a sequence, i.e. to capture effects of
reordering, dependencies, etc., and then compute overall SAVAT values for instruc-
tion sequences by using the interaction model to combine measured single-instruction
SAVAT values.
3.3 Methodology for Measuring SAVAT in Real Systems
This chapter describes a methodology for directly measuring SAVAT for a pair of
instructions in a system. The goal is to measure the EM emanations side-channel
signal (or another type of side channel signal) created by executing instruction A vs
executing instruction B (i.e. SAVAT(A,B)). A naive approach measures the signals
for A and B separately, then computes the area (total amplitude difference over time)
between the signal curves for A and B. Unfortunately, this naive approach has a
very large measurement error. First, the single-instruction signal difference is much
smaller than the overall signal generated by the execution that surrounds the instruc-
tion under examination. Complex processors heavily optimize the scheduling and
execution of instructions, so determining the times where the test instructions A or
B are actually active would be problematic. Computing a small difference between
two large signals is subject to huge relative error because the measurement error for
each signal is proportional to the signal’s overall value, i.e. the difference between
signals might be dominated by measurement errors in the two measurements. Sec-
ond, the computed A−B signal is affected by imperfect alignment of the two signals
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in time. Other instructions must be present around A and B to make the measure-
ment practical (to trigger the measurement, setup the registers and memory used
by instructions A and B, etc.), and so noise and other unrelated components of the
received signal obfuscate the signal components created by the A and B instructions
themselves. Third, this approach requires recording many samples of the two signals
(to enable accurate subtraction) over a very short period of time (the duration of a
single instruction). Even the most sophisticated (>$200,000 cost) instruments pro-
vide only 10-20 samples per clock cycle in modern multi-GHz processors. Equipment
capable of measuring the low amplitude a(t) and b(t) signals at greater than 10G
samples/sec (as required to test a processor using a GHz clock) is prohibitively ex-
pensive or non-existent. The naive approach for measuring an A/B SAVAT which is
subject to the aforementioned problems is illustrated in Figure 5: execute a program
fragment that performs instruction/event A and record the side channel signal, then
execute an identical program fragment but now with instruction/event B instead of
A, record the side channel signal again, then align the two signal curves in time and
compute the area between the two curves.
To overcome these problems, our methodology employs microbenchmarks carefully
constructed so that any signal due to differences between the A and B instructions is
localized in frequency (Figure 6b), whereas the naive approach attempts to localize
this difference in time in separate A and B signals (Figure 5). The new A and B
combined signal is constructed by having the computer system alternate between the
two instructions/events (A and B) many times per second as shown in Figure 6b.
This alternation generates a periodic signal at the alternation frequency that corre-
sponds to the overall difference between the individual signals. This periodic signal
can then be filtered to reject other frequencies including the noise and the uninterest-
ing signals they carry, and the filtered signal’s magnitude can then be measured. For







Figure 5: A naive approach for measuring SAVAT.
precisely using a spectrum analyzer. The spectrum obtained in this way measures
the difference in signal strength between A and B instructions/events over a unit
time (e.g. a second), and overcomes all of the problems with the naive measurement
because (1) the measured A/B difference signal accumulates over many A/B differ-
ences over this one second, effectively amplifying the signal and suppressing noise
(the instrument only needs to be sensitive enough to measure the one-second total,
we can still compute the single-instruction/event SAVAT by dividing the measured
signal by the number of A/B instances that occur each second), (2) the difference
between A and B side channel signals is directly measured, without the relative-error
problem present when measuring A and B signals separately, and (3) the signal is
measured at the alternation frequency, which can be adjusted in software by changing
the number of A and B events per iteration of the alternation loop, so we can easily
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bring that frequency within the measurement range of commercially available instru-
ments. We also have the freedom to select a frequency with relatively little noise - an
important consideration for EM emanation side channels where direct collection of A
and B side channel signals is subject not only to measurement error but also to noise
from various radio signals. Also, while the A/B difference signal occurs at the greatly
attenuated high frequencies in the naive measurement, in this new methodology the









Figure 6: Our methodology measures the (a) signal difference by (b) alternating the
signals then filtering and measuring the resulting periodic signal at the alternation
frequency.
1 while (1){
2 // Do some instances of the A inst/event
3 for(i=0;i<n_inst;i++){
4 ptr1=(ptr1&~mask )|(( ptr1+offset )&mask);
5 // The A-instruction , e.g. a load
6 value =*ptr1;
7 }
8 // Do some instances of the B inst/event
9 for(i=0;i<n_inst;i++){
10 ptr2=(ptr2&~mask )|(( ptr2+offset )&mask);




Figure 7: The A/B alternation pseudo-code.
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The overall structure of the code used in the measurement methodology is shown
in Figure 7. Lines 2 through 7 execute n inst instances of the A instruction/event,
and then lines 8 through 13 execute the same number of instances of the B instruc-
tion. Thus lines 2 through 13 represent one A/B alternation, and this alternation
is repeated (line 1) until the measurement of the side channel signal is complete.
The value of n inst allows us to control the number of alternations per second, and
we select a value that produces the desired alternation frequency for our measure-
ments. For a given desired repetition period Talt corresponding to one iteration of the
outer loop, Talt can be directly measured using counters available through processor
instructions (e.g. the x86 rdtsc instruction) or the operating system (e.g. the Win-
dows API QueryPerformanceCounter() function). For example, increasing n inst
increases the time required to execute one iteration of the outer loop (Talt).
The benchmarks generate controllable emanations at frequency (falt = 1/Talt) as
shown in Figure 8. Intuitively we expect differences between the A and B instructions
to appear at the frequency falt = 1/Talt. More analysis is required to derive the exact
relationship between the spectral power P (falt) (observed at falt while running the
A/B alternation microbenchmark) and the side channel energy available to attackers
due to a single execution of instruction A instead of instruction B (SAVAT(A,B)).
Appendix 7.2 describes some required assumptions and a derivation of the relationship
between P (falt) and SAVAT(A,B).
Activity A Activity B
Period (T)
In system signal due to A/B activity
Spectral component at
Figure 8: The A/B alternation pseudo-code induces emanations at a specific radio
frequency by alternating half-periods of A and B activity.
To generate different cache behavior during load and store instructions, our code
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(in lines 4 and 10) updates the address of the accessed memory location so the memory
access repeatedly sweeps over an array of appropriate size (fits in L1 cache, does not
fit in L1 but fits in L2 cache, or does not fit in L2) to create the desired cache
hit/miss behavior. Note that ptr1, ptr2, and offset must be chosen so that the A
and B instructions access separate groups of cache blocks to create the desired cache
behavior (e.g. every A is a L1 cache hit and every B is a L2 cache hit). Aside from
the test instructions (line 6 for A and line 12 for B), the executed code should be
identical for all instructions/events, so this pointer-update code is present even when
the A and/or B instruction is a non-memory instruction (e.g. ADD). Our actual
code is written in x86 assembler to minimize the amount of non-under-test activity
and prevent compiler optimizations that might make the non-under-test code differ for
different under-test instructions (e.g. different instruction scheduling by the compiler,
dead code elimination of memory address updates for non-memory instructions, etc.).
Measuring SAVAT using this methodology overcomes several measurement prob-
lems. First, the measured signal represents the accumulation of many repetitions of
the A/B difference, so this signal can be measured with less sensitive instruments.
Second, the difference between A and B side-channel SAVAT is directly measured,
avoiding the relative error introduced when measuring A and B signals separately.
Finally, the signal is measured at the alternation frequency, which can be adjusted
in software by changing the number of A and B instructions per iteration of the
alternation loop, resulting in a lower measurement frequency which is within the
measurement range of commercially available instruments. We also have the freedom
to select a frequency with the least interference from noise and unrelated signals. This
is particularly important for the EM emanations side-channel because EM probes pick
up numerous unrelated noise sources and radio signals.
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3.4 Experimental Setup
To demonstrate the usefulness, repeatability, and validity of the SAVAT metric and
methodology, we will run the SAVAT benchmarks for several instruction pairs on
some computing devices and measure the resulting EM emanations. The instructions
listed in Tables 3.4 and 2 were used in the the A/B alternation microbenchmarks
as described in Section 3.3 for each pairwise instruction combination. These lists
include loads and stores serviced by different levels of the cache hierarchy, simple
(ADD and SUB) and more complex (MUL and DIV) integer arithmetic, and the ”No
instruction” case where the appropriate line in our alternation code (Line 6 or 12 in
Figure 7) is simply left empty. The NIOS processor has only an L1 cache so LDL2
and STL2 are not applicable.
Table 1: x86 instructions for our A/B SAVAT measurements.
Instruction Description
LDM mov eax,[esi] Load from main memory
STM mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to main memory
LDL2 mov eax,[esi] Load from L2 cache
STL2 mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to L2 cache
LDL1 mov eax,[esi] Load from L1 cache
STL1 mov [esi],0xFFFFFFFF Store to L1 cache
ADD add eax,173 Add imm to reg
SUB sub eax,173 Sub imm from reg
MUL imul eax,173 Integer multiplication
DIV idiv eax Integer division
NOI No instruction
The systems tested are listed in Table 3, along with relevant system properties such
as CPU and memory clock rates, processor microarchitecture, and cache parameters.
For the laptops and desktop, the benchmarks are run as single-threaded Windows 7
32-bit user mode console applications. No other user-mode applications were active
and wireless devices were disabled to minimize interference with the intentionally
generated signals. Aside from this, the systems were operating normally, meaning
that any EM signals resulting from system processes and other OS activity would
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Table 2: NIOS instructions for our DE1 FPGA A/B SAVAT measurements.
Instruction Description
LDM ldw r21, 0(r21) Load from main memory
STM stw r21, 0(r21) Store to main memory
LDL1 ldw r21, 0(r21) Load from L1 cache
STL1 stw r21, 0(r21) Store to L1 cache
ADD addi r22,r22,173 Add imm to reg
SUB subi r22,r22,173 Sub imm from reg
MUL muli r22,r22,173 Integer multiplication
DIV div r22,r22,r22 Integer division
NOI No instruction
Table 3: Measured FPGA, laptop, and desktop systems.
System Processor Memory L1 Data Cache L2 Cache
Altera DE1 FPGA NIOS II “fast”, 50 MHz 50 MHz SDRAM 4 KB, 1 way None
Dell Latitude C610 Intel Pentium IIIM, 1 GHz 133 MHz DDR 16 KB, 4 way 512 KB, 8 way
Lenovo X61 Intel Core Duo, 1.8 GHz 333 MHz DDR2 32 KB, 8 way 4096 KB, 16 way
HP Pavilion tx2000 AMD Turion X2, 2.3 GHz 333 MHz DDR2 64 KB, 2 way 1024 KB, 16 way
Dell Optiplex 7010 Intel Core i7, 3.4 GHz 1600 MHz DDR3 64 KB, 2 way 1024 KB, 16 way
affect the received signal. For the FPGA, the benchmarks were run on a NIOS
soft processor implemented on a DE1 Cyclone II FPGA board, with no memory
management or operating system. No other logic was active on the FPGA.
EM probe type, position, and orientation affect the strength of the received em-
anations. A small “sniffer” probe placed a few millimeters above components picks
up signals from only the components near the probe, but receives these signals very
strongly. On the other hand, placing a probe with a larger effective area far away
(> 2 meters) will pick up signals from all the parts of the system, but is often not
sensitive enough to pick up the weakest signals. Furthermore, the strength of the
emanations from the x86 systems is much stronger than the emanations from the
NIOS FPGA system. Therefore, two measurement setups were used. The first setup,
shown in Figure 9 was used for measurements and comparisons which did not involve
the FPGA system. For these measurements, the periodic EM signal at the alterna-
tion frequency was measured using a 20 cm diameter magnetic loop antenna (AOR
LA400) placed at a distance of 10 cm from the tested system. This antenna does not
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use a tuning capacitor and is terminated with a 50Ω load, so it has a flat frequency
response between 10 kHz and 1 MHz. This will be referred to as the 20 cm loop
setup. A recent paper illustrates a practical EM attack on implementations of the
RSA and ElGamal algorithms using similar equipment and laptops [41].
 
Figure 9: Measurement setup for the 20 cm loop probe.
To conduct a comparison between the x86-based and NIOS-based systems, the
probe must pick up emanations from all the parts of the system while at the same
time being close enough to pick up the weakest signals tested. A medium sized
multiple turn square loop (4 cm width, 20 turns) placed 10 cm above the processor
as shown in Figure 10 was ideal for this purpose. This will be referred to as the 4 cm
coil setup. For our measurements the loops are oriented parallel to the PCBs because
the magnetic field vectors for the generated signals point in this general direction at
the shown probe locations.
Figure 10: FPGA (left), laptop (center), and desktop (right) measurement setups
for the 4 cm coil probe.
The power across the probes was measured using a spectrum analyzer (Agilent
MXA N9020A). The spectrum around the alternation frequency was recorded with
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Figure 11: Power spectrum of ADD/LDM instruction pair at 79 kHz and 80 kHz.
a resolution bandwidth of 1Hz, which results in a very low measurement noise floor
because the measured signal is affected only by noise from a 1Hz-wide spectral band.
Unless otherwise noted, measurements use an A/B alternation frequency of 80 kHz
and are collected 10 cm above the device. As shown in Figure 11, we can choose
the alternation period Talt, allowing us to avoid parts of the spectrum where other
signals might be present. This spectra shows the ADD/LDM instruction pair (integer
addition vs an off-chip memory load) with 79 and 80 kHz alternation frequencies along
with an ADD/ADD measurement.
Our measurements include all cases where A and B are the exact same instruc-
tion/event, where the resulting A/A alternation should result in no signal at the
alternation frequency, such as the ADD/ADD spectrum shown in Figure 11. We see
that some signal does exist in the band around the intended alternation frequency:
these signals may be caused by the instrument’s sensitivity floor (which is around
−147 dBm in Figure 11), external radio signals, and a weak signal created by im-
perfect matching of A/B not-under-test activity. Therefore, these same-instruction
alternation measurements give us a very good estimate of the experimental measure-
ment error, and can help identify possible problems such as strong radio interference
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or mistakes in the A/B alternation code. When A and B instructions/events are
not the same, we measure both the A/B alternation and the B/A alternation - these
should be the same, so their difference allows us to assess the measurement error
caused by placing identical instructions at different program addresses, i.e. the effect
of fetch-related variations such as instruction cache alignment.
In Figure 11, the 79 kHz and 80 kHz ADD/LDM spectra show broad peaks, and
these peaks clearly track the alternation frequency. The shifting signals we observe
are not due to other unrelated signals (such as nearby switching power supplies, CRT
or LCD monitors, or other cabling) because the signal is only present when the A
and B instructions differ (i.e. there is no signal for ADD/ADD), and because the
observed peak follows the intended alternation frequency. The generated signals are
not perfectly concentrated at the intended falt because (1) falt cannot be controlled
perfectly in a real system and (2) the alternation period Talt (the time to execute
one iteration of the outer loop in Figure 7) varies slightly in complex processors and
systems, resulting in the dispersion of power around the alternation frequency. For
each pair of instructions A and B, we run the A/B microbenchmark and measure the
power spectral density from 2.5 kHz above to 2.5 kHz below the alternation frequency.
Then we integrate over this band to get the total power P (falt) generated by the
difference between A and B. Finally the SAVAT(A,B) is calculated from P (falt).
3.5 Experimental Results
This section presents the following SAVAT experimental measurement results:
1. A case study using SAVAT to compare and contrast EM emanations from several
laptops and a desktop using a 20cm loop antenna
2. A comparison of SAVAT across a laptop, desktop, and FPGA using a 4cm coil
antenna
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3. Measurements characterizing SAVAT’s reliability and repeatability
3.5.1 SAVAT Laptop and Desktop Measurements using a 20 cm Loop
Antenna
In this section, we perform a case study where we measure the EM side channel
SAVAT for all possible pairings of 11 instructions selected from the x86 instruction
set, on three different laptop systems and one desktop system. We demonstrate our
methodology on EM side channel emanations because such signals are generally very
weak and can be measured non-destructively using measurement instruments avail-
able in our lab. The results of the case study confirm the intuitive expectations that
(1) off-chip accesses (cache misses that go to main memory) vs on-chip activity have a
high SAVAT and that (2) instructions with similar activity (e.g. ADD and SUB) have
a very low mutual SAVAT. However, we also find that, for attacks from shorter dis-
tances, cache hits in large caches are also easily distinguished from other operations -
just as easily as off-chip memory accesses are, and that among arithmetic instructions,
execution of an integer divide instruction is by far the easiest to distinguish.
We measure SAVAT between each pair of instructions resulting in an 11×11 table,
including the 11 diagonal entries where the A and B instructions are the same. Each
entry in this table is the SAVAT between the A instruction (row) and B instruction
(column). We measure each table 10 times over multiple days and take the mean
to minimize the impact of changes in radio signal interference, room temperature,
and slight differences in antenna position. These measurements were conducted at a
distance of 10 cm with an alternation frequency of 80 kHz.
The matrix for the Lenovo X61 laptop is shown in Table 4. Note that these values
are extremely small - they are in zepto-joules (1zJ = 10−21J)! This indicates that one
occurrence of a single-instruction difference would probably not be sufficient for the
attacker to decide which of the two instructions was executed – many repetitions of
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the same instruction, or many instructions worth of difference will be needed. Unfor-
tunately, repetition is common for some kinds of sensitive data, e.g. a cryptographic
key can be reused many times while encrypting a long stream of data. The SAVAT
tables for the other laptops and desktops listed in Table 3 are shown in Tables 5, 6,
and 7.
Table 4: SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the Lenovo X61 laptop.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 20 32 88 112 82 82 87 84 84 85 150
STM 31 38 82 120 39 45 42 41 41 41 77
LDL2 93 82 2 4 82 83 86 86 85 84 104
STL2 115 121 4 3 104 107 111 111 108 108 163
LDL1 81 39 73 105 2 2 2 2 2 2 6
STL1 80 46 82 107 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
NOI 84 42 87 114 3 2 2 2 2 2 4
ADD 83 41 87 111 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
SUB 85 40 85 110 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
MUL 83 41 85 111 2 2 2 2 2 2 5
DIV 152 78 103 164 6 5 4 5 5 5 4
Table 5: SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the DELL Latitude C610 laptop.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 21 416 207 252 133 140 103 124 128 127 85
STM 334 184 185 224 131 126 92 133 136 134 69
LDL2 212 169 2 3 6 6 10 9 9 11 84
STL2 246 188 3 2 10 10 16 15 14 17 109
LDL1 146 122 5 10 2 2 2 2 2 3 45
STL1 145 110 5 10 2 2 3 2 2 3 45
NOI 138 137 6 11 2 2 2 2 2 2 39
ADD 131 125 8 15 2 2 2 2 2 2 38
SUB 134 128 7 13 2 2 2 2 2 2 39
MUL 137 128 8 15 2 2 2 2 2 2 36
DIV 90 62 85 108 44 45 29 48 50 40 9
Several SAVAT properties can be observed in these tables that confirm some
assumptions about our measurement methodology. First, the SAVAT between an
instruction and itself (i.e. A/A) should theoretically be zero, assuming no noise or
signal variation. The A/A SAVAT values, the entries along the table’s diagonal, are
generally the smallest in the table agreeing with theory. This validates the assump-
tion that the largest (i.e. most interesting/dangerous) measured SAVAT values are
predominantly a result of actual differences among instructions under consideration,
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Table 6: SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the HP Pavilion tx2000 laptop.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 316 1402 479 180 143 334 302 352 352 200 1799
STM 1401 226 1252 151 677 694 673 614 623 612 3215
LDL2 647 1391 44 40 34 33 34 34 30 32 185
STL2 671 1447 58 48 32 32 32 33 34 33 214
LDL1 382 802 41 35 21 22 19 21 21 22 186
STL1 391 513 41 35 21 21 19 21 21 21 190
NOI 137 740 44 37 20 19 17 19 20 19 154
ADD 387 749 43 34 21 21 19 21 21 21 193
SUB 382 760 44 35 21 21 19 22 21 21 187
MUL 382 765 42 37 22 21 20 22 22 21 182
DIV 2089 1548 303 206 195 199 164 190 194 183 432
Table 7: SAVAT values (in zepto Joules) for the Dell Optiplex 7010 desktop PC.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 319 695 586 1559 438 447 500 481 479 446 1669
STM 621 816 1400 1853 564 613 598 600 599 612 1738
LDL2 544 1851 98 130 175 203 309 237 233 198 902
STL2 1376 1712 126 112 140 154 179 195 197 210 709
LDL1 664 685 281 174 83 79 74 76 77 80 328
STL1 665 724 310 195 88 84 74 80 79 76 293
NOI 637 637 326 233 83 93 71 91 84 87 259
ADD 708 702 345 231 102 92 80 79 83 78 263
SUB 687 692 296 242 94 98 80 85 82 84 289
MUL 686 699 309 239 89 95 84 82 96 80 272
DIV 1464 1337 816 466 240 249 237 249 251 290 234
and not of the surrounding code that should be the same for all instructions under
test. Next, observe that pairs of instructions that share common circuitry tend to
have lower SAVAT values. For example LDM and STM both activate the memory
interface and DRAM, LDL2 and STL2 both access the L2 cache, and ADD, SUB,
MUL and DIV all use ALUs. Finally, observe that the table is largely symmetric.
This is consistent with the fact that the swapping the order of instruction A and B
should have no effect according to theory. This property is further characterized in
Section 3.5.3.
These tables also show that there are large variations in SAVAT among these
instruction pairs – this means that some instruction pairs are much easier for at-
tackers to disambiguate than others. We observe four groups of instructions/events
that have low intra-group and high inter-group SAVATs: The off-chip access group
(LDM and STM), the L2 hit group (LDL2 and STL2), an Arithmetic/L1 group that
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includes ADD, SUB, MUL, NOI, and also LDL1 and STL1, and a group that only
contains the DIV instruction. We can see that the SAVAT between instructions in
the Arithmetic/L1 group is similar to the same-instruction measurement (e.g. AD-
D/ADD), i.e. it is very difficult for attackers to distinguish between instructions in
this group. Although their functionality is quite different, L1 cache accesses are also
very difficult to distinguish from ADD/SUB/MUL arithmetic instructions. As ex-
pected, L2 accesses and main-memory accesses are much easier to distinguish from
other instructions. Note that for some devices an L2 store hit is noticeably easier to
distinguish from other instructions than it is an L2 load hit. This might be caused
by the fact that we cannot create a sustained string of L1 write misses without also
creating dirty replacements from L1 to L2, i.e. each STL2 instruction creates two L2
accesses - one to fetch the block from the L2 cache into L1, and later another that
writes back the dirty block from L1 to L2. So the higher SAVAT values for STL2
might be attributable to write-back activity caused by these instructions.
Surprisingly, the DIV instruction generally has noticeably higher SAVAT values
than ADD, SUB, and MUL. It is also surprising that some of the off-chip memory
accesses and L2 hits have similar SAVAT, i.e. the task of distinguishing between LDM
and ADD using EM emanations is similar in difficulty to the task of distinguishing
between LDL2 and ADD. This is contrary to the intuitive expectation that off-chip
accesses should create stronger emanations because they toggle long off-chip wires that
can act as better transmission antennae for EM emanations. Interestingly, however,
some off-chip memory accesses do have an even higher SAVAT when paired with L2
hits than when paired with other instructions. One possible explanation for this is
that e.g. LDM creates an EM field that allows it to be distinguished from e.g. an
ADD, and that LDL2 creates an EM field that is similarly distinguishable from an
ADD, but the fields for LDM and LDL2 are also different from each other and very
easy to distinguish.
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For computer architects who desire to reduce the potential for EM side channel
attacks on their processors, these results indicate that the path of least resistance for
the attackers is in code that uses off-chip accesses, L2 cache accesses, and possibly
DIV instructions in ways that depend on sensitive data, so the architects’ focus should
be on making execution of these instructions less EM-noisy, e.g. through limited use
of compensating-activity techniques. For programmers, these results confirm what
programmers should already know from work on other side channels - in code that
processes sensitive data, special care should be taken to avoid situations where a
memory access instruction might have an L2 hit or miss depending on the value of
some sensitive data item. Code that does not have data-dependent variation in cache
hit/miss behavior is considerably less vulnerable to EM side channel attacks, and
the most worrisome situation in that code would be one where a DIV instruction is
executed or not depending on sensitive data, e.g. when a control flow decision based
on sensitive data selects between a path that includes a DIV instruction and another
that does not.
Table 5 show the results for a laptop with a Pentium IIIM processor. This pro-
cessor is several generations older than the other devices. Some of the trends in this
table are similar - the ADD/SUB/MUL instructions are very difficult to distinguish
from each other, the SAVAT for pairings of L2 accesses and arithmetic instructions is
higher (and similar to what we saw for the Lenovo X61 laptop), and the DIV instruc-
tion has higher SAVAT than other arithmetic instructions. However, in this laptop
the DIV instruction is much easier to distinguish from other arithmetic instructions
- the ADD/DIV SAVAT is an order of magnitude higher than the ADD/MUL SA-
VAT. Similarly, off-chip accesses here have much higher SAVAT values than do L2
accesses. Overall, it seems that the high-SAVAT problem of DIV and off-chip load-
/store instructions in the Pentium IIIM processor was reduced when designing Core
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2 (released 7 years after the Pentium IIIM). It is likely that the reason for this im-
provement was not a deliberate effort to alleviate EM side channel vulnerabilities –
reduction in EM leakage might be a side effect of a reduction in operating voltages,
shorter wire lengths in the technology-shrunk divider, and signaling optimizations
that save power by reducing wire toggling at the processor-memory interface.
3.5.2 SAVAT Laptop, Desktop, and FPGA Comparison Measurements
To compare the emanations between desktops, laptops, and an embedded device (an
FPGA-based processor), we measured the EM side-channel energy among the 11
instructions given in Table 3.4 for the Lenovo X61 laptop and Dell Optiplex 7010
desktop, and among the 9 instructions in Table 2 on the DE1 NIOS FPGA using the
4cm wide square loop probe at the positions shown in Figure 10. Each measurement
results in a 11× 11 table (9× 9 table for NIOS) of pairwise A/B SAVAT values for a
particular system, with each measurement repeated 10 times over a period of multiple
days to assess the impact of changes in radio signal interference, room temperature,
errors in positioning the antenna, etc. We include all cases where the A instruction is
the same as the B instruction, and these cases are again expected to have a negligible
signal at the alternation frequency. The DE1 NIOS FPGA results are given in Table 8,
the Lenovo X61 laptop results are given in Table 9, and Dell Optiplex 7010 desktop
results are given in Table 10. All these results were measured at an 80 kHz alternation
frequency, placing the loop probe 10 cm above each processor as shown in Figure 10.
The power spectrum is measured at the same alternation frequency of 1/T =
80 kHz, to quantify the EM side-channel signal created by the difference between
the A and B instructions. A comparison of recorded spectra produced by alternating
between an off-chip memory load vs. an on-chip cache load (LDM/LDL1) instruction
executing on a Cyclone II FPGA, a Lenovo X61 Laptop, and a Dell Optiplex 7010
Desktop is shown in Figure 12. We can be confident the signals we observe are not
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due to other unrelated signals (such as nearby switching power supplies, CRT or
LCD monitors, or other cabling) because the signal is only present when the A and B
instructions differ (e.g. there is no signal for LDM/LDM), and because the observed
peak follows the intended alternation frequency.



















Figure 12: Comparison of power spectra for LDM/LDL1 on DE1 NIOS (FPGA),
Lenovo X61 laptop, and Dell 7010 desktop.
It is interesting to observe that the generated signals are almost perfectly concen-
trated at the intended alternation frequency for the FPGA board, but are much more
spread for laptops and desktops. One possible explanation for the wider spectra is
that the alternation frequency cannot be controlled perfectly in laptops and desktops
and that the alternation period T varies slightly in complex processors, resulting in
the dispersion of power around the alternation frequency. This is likely caused by
greater variation in the total off-chip memory access time on the desktop and laptop
systems. Furthermore, we observe that emanations from desktops and laptops are
much stronger than those from FPGA, which aligns with the number of switching
transistors and power expended in complex systems. To ensure we are capturing all
the power generated by our benchmark, we integrate over the frequency band from
2.5 kHz below to 2.5 kHz above the alternation frequency to find the total generated
signal power. This power is converted to energy per instruction (SAVAT) according
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to Equation 10.
Table 8: SAVAT collected 10 cm above the NIOS processor on the DE1 FPGA board
with the 4cm coil probe. Values are in zepto-Joules.
LDM STM LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 0.05 1.84 3.77 4.13 4.90 6.22 7.22 3.98 4.02
STM 1.74 0.03 1.34 1.15 1.33 1.35 1.59 1.31 1.38
LDL1 3.93 1.47 0.03 0.18 0.66 0.74 1.18 0.05 0.04
STL1 4.32 1.23 0.20 0.01 0.24 0.22 0.46 0.10 0.24
NOI 5.11 1.42 0.70 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.53 0.87
ADD 5.11 1.40 0.83 0.26 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.68 0.87
SUB 7.03 1.60 1.05 0.45 0.05 0.07 0.02 1.03 1.25
MUL 4.10 1.44 0.04 0.09 0.55 0.63 0.95 0.00 0.08
DIV 4.28 1.54 0.05 0.24 0.91 0.92 1.29 0.08 0.02
Table 9: SAVAT collected 10 cm above the Lenovo X61 laptop with the 4cm coil
probe. Values are in zepto-Joules.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 0 35 182 96 610 661 515 667 659 661 2160
STM 45 0 6 6 21 24 13 18 18 18 130
LDL2 175 6 0 18 176 195 163 203 200 203 283
STL2 96 11 16 0 263 292 256 301 292 297 363
LDL1 637 23 191 298 0 0 0 0 0 0 19
STL1 667 45 185 302 0 0 0 0 0 0 15
NOI 536 13 161 262 0 0 0 0 0 0 14
ADD 676 37 193 312 1 0 0 0 0 1 13
SUB 668 23 190 307 1 0 0 0 0 0 18
MUL 677 29 198 310 1 0 0 0 0 0 14
DIV 2224 176 275 363 19 16 14 13 15 14 2
These tables only describe one possible probe position and orientation, though
there are several trends that have been found to be generally consistent across many
probe positions and across the tested systems. First, the differences between the ADD,
SUB and NOI columns (and rows) is generally within experimental error. This means
that adding (or removing) a single integer add or subtract instruction, or substituting
an ADD for a SUB has an extremely small impact on emanations. Second, the integer
divide instruction generates significantly more SAVAT than the add and subtract
operation. This is likely because division is a more complex operation executed over
several clock cycles, expending more energy. Finally, regarding loads and stores, more
side channel energy per instruction is available to the attacker as higher levels of the
memory hierarchy are accessed. In other words, generally L2 cache accesses have
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Table 10: SAVAT collected 10 cm above the Dell 7010 desktop with the 4cm coil
probe. Values are in zepto-Joules.
LDM STM LDL2 STL2 LDL1 STL1 NOI ADD SUB MUL DIV
LDM 2 262 84 82 140 170 155 179 196 148 861
STM 55 1 164 162 306 334 369 420 418 318 1490
LDL2 85 153 1 1 32 43 43 51 55 42 297
STL2 84 165 2 1 46 44 85 72 66 33 256
LDL1 140 296 27 24 0 1 2 3 5 1 108
STL1 143 321 29 44 0 0 5 4 3 1 61
NOI 144 332 44 39 2 0 0 0 0 0 76
ADD 198 423 58 54 5 1 1 1 1 1 60
SUB 145 321 38 55 1 1 2 1 2 2 48
MUL 189 431 64 49 7 1 1 2 2 2 59
DIV 708 1400 193 246 58 56 25 70 31 76 2
higher SAVAT than L1 cache accesses, and memory accesses have higher SAVAT than
L1 and L2 cache accesses. This is consistent with the intuition that higher levels of
the memory heirarchy should emanate more strongly since such accesses expend more
energy per instruction, activating more circuitry and drawing more current through
longer wires (antennas).
3.5.3 Characterization of SAVAT Reliability and Repeatability
This section uses the measurement setups described in Section 3.4 to illustrate the
usefulness and repeatability of the SAVAT metric. It describes general SAVAT prop-
erties and demonstrates SAVAT’s consistency across repeated measurements on one
system as well as between two different systems with the same design. Section 3.5.3.1
shows the effect of changing the duty cycle of the benchmark (the time instruction A
is active vs the time instruction B is active), and shows that SAVAT does not change
significantly if we exchange the order of instructions A and B in the microbenchmarks.
Section 3.5.4 explains the impact of the alternation frequency on SAVAT.
Practical usage of SAVAT requires that measurements taken on a single system
are repeatable and consistent (precise). The tables in section 3.5.1 showed the SAVAT
values for 4 laptops and desktops. To generate these tables, SAVAT was measured 10
times for each instruction pair at a 80 kHz alternation frequency and at a distance
of 10 cm, measured on the four tested computer systems in Table 3. The tables in
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Section 3.5.1 show the means of each set of measurements for a given A/B instruction
pair. Figure 13 plots these means, along with the standard deviation among the
10 repeated measurements of each A/B instruction pair. Each point indicates the
mean and standard deviation of one population of 10 SAVAT measurements (i.e. one
entry in Table 4). The position along the x-axis represents the mean and the y-
axis position indicates the standard deviation for each SAVAT value. The precision is
good (stdev/mean < 10%), so the resulting SAVAT values can be used to guide design
decisions with confidence. This also implies that our measurements are repeatable,
and indicates that the signal created by the alternation loop (discussed in the previous





































) Intel Pentium 3 M































) Intel Core 2 Duo































) AMD Turion X2
































) Intel Core i7
Figure 13: SAVAT measurement precision.
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SAVAT values must also be consistent between different physical units of the same
system design for SAVAT to be practical. Figure 14 compares SAVAT values from
two PCs (2 physical units of a DELL Optiplex 7010 model with Core i7 processors)
for three different alternation frequencies using the 20 cm loop antenna. For each
alternation frequency and PC, the SAVAT values have been separately normalized by
the equation SAVATplot = SAVATmeasured/µA/B where µA/B is the mean of all A/B
measurements where A and B are different (i.e. the off-diagonal entries in Table 7).
The black line corresponds to a perfect 1-to-1 match, and the closeness of the data
points to this line indicates there is a good match between the two systems for all three
alternation frequencies. This implies that SAVAT values measured on one physical
system can represent all manufactured systems of the same or similar design and that
our measured SAVAT values are largely insensitive to the alternation frequency.























80 kHz (pc1) vs 80 kHz (pc2)
140 kHz (pc1) vs 140 kHz (pc2)
200 kHz (pc1) vs 200 kHz (pc2)
Figure 14: SAVAT comparison for two identical desktop (DELL Optiplex 7010)
systems.
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3.5.3.1 Impact of A/B Duty Cycle and Instruction Ordering
When measuring SAVAT the A and B instructions are each executed the same number
of times per each loop iteration (n inst) because this allows us to directly calculate
the energy per each executed instruction using the derivation in Appendix 7.2. How-
ever, it is also possible to execute more A instructions than B instructions or vice
versa. This changes the duty cycle for the w[n] waveform described in Appendix 7.2.
Changing this duty cycle changes the magnitude of W [1] and therefore changes the
magnitude of V [1] and the measured spectral power.
































Figure 15: The effect of the alternation waveform duty cycle on observed SAVAT.
The effect of the duty cycle on different pairs of instructions is illustrated in
Figure 15. These results were obtained by varying the duty cycle of several A/B
pairs and observing the change in power as a function of duty cycle. The duty cycle
was varied by executing the A and B instructions different numbers of times per each
iteration of the alternation loop. For example, if executing LDL1 and LDL2 100 times
each per loop iteration results in a duty cycle of 50%, then executing LDL1 50 times
and LDL2 150 times per iteration results in a duty cycle of 25%. Each instruction
pair has a different maximum magnitude (as seen in the SAVAT tables) and so the
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general trend is best seen by normalizing each curve so that the power observed at
50% duty cycle is plotted at 1.
These experimental values can be compared against the theoretical curve using
Fourier analysis of square waves with varying duty cycle. From Fourier analysis the









where w[n] is 1 (i.e. instruction A is active) for time τ and 0 (i.e. instruction B is
active) for time T − τ . τ/T is the duty cycle. Using Equation 25 and normalizing
so that the amplitude of the first harmonic at 50% duty cycle is 1 (to match the
normalized measurements just described), in theory the measured magnitude should
vary as a function of duty cycle as sin(πτ
T
). This theoretical result is shown as a dotted
black line in Figure 15.
Previously we also claimed that the SAVAT tables are generally symmetric. In
other words, SAVAT(A,B) ≈ SAVAT(B,A). To test this, we measured SAVAT for
several A/B and B/A pairs at three different frequencies (80 kHz, 140 kHz, and
200 kHz) on the DELL Optiplex 7010 desktop with the 20 cm loop antenna as shown
in Figure 16. The black line corresponds to a perfect 1-to-1 match. Instruction
ordering creates only small deviations from the perfect match for all three alterna-
tion frequencies which implies that the ordering of instructions does not significantly
impact the measured SAVAT.
3.5.4 Impact of the Alternation Frequency
The power spectrum measured close to a desktop or laptop computer consists of nu-
merous peaks protruding above “rolling hills” of noise. In addition to intentional
radio signals (such as Wifi and Bluetooth), each system has numerous other ema-
nations sources. Switching power supplies create broad noise peaks, clocks create
narrow peaks at their operating frequency, and long cables radiate noise across a
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Figure 16: The effect of instruction ordering on observed SAVAT.
broad range of frequencies. In addition, moving an EM probe closer to the test sys-
tem (< 1 meter) reveals that the random switching activities in the processor and
other system components create a broadband noise floor (typically higher than the
spectrum analyzer noise floor) that varies as a function of frequency.
SAVAT integrates spectral power density over a frequency band around the al-
ternation frequency (5 kHz bandwidth in our experiments), so measuring the same
SAVAT value at different alternation frequencies will unavoidably integrate different
noise sources along with the intended signal, resulting in different SAVAT values.
The emanations created by our benchmarks at the alternation frequency are likely
caused by currents flowing through the system’s power distribution network (PDN)
and are therefore a function of the path this current takes through the PDN. The
PDN can be modelled as a network of shunt capacitances and series inductances, and
so the current’s path is expected to be frequency dependent. A longer current path
might enclose a loop with a larger area, creating stronger emanations [71]. To account
for this frequency dependent “gain” we normalize by the average SAVAT value at a
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given frequency when comparing SAVAT across frequencies. For neighboring frequen-
cies (e.g. 80kHz vs 90kHz or 190kHz vs 200kHz), the change in gain is small as shown
in Figure 17 for the DELL Optiplex 7010 desktop with the 20 cm loop antenna.
























60 kHz vs 70 kHz
60 kHz vs 80 kHz
70 kHz vs 70 kHz
180 kHz vs 190 kHz
180 kHz vs 200 kHz
190 kHz vs 200 kHz
Figure 17: Comparison of SAVAT at different frequencies for the DELL Optiplex
7010 desktop.
Figure 18 shows how SAVAT changes as a function of the alternation frequency
on NIOS measured with the 4cm coil probe.Each instruction pair is plotted along the
x-axis at its SAVAT value measured at 40 kHz, and is plotted along the y-axis at its
SAVAT value measured at another frequency. The SAVAT values at 40 kHz appear
to be linearly related to the SAVAT values at each other frequency, suggesting that
SAVAT values at one frequency can be used to predict SAVAT values at any other
frequency in this range. Therefore within this frequency range the DE1 NIOS SAVAT
is largely independent of frequency and can be measured at whichever frequency is
most convenient. Figure 19 shows the FPGA SAVAT values at 40 kHz vs 60 kHz,
along with the laptop and desktop SAVAT values of comparable magnitude at the
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40 kHz vs 50 kHz
40 kHz vs 60 kHz
40 kHz vs 70 kHz
40 kHz vs 80 kHz
Figure 18: Comparison of SAVATs at different frequencies for NIOS on the DE1
FPGA board.
same frequencies. All three systems follow a similar trend, suggesting that the SA-
VAT values on all three systems may have a similar dependence on the measurement
frequency.
3.6 Summary
This chapter presented a new metric, which we call Signal Available to Attacker
(SAVAT), that measures the side channel signal created by a specific single-instruction
difference in program execution, i.e. the amount of signal made available to a potential
attacker who wishes to decide whether the program has executed instruction/event A
or instruction/event B. We also devised a practical methodology for measuring SAVAT
in real systems using only user-level access permissions and realistic measurement
equipment. While similar metrics rely on time domain measurements, SAVAT is
measured in the frequency domain, overcoming some challenges posed by time domain
measurements of EM emanations caused by instruction execution in high performance
systems.
We measured SAVAT among several common x86 instructions on three different
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Figure 19: Comparison of SAVATs at 40 kHz and 60 kHz for the NIOS DE1 FPGA,
the Lenovo X61 laptop, and the DELL Optiplex 7010 desktop.
laptops and one desktop at several different frequencies. Our results showed that two
systems with the same design have nearly identical measured SAVAT values, which
implies that SAVAT measurements on one system are representative of an entire man-
ufacturing run, or possibly an entire family, of systems. Our SAVAT measurements
were precise (st.dev/mean < 5%) for each tested system. We also demonstrated that
SAVAT measurements are consistent regardless of instruction order and other imple-
mentation details. We also measured the effect of unequal A and B instruction counts
and showed that with appropriate normalization, SAVAT is consistent over a range
of frequencies. Finally, to illustrate the validity of SAVAT we derived a relationship
between SAVAT and a simple time domain metric.
Overall, we confirmed that our new metric and methodology can help discover
the highest-vulnerability aspects of a processor architecture or a program, and thus
inform decision-making about how to best manage the overall side channel vulnera-
bility of a processor, program, or system. SAVAT can be used by circuit designers
and microarchitects to reduce susceptibility to side channel attacks by focusing on
high-SAVAT aspects of their designs (e.g. off-chip memory accesses, last-level-cache
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hits, and possibly the integer divider in the systems we measured). Programmers,
compilers, and algorithm designers can also use SAVAT to guide code changes to avoid
using “loud” activity when operating on sensitive data. Overall, our instruction-level
metric and methodology differ from prior work in that they quantify the signal that
is sent to the attacker by an instruction-level difference in program execution. These
measurements can be used to determine the potential for information leakage when
execution of individual instructions or even sections of code depends on sensitive
information. We expect our instruction-level attribution of potential side channel
vulnerability to help system designers decide where in the system/processor to apply
countermeasures, and also to help programmers and compilers apply software-based






This chapter describes FASE (Finding Amplitude-modulated Side-channel Emana-
tions). FASE systematically and efficiently identifies periodic EM emanations whose
amplitudes change as a result of specific changes in system activity, i.e. signals that
are amplitude-modulated by system activity. Our methodology uses the SAVAT
micro-benchmarks to generate repetitive changes in processor and memory activity,
then processes the resulting EM signals to find spectral patterns corresponding to
amplitude modulation. The EM spectrum is full of amplitude-modulated signals
(e.g. radio broadcasts) that are not modulated by program activity. FASE filters out
such signals by generating several different activity patterns and reporting only those
signals which are specifically modulated by all the generated activity patterns.
Side channels based on physical side-effects (power consumption, sound, or EM
emanations) are difficult for microarchitects and programmers to alleviate, in part be-
cause the relationship between computational behavior and the resulting side channel
signal is very complex and poorly understood. EM emanations side channels may be
the most complex: the emanated signals may theoretically be anywhere in the EM
spectrum, and signals at different frequencies may provide attackers with insight into
different aspects of computational activity. Therefore, the first step to use or mitigate
side channel leakage is to identify signals that have some dependence on the secret
information of interest. Much previous work addresses finding leakage signals as part
of the process of carrying out an attack [40, 57, 65, 89]. However, many of these side
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channel attack descriptions only briefly or implicitly address the underlying mecha-
nisms that cause information leakage. While attacks do not require determining the
cause of leakage, efficient mitigation does. Without a systematic approach to identifi-
cation and causation, the process of finding root causes is time-consuming and mostly
trial-and-error: the defender makes an educated guess about the leakage source, fixes
the hypothesized problem, and sees whether the leakage has been reduced.
The FASE approach for discovering AM-modulated signals is highly effective at
both finding modulated leakage sources, and at determining the type of activities
causing the leakage. Computer systems generate thousands of periodic EM emana-
tions. FASE successfully rejects all such signals that are not modulated by system
activity, while reporting the small number of remaining signals that are modulated
by specific system activities. This chapter describes unintentional AM modulated
signals in computer systems, and then describes how FASE can be used to find and
characterize such signals. To test FASE, we use it to find AM signals on a number of
different computer systems. We also identify the source of each periodic signal and
the mechanism by which it was modulated to demonstrate the usefulness of FASE
and to understand potential EM side-channel vulnerabilities of modern processor and
memory systems. Finally, we present a fully automated version of FASE and use it
to find AM modulated signals on a large range of devices.
4.2 Unintentional AM Carriers in Computer Systems
Amplitude modulation (AM) is well-studied [79] and is used in numerous commu-
nications systems. AM communications rely on carefully designed transmitters and
thoroughly regulated allocation of the frequency spectrum to minimize interference.
Unintentional AM signals in computer systems are generated by many possible “trans-
mitters.” A memory clock signal, for example, may act as a carrier. A clock signal
creates periodic currents at the clock frequency fc, and these currents flow through
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power and signal wires, generating a strong EM field. When the memory is active,
more current is drawn by the clock, and less current is drawn when the memory is
less active. If we alternate between high memory activity and low memory activity
with a frequency falt, the amplitude of the carrier at fc is modulated creating signals
at fc ± falt.
The transmission and reception of such unintentional modulation “signals” dif-
fer from communication signals in several ways. Since unintentional signals occur
at the frequency of the unintentional carrier, they are mixed in with all the other
noise generated by the computer system (other clocks and switching noise) and other
communications signals. Unintentional signals are subject to EMC restrictions which
impose a maximum noise power (signal power from our point of view). Therefore,
unintentional signals are typically weaker and may be diffused across the spectrum by
spread spectrum clocking or by using clock sources with inherent variation (e.g. RC
oscillators). Also, since the carriers are typically generated by non-sinusoidal sources,
the carrier signals may have harmonics.
These effects complicate the detection of unintentionally modulated signals. The
presence of noise generated by the system makes it difficult to determine which signals
are AM carriers and sidebands. Some of the unintentional AM carriers are generated
by spread spectrum clocked signals, making them harder to recognize. Existing meth-
ods to find AM modulation based on its spectral properties (i.e. without knowing the
baseband signals) are not designed to deal with these issues.
Finally, communication signals have direct and obvious control of the baseband
(modulation) signal while unintentionally modulated signals from computer systems
do not. In some cases, multiple baseband signals may even modulate the same unin-
tentional carrier present in a computing system. We may, for example, be interested
in separating out and determining the source of each such baseband signal (i.e. a par-
ticular system activity). For example, a baseband signal may be caused by processor
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activity and another baseband signal may be caused by memory activity. Existing AM
detection methods are not able to identify which carriers are modulated by specific
system activities.
The spectral properties of amplitude modulated non-ideal carriers are summa-
rized in Section 2.5. Several other non-ideal properties of computer systems are seen
in measured spectra. Randomly timed switching activity causes broadband noise,
and this noise appears as gently rolling “hills” and “valleys” in the spectrum. Addi-
tionally, a realistic spectrum contains periodic signals from both inside and outside
the system that are either not modulated at all or that are AM-modulated (e.g. AM
radio broadcasting) but not by program activity. Such a spectrum is shown in Fig-
ure 20. Even if we know the carrier and the program activity’s frequency content
it is hard to decide whether this spectrum contains an activity-modulated signal by
visual inspection. Our FASE methodology uses several specially generated program
activities in conjunction with a heuristic carrier likelihood function to automate the
decision process and overcome these problems.
Figure 20: The same non-ideal carrier and arbitrary side-band signal as Figure 4
with noise and other sources present.
Many periodic carrier signals in computer systems are generated by digital cir-
cuits and clocks, and therefore have sharp transitions that are best approximated by
rectangular pulses instead of the sinusoidal waves used as carriers in communications
systems. The spectrum of a pulse train with an arbitrary duty cycle is equivalent via
Fourier analysis to a set of sinusoids with various amplitudes at fc and its multiples
(harmonics). In other words, for each carrier signal generated by a digital circuit or
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clock, additional carrier signals will also be present at 2fc, 3fc, 4fc, 5fc, etc. As the
duty cycle of a signal approaches 50%, the amplitudes of the odd-numbered harmon-
ics (fc, 3fc, 5fc, etc.) reach their maximum, while amplitudes of the even harmonics
(2fc, 4fc, etc) trend toward zero. For a small duty cycle (i.e. < 10%), the magnitudes
of the first few harmonics (both even and odd) decay approximately linearly. Finally,
note that these observations imply that the amplitudes of all the harmonics are a
function of the duty cycle. If program activity modulates the duty cycle of a periodic
signal while keeping its period constant (i.e. causes pulse width modulation), all of
the signal’s harmonics are amplitude-modulated and consequently will be identified
by our FASE methodology.
4.3 Methodology for FASE
A carrier at frequency fc modulated by system activity is a lot easier to recognize if we
generate periodic processor and/or memory activity that repeats falt times per second.
We will used the SAVAT micro-benchmarks (which create measurable periodic signals
at arbitrary frequencies as described in Chapter 3) to find AM modulated signals in
computer systems. A modified version of one such micro-benchmark is shown in
Figure 21. Recall that the loop beginning on line 2 performs one activity (activity
A), and the loop beginning on line 8 performs another activity (activity B). The
outer loop repeatedly alternates activities A and B, creating periodically changing
activity whose period equals the execution time for one iteration of the outer loop.




in Chapter 3, we used this alternation to generate a carrier signal at some chosen
frequency fc, while in this chapter we use this alternation at falt to measure AM-
modulation of any potential carrier signals intrinsically generated (and emanated)
by the system.
As an example of how the alternation of activity can AM-modulate a carrier
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1 while(true){
2 // Execute the A activity
3 for(i=0;i<inst_a_count;i++){
4 ptr1=(ptr1&~mask1 )|(( ptr1+offset )& mask1);
5 // The A-instruction , e.g. a load from L2
6 value=*ptr1;
7 }
8 // Execute the B activity
9 for(i=0;i<inst_b_count;i++){
10 ptr2=(ptr2&~mask2 )|(( ptr2+offset )& mask2);




Figure 21: Pseudo-code to generate the A/B alternation activity.
signal, consider a DRAM memory clock signal as shown in Figure 22. Activity A
may involve many LLC misses, so it results in substantial DRAM activity. During
the A-activity half-period, the DRAM clock drives a lot of switching activity (current
flowing through wires), resulting in strong emanations at the DRAM clock frequency.
If activity B has little DRAM activity, less switching activity is driven by the DRAM
clock, generating weaker emanations at the DRAM clock frequency. Therefore the
amplitude of the emanations at the DRAM clock frequency will change with period
Talt (frequency falt), which means that emanations at the DRAM clock frequency will
be AM-modulated by the A/B periodic behavior whose frequency is falt.
The key difference between the code shown in Figure 21 and the SAVAT bench-
marks described in Chapter 3 is that while the instruction counts for the A and
B instructions were equal for SAVAT, for FASE we adjust the inst a count and
inst b count variables so that activity A and activity B are each done for half of the
alternation period (50% duty cycle). Thus the spectrum of each side-band around
the carrier’s frequency fc will also have strong odd-numbered harmonics of the al-
ternation frequency, i.e. the side-band signal will have spikes/peaks at fc ± 3falt,
fc ± 5falt, etc. in addition to fc ± falt. Also note that the alternation frequency falt
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Figure 22: The micro-benchmarks do each of activities A and activity B for half the
alternation period, resulting in a periodic component at the alternation frequency
falt.
separate spectra with sideband signals at different falt frequencies. These spectra can
be considered jointly in an effort to distinguish which carriers are modulated by a
particular activity.
Finally, we use loads from memory (LDM), loads from the L2 cache (LDL2),
and loads from the L1 cache (LDL1) as the activities A and B in the experiments
we report. We have performed additional experiments with other activities (various
arithmetic instructions) and have found that for the systems tested such activities
modulate the same carriers that on-chip cache accesses do, so we use cache accesses
as representatives of on-chip activity. Varying only the memory accesses in our code
also allows us to eliminate all other code in the alternation loop as a possible source

































Figure 23: A carrier at fc and its right and left side-bands generated by memory
activity.
differs in the values of the mask1 and mask2 parameters and the memory access
instruction itself is also identical in all three cases.
FASE results for different A/B pairings usually provide a strong indication of
which aspect of the system modulates a given carrier signal. For example, when a
signal at a particular frequency fc is modulated by A/B alternation between memory
activity and any on-chip activity, but remains unmodulated when alternating between
two types of on-chip activity, the carrier signal and/or its modulation mechanism are
likely related to the memory controller, processor-memory communication, or the
DRAM memory itself.
As indicated in Section 4.2, discovery of activity-modulated carriers by “eye-
balling” the spectrum without generating controlled system activity would be very
difficult. Theoretically, one could look for narrow spikes (potential carriers) with
symmetric side-bands on either side as shown in Figure 2, but this approach is not
practical due to the non-ideal nature of unintentional carriers, the interference of
other signals, and noise as shown in Figure 20.
Measuring arbitrary programs or benchmarks may provide some information about
carriers that are modulated by system activity but it would be difficult to determine
the spectral properties of such arbitrary system activity. Even if we are somehow given
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spectral information about activity in an application, it would be hard to recognize
whether the side-band signals around each potential carrier match that spectrum with
high confidence because 1) amplitude modulation combines (convolves) the spectrum
of the possibly non-ideal carrier signal with the arbitrary benchmark spectrum (Fig-
ure 4), and 2) recognition of such a complicated overall spectrum is further hampered
by noise and unrelated signals that overlap with portions of the modulated-signal
spectrum (Figure 20). We cannot directly control the shape of a system’s intrinsic
carrier signals, but we can use SAVAT to generate system activity that is as close to
a perfect square wave as possible. This results in side-band signals whose spectrum
has a shape that closely matches the shape of the carrier signal they are modulating,
with a falt separation between the carrier and its two side-bands in the spectrum.
This could be used to find carriers automatically by looking for such right and left
side-band signals because they always appear as peaks in the spectrum separated by
2falt with the carrier peak half-way between them. However, this simplistic approach
has a number of drawbacks. First, the alternation activity is a square wave which has
many odd-numbered harmonics (fc±falt, fc±3falt, etc.) that are separated by exactly
2falt. This makes it difficult to attribute the spikes in the side-band signals to partic-
ular carrier frequencies, creating many false positive indications of carrier locations.
Second, for some values of falt, some of the side-band signals may be overwhelmed
by noise and unrelated signals, which would result in many false negatives. Third,
computer systems contain many components with periodic activity, so unmodulated
signals are often concentrated at specific frequencies. Some such spectral peaks will
be nearly 2falt apart by random chance, resulting in more false positives.
Many of the problems caused by the harmonics of the alternation signal and by
the existence of unrelated signals can be solved by performing multiple measurements
with different alternation frequencies, e.g. falt1 , falt2 = falt1 + f∆, falt3 = falt1 + 2f∆,
etc., where f∆ is typically small compared to falt. Figure 24 illustrates an idealized
63
diagram of the faltN side-bands with five such alternation frequencies. Figure 23 shows
five real spectra spectra with falt1 = 43.3kHz and f∆ = 0.5kHz around a carrier signal
at fc = 1.0235MHz. To avoid clutter, Figure 23 only shows the three parts of the
spectrum that contain the left side-bands, the carrier, and the right side-bands of the
signals. In other words, it does not show about 40kHz worth of spectrum to the left
and right of the carrier. Note how the peaks in the side-bands move by f∆ as the
alternation frequency falt changes by f∆.
fc
fc − faltN fc + faltN
AM modulated at falt1
AM modulated at falt2
AM modulated at falt3
AM modulated at falt4
AM modulated at falt5
Figure 24: Ideal FASE spectral pattern illustrating an AM carrier at fc.
Conceptually, the FASE methodology for finding activity-modulated carriers and
determining the frequencies of such carriers is now as follows. First, perform several
measurements (we use five) with different falt frequencies as described above. Second,
look for a shape in the spectrum that moves by f∆ or −f∆ in successive measurements.
This approach eliminates external signals and system-emanated periodic signals that
do not correspond to activity-induced AM modulation because such signals stay at
the same frequency as falt changes. It also only detects the first harmonic of falt to
the right and left of the carrier. Recall that the alternation activity changes abruptly
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and may not have a perfect 50% duty cycle, so the spectrum of the modulated signal
has side-band signals not only at fc±falt but also at fc±2falt, fc±3falt, etc. However,
only the first harmonic (fc ± falt) moves by f∆ in the spectrum as we change falt by
f∆. The other harmonics in the side-band move by 2f∆, 3f∆, etc.
Once we have identified a first harmonic side-band signal in this way, we can
determine whether it is the left side-band (moves by −f∆) or the right one (moves by
f∆), and we can compute the frequency of its carrier signal. The carrier is located at
f − falti if the modulated peaks are detected at frequency f and if falt1 is to the left
of falt5 (or at f + falti if falt1 is to the right of falt5). Note that detection of a single
harmonic of falt in a single side-band is sufficient to detect a carrier frequency, i.e.
we do not need all of them to find the frequency of the carrier. Also, note that any
harmonic (e.g. ±2nd, ±3rd, etc.) is sufficient since the observed spacing between the
side-band peaks is unique for each harmonic (e.g. 2h∆ for the positive 2nd harmonic,
-3h∆ for the negative third harmonic, etc.). This comes in handy if one or more of the
signals overlap with other signals or unusually strong noise – with five measurements
we get a total of ten side-band signals (two side-bands per measurement) at different
frequencies, so we can reliably detect the presence of modulation and the frequency
of the carrier even if several of the side-band signals are obscured as shown in the
left side-band of Figure 27. Also note that this approach does not rely on actually
observing a peak for the carrier signal. This is important when the carrier itself is
located in a crowded part of the spectrum – as long as at least a few side-band signals
“land” in a “quiet” part of the spectrum, we can deduce the exact frequency of the
carrier.
There often are several modulated carrier signals in the same general region of the
spectrum, so that their side-band signals may not be neatly separated from each other.
A simplified representation of one actual recorded spectrum is shown in Figure 25.
The thick lines in this figure indicate carrier frequencies, each with a different color.
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Processor Core Regulator (1st Harmonic)
Processor Core Regulator (2nd Harmonic)
Processor Core Regulator (3rd Harmonic)
Processor Core Regulator (4th Harmonic)
Processor Core Regulator (5th Harmonic)
Figure 25: Simplified spectrum representation of the harmonics of the LDL2/LDL1
activity for the Intel Core i7 desktop.
The thin lines indicate the frequencies of side-band falt harmonic signals, where the
color indicates which carrier generates this side-band signal and the number indicates
which harmonic of falt it corresponds to. Without FASE the interleaved side-band
signals generated by different carriers make it very difficult to manually interpret such
measured spectra.
The antennae we used to capture signals from computer systems were designed
to detect broadcast radio signals over a wide frequency range, so they pick up these
interfering signals very well. It is critical to note that FASE is intended to identify
only AM signals which are modulated by our micro-benchmark. Although AM radio
signals are amplitude-modulated and strong, FASE correctly identifies that these
signals are not caused by our modulation activity and so should not be reported. This
is important not only because it is painfully expensive to shield a measurement setup
from broadcast signals, but also because computer systems themselves emit strong
radio signals (wifi, bluetooth, NFC, etc.) that are modulated for communication
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purposes but should not be reported by FASE unless they are also modulated by our
microbenchmark activity.
4.4 Experimental Setup
We evaluate the effectiveness of our FASE methodology by applying it to the laptop
and desktop systems in Table 3. Unless otherwise indicated, the EM emanations were
received with a magnetic loop antenna (AOR LA400) from a distance of 30 cm and
a spectrum analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A) was used to record the spectra of the
received signals. This setup was used because it allowed us to capture emanations
from the entire system across a wide range of frequencies with little manual effort. We
note, however, that attacks exploiting a particular set of carrier signals could likely
be carried out at larger distances using more directive antennae optimized for higher
gain across a narrower frequency band.
We performed three measurement campaigns, each across a different frequency
range and with different FASE parameters, as shown in Table 11. Parameters falt1
and f∆ were chosen to ensure sufficient separation between side-band and carrier, and
between the peaks generated at falt1 , falt2 , etc. Aside from this consideration, the
choice of falt1 and f∆ is arbitrary, with the caveat that while using only one choice of
falt1 and f∆ is almost always sufficient to detect all carriers, measuring with multiple
choices of falt1 and f∆ increases the confidence that all carriers have been detected.
For example, a carrier might be missed if FASE is only run with one choice of falt1 and
f∆ and a carrier is weak and strong signals happen to occur at the side-bands. We
found that five alternation frequencies (i.e. falt1 through falt1 + 4f∆) are sufficient to
detect almost any carrier even in the presence of unrelated signals from other system
activity, noise, and radio broadcasts. These experiments cover the entire AM radio
spectrum, and were performed without shielding in a major metropolitan area with
hundreds of radio stations nearby.
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Table 11: FASE measurement parameters.
Frequency Range(MHz) fres(Hz) falt1(kHz) f∆(kHz)
0 to 4 50 43.3 0.5
0 to 120 500 43.3 5.0
0 to 1200 500 1800 100
The fres parameter is the resolution of spectrum sampling. For example, our 0-
4MHz measurements used fres = 50Hz, so each recorded spectrum has 4MHz/50Hz =
80, 000 data points (frequencies). Each spectrum was measured 4 times over several
hours and averaged, and we used the heuristic function in Section 4.6 to detect the
1st, 2nd, 3rd, 4th and 5th positive and negative harmonics of the alternation activity.
We then visually inspected the heuristic function’s output to identify peaks (potential
carriers). [72] and [6] present algorithms detect peaks in the output of the heuristic
function, but we found that the heuristic function’s output had strong spikes for
carriers modulated by system activity, so the task of visually inspecting the output
to identify potential carriers was relatively straightforward and quick.
A variety of activities were used as activities A and B in the alternation loop
– integer multiplication, division, addition, subtraction, as well as load and store
to all levels of the cache hierarchy. The results we show focus on only three A/B
alternations. The first alternates between a load from main memory (LLC miss) and
a load from L1 cache (L1 hit), which we abbreviate as LDM/LDL1. This alternation
is useful in exposing modulated carriers related to memory activity. We tried other
A/B activity pairs that included main-memory accesses and on-chip activity, e.g.
LDM/ADD, LDM/DIV, etc. and also pairings that used STM (LLC write-back
activity) instead of LDM. We found that they have some variations in the exact
shape and strength of the side-band signals, but applying FASE to them exposes the
same carriers as LDM/LDL1.
The second A/B alternation whose results we show alternates between L2 hits
and L1 hits (LDL2/LDL1). This alternation is useful in exposing carriers related
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to variations in activity on the processor chip. We tried numerous other pairings of
on-chip activities, e.g. LDL1/ADD, LDL2/DIV, etc. and found that they expose the
same carriers through FASE, although they vary in the exact shape and strength of
the side-band signals.
Use of LDM, LDL2 and LDL1 is also methodologically convenient in that it uses
the exact same micro-benchmark code for all three activities. They differ only in
the mask values in Figure 21, which gives us excellent confidence that any observed
modulation is due to differences between LDM, LDL1, and LDL2 activity and not the
other activity (address computation, looping, etc.) in the alternation loop. Finally,
note that the microbenchmarks produce a nearly 100% load, so frequency scaling does
not affect our experiments much. However, the effect of frequency scaling wasn’t
of interest for these measurements and so we disabled dynamic frequency scaling
whenever possible.
4.5 Experimental Results
We discovered three main types of signals. First, strong signals emanate from switch-
ing voltage regulators and power filtering components at the specified switching fre-
quency of the regulator (usually between 200 kHz and 500 kHz) or multiples of it
(harmonics). These signals are modulated by variations in power consumption in the
voltage regulator’s load (the processor, memory or other system components), and
they allow attackers to carry out the equivalent of power side-channel attacks from
a distance without the need to place probes within the system. Voltage regulators
for processor cores, the memory controller, and the DRAM memory itself often have
different switching frequencies, giving the attacker component-by-component power
consumption information.
Another type of signal is generated by periodic memory refreshes. This signal
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is amplitude-modulated by memory access activity, i.e. the attacker gets an at-a-
distance readout of how often the memory is used. Unlike voltage regulators, which
can be considered an external problem by processor/memory architects, these refresh-
related signals are entirely caused by activity within the purview of memory controller
designers and are likely to be completely eliminated by appropriate modifications to
how memory refresh is carried out.
At higher frequencies, FASE discovers clock signals and their harmonics that are
modulated by activity in the clock’s domain. Because most clock and switching reg-
ulator harmonic frequencies are subject to electromagnetic interference (EMI) regu-
lations [36], they are subjected to measures (such as spread-spectrum clocking) that
spread the resulting EM emanations over a range of frequencies [46]. In spite of this,
FASE discovers such signals and provides insight into the nature of the activity that
modulates them. In particular, we identify that DRAM clocks generate EM emana-
tions which are modulated by DRAM activity. The systems tested generated weak
spread-spectrum signals at CPU clock frequencies. Interestingly, we do not observe
any variation in these signals in response to processor activity.
We begin with Figure 26, which shows the FASE results for a recent desktop
system with an Intel Core i7 processor, with the memory access modulation (LD-
M/LDL1) micro-benchmark. To emphasize the usefulness of FASE, we show a light
gray outline of the actual recorded spectrum for one of the alternation frequencies.
This spectrum is very noisy and crowded, especially in the long-wave (30-300 kHz)
and AM radio (540-1600 kHz) bands, but FASE correctly indicates which signals are
AM-modulated by the alternation activity. The thick vertical lines correspond to the
frequency and magnitude of the modulated carrier signals automatically identified by
FASE. Lines with the same color/pattern correspond to harmonics of the same fre-
quency. A set of harmonics is likely caused by a periodic yet non-sinusoidal behavior
within the system, and the magnitudes of the harmonics in a set give us important
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clues for identifying the source of that carrier signal. Therefore, after performing
FASE it is useful to group the identified carriers into sets such that all the carriers
within a set occur at frequencies which appear to be multiplies of one another.
The remainder of this section discusses how we used the information provided
by FASE such as carrier frequency, harmonics, modulation depth, and modulation
activity (e.g. on-chip activity or memory activity) to identify the sources of three
types of carrier signals. In the systems not shown, similar types of signals were
detected.























Figure 26: FASE results for the Intel Core i7 desktop and main-memory (LD-
M/LDL1) modulating activity.
4.5.1 Switching Voltage Regulators
The set of carriers indicated by red dashed lines in Figure 26 occurs at frequencies
315 kHz, 630 kHz, 945 kHz, etc., which are all multiples of 315 kHz. Because the even
harmonics of this carrier are relatively strong we can conclude that these carriers are
likely caused by some behavior that repeats at 315 kHz and has a small duty cycle. It
is also helpful to look at each harmonic’s shape in the spectrum. While this figure does
not provide enough detail to see each harmonic’s shape distinctly, the shape is very
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similar to that shown in Figure 27 (this figure corresponds to a different regulator in
the same system). The carrier’s energy is spread around its central frequency by what
looks like a Gaussian distribution. Clock signals for digital logic and I/O interfaces
(such as memory) are tightly controlled but clocks generated by RC oscillators create
carriers like the one in Figure 27.1
Switching regulators often use RC oscillators. In computer systems, switching
regulators convert the 12V to 24V PSU or battery voltage to 1V to 2V supplies used
by processors and memory. The duty cycle of the regulator’s switching signal is small
when the ratio between the input and output voltage is large, which is consistent
with the 315 kHz signal being related to a switching voltage regulator. We manually
localized the source of the signal using an EM probe to determine where the 315 kHz
EM signal was strongest in the system. We found that the signal was strongest near
the high power MOSFET switches and power inductors that supply power to the main
memory DIMMs. These switches were driven by a nearby switching voltage regulator
IC and its switching frequency was 315 kHz, confirming our initial hypothesis.
Once the source was found, the modulation mechanism was obvious: the regulator
maintains the voltage supplied to the CPU by varying the duty cycle of the control
signal of a switch between the 12V supply and the 1V output supply. For example,
when DIMMs draw more current, the voltage at the regulator’s output drops, so the
regulator compensates by increasing the duty cycle of the switch, i.e. by connect-
ing the 12V supply to its output for a longer fraction of the fixed 315 kHz period.
When running the LDM/LDL1 microbenchmark, the DRAM regulator’s duty cycle
is increased during the DRAM accesses (LDM) and decreased during L1 cache hit
activity (LDL1). Changing the duty cycle changes (modulates) the amplitude of all
the signal’s harmonics, so LDM/LDL1 activity modulates the emanated signal at the
1This variation (called jitter or phase noise) is well studied because it impacts reliable communi-
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Figure 27: A switching regulator related carrier at fc and its right and left side-bands
generated by on-chip activity.
harmonics of the regulator’s switching frequency.



















Figure 28: FASE results for Intel Core i7 desktop and L2 cache (LDL2/LDL1)
modulating activity.
Carrier signals indicated by black dash-dot lines in Figure 26 are also caused by
another voltage regulator. This regulator powers the on-chip memory interface (the
chip has separate power supplies for its cores and its memory interface). Figure 28
shows the spectrum for heavy on-chip alternation activity (LDL2/LDL1). Only one
type of carrier was found to be modulated in this case – the signal that corresponds
to the switching regulator for the CPU cores. Figure 27 shows one of the harmonics
of this signal in greater detail. We confirmed the origin of both memory interface and
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core regulator signals through the same near-field localization process. Interestingly,
the prominent Gaussian-like shapes of the core regulator’s signal are also visible in
Figure 26 but were not reported by FASE because they were not significantly mod-
ulated by the LDM/LDL1 alternation. This again illustrates that strong signals are
not necessarily modulated by the activity under observation.
In many recent processors, the core CPU voltage is adjusted dynamically, while
many on-chip cache and memory interface designs require fixed voltage supplies.
Therefore, some processors require separate voltage regulators for the CPU and cache.
As we have demonstrated, a regulator’s carrier is modulated by the activity in the cir-
cuit it powers, so an attacker can distinguish cache and CPU activity by demodulating
each regulator’s carrier separately. Also, when separate dynamic voltage scaling is
used for each CPU core, each core requires a separate regulator. When such regulator
switching frequencies are not identical, attackers might be able to remotely receive
a separate power consumption readout for each core, allowing attackers to remotely
perform a separate power analysis attack for each core.
Finally, we note that the emerging use of in-package/on-chip regulators for pro-
cessors affects regulator-related EM information leakage in new and interesting ways.
On-chip linear regulators [99] do not produce modulated emanations because they
have no switching frequencies to modulate. The integration of switching regulators
has a more complex impact. Each integrated regulator supplies a smaller part of the
chip, so the switching currents are lower and follow shorter paths, reducing emana-
tions. However, integrated switching regulators use higher switching frequencies (e.g.
140 MHz in [20]) resulting in stronger emanations. Higher switching frequencies also
allow faster reactions to changes in the output voltage providing attackers with a
higher bandwidth readout of power consumption.
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4.5.2 Memory Refresh
The modulated carrier shown in Figure 26 as solid blue lines has harmonics at fre-
quencies of 512 kHz, 1024 kHz, etc. This signal did not match any previously known
mechanisms that can cause EM emanations. It has a very stable frequency, indicating
it was likely generated by logic that is clocked with a crystal-oscillator derived clock.
Its harmonics are all of similar strength, indicating an extremely small (<5%) duty
cycle. Localization showed that this signal was strongest near the memory DIMMs.
Additional experiments showed that the carrier signal is strongest when there is no
memory activity and weakest when we generate continuous memory activity.
This is unusual – if this signal is caused by memory activity, we would expect it
to get stronger with more activity. Further measurements with small probes close
to the memory revealed many additional harmonics with a greatest common divisor
of 128 kHz, not 512 kHz. This was the key clue in solving the puzzle, because 128
kHz corresponds to a period of 7.8 µs, the maximum allowable average time between
refresh commands for recent DRAM standards such as DDR3.
While it would be difficult to conclusively prove that this signal is generated by
memory refresh activity, the evidence strongly suggests it is. The duty cycle of the
memory refresh activity is very low (< 3%) because each refresh command only lasts
approximately 200 ns and occurs every 7.8 µs. The refresh timing is derived from
the memory controller clock, which is crystal-derived. While DRAM standards spec-
ify that the average time between refresh commands must not exceed 7.8 µs, the
memory controller has some control over the timing of the refresh commands. For
example, the memory controller could postpone sending refresh commands during
a 40 µs period of intense memory activity, and then “catch up” when memory has
some idle time. This explains the strangest observation about this signal, which was
that it weakens (instead of getting stronger) as memory activity increases. When the
memory is inactive, the memory controller simply sends memory refresh commands
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Figure 29: DRAM clock spectrum with 0% (LDL1/LDL1) and 100% (LDM/LDM)
memory activity.
at regular intervals, resulting in the strongest signal at that interval’s frequency. As
memory activity increases, the memory accesses increasingly interfere with the timing
of the refresh commands, causing refreshes to be delayed and disrupting their period-
icity (thus spreading their emanated energy across a much larger frequency range and
causing the signals at 128 kHz, 256 kHz, etc. to weaken). Although the first harmonic
of this signal is weaker than regulator-related signals, note that memory refresh pro-
duces many modulated harmonics and that attackers can potentially correlate them
to dramatically improve their detection of this signal and its signal-to-noise ratio. It
is also worth noting that since refresh timing is dictated by a standard, refresh carrier
signals are present at roughly the same frequencies on all the systems we tested, which
could simplify the exploitation of this leakage. This potential problem likely has an
easy fix: randomizing the issue of memory refresh commands would be compatible
with existing DRAM standards and would greatly reduce the modulation of refresh
activity.
4.5.3 DRAM Memory Clock
Above 30 MHz, electromagnetic compatibility (EMC) standards limit the allowable
level of EM emanations from consumer devices such as computers. Many periodic
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signals such as high frequency processor and memory clocks are strong enough to vio-
late these limits, so alleviation techniques for these clock signals have been developed.
EMC requirements specify the maximum magnitude for emissions at any particular
frequency, and a popular technique (called spread spectrum clocking) varies the clock
frequency periodically, spreading the emitted energy across a range of frequencies
(instead of emanating it all at one frequency). For example, a 333 MHz memory
clock might be swept back and forth between 332 MHz and 333 MHz over a period of
100 µs, producing a spectrum similar to Figure 29. While such techniques facilitate
compliance, the signals are only weaker in an averaged sense: attackers can still track
the carrier and use the full power of the signal after demodulation. Such “carrier
tracking” techniques have already been developed in telecommunications to allow re-
ception of radio signals transmitted using this technique [28]. Therefore, predictable
spread-spectrum clocking does not mitigate information leakage, but it does create
interesting problems for discovering such modulated carriers through manual analysis
of the spectrum. The shape of the carrier and its side-bands is less recognizable,
and the carrier and its side-band signals are likely to overlap significantly when using
modulation activity that is not carefully chosen.
To allow FASE to successfully detect modulated spread-spectrum clocks, it is























Figure 30: DRAM clock spectrum with 50% (LDM/LDL1) memory activity.
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best to set falt large enough to move the side-band signals outside of the carrier’s own
spectrum. Figure 30 shows the effect of modulating the clock signal at several such
alternation frequencies.
4.5.4 Testing the Laptop Systems
We tested three laptop systems: one based on an Intel Core 2 Duo processor from
2010, one based on AMD Turion X2 from 2007, and one based on Intel Pentium 3M
from 2002. In all three systems, FASE finds the same types of carriers we already
reported: regulator-related signals, signals caused by memory refresh, and DRAM
clock signals. For example, Figure 31 shows the modulated carrier signals found for
the AMD Turion X2 system with LDM/LDL1 alternation of activity. Interestingly,
the memory refresh carrier for the AMD Turion X2 laptop is at 132 kHz instead of 128
kHz as observed in all three other systems. We also confirmed a memory regulator
carrier and while the two signals shown as “unidentified” appear to be caused by
regulators, we did not confirm their sources because the laptop is very compact and
taking it apart to perform localization may damage the system.





















Figure 31: FASE results for the AMD Turion X2 laptop and main-memory (LD-
M/LDL1) modulating activity.
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The AMD system was the only system confirmed to have an activity-modulated
carrier that is not reported by FASE. This carrier was emanated by the voltage regula-
tor circuitry for the processor cores, and was frequency-modulated (we confirmed this
with a spectrogram of the modulation). Therefore FASE correctly does not report
it. This particular regulator keeps the input-to-output switch turned on for a fixed
amount of time during its switching cycle, but changes the duration of the switching
cycle (i.e. its switching frequency) to increase/decrease its duty cycle. In principle,
signals that are frequency-modulated by system activity should be possible to identify
by a FASE-like approach based on spectral properties of FM-modulated signals.
4.6 Automating FASE
In Section 4.3, we explained that carriers are found by searching for a shape that
shifts by f∆ when falt changes by f∆. However, visual comparison of numerous
recorded spectra across a wide range of frequencies would be tedious and error prone.
Equations 3 and 4 a simplified and easily-implementable heuristic for finding side-
bands whose shifts in frequency correspond to shifts in falt. For a given harmonic
h of falt, the function Fh(f) is intended to have a large value for a frequency that





where Fi,h(f) is a sub-score for the i-th recorded spectrum (i-th falt). This subscore
is computed as
Fi,h(f) =




j 6=i SPj(f + h · faltj)
. (4)
This function first appropriately shifts SPi(f), the spectrum captured with the mi-
crobenchmark active at alternation frequency falti , so a side-band signal at fc+h ·falti
gives a peak in Fi,h at the carrier frequency f = fc, i.e. we score the side-band signals,
but the sub-score is “reported” at fc.
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The value of the sub-score is computed by normalizing the strength of the side-
band signal in this spectrum by the average of the other N−1 faltj spectra. For side-
band signals that do shift in frequency as falt changes, the sub-score for a particular i
will be larger than 1 because the side-band signal is stronger at the fc+falt frequency
in this spectrum. At the exact same frequency in at least some of the other spectra,
however, the signal will not be as strong because these spectra have peaks at faltj and
so their side-band signal is at a different frequency. In contrast, a strong signal that
does not shift in frequency as falt changes will stay at the same frequency in the other
spectra, so the normalization will produce a score close to 1. The overall score Fh(f)
multiplies the sub-scores, so the overall score is close to 1 if no falt-induced frequency
shifting occurs. If each i-th spectrum has side-band signals at falti , the frequency-
shifted sub-scores will align producing a very large value for the carrier frequency.
Finally, if only some side-band signals are present (one or a few may be “buried”
by some unrelated signal), the overall score will be weakened because each obscured
falti side-band will have a sub-score close to 1, but the remaining sub-scores will still
increase the overall score significantly above 1. Overall, this heuristic produces large
peaks at frequencies of modulated carriers and is almost completely flat at all other
frequencies. Figure 32 shows the heuristic function’s output for the carriers shown
in Figures 23 and 27. Figure 33 shows the heuristic function for the DRAM clock
signal shown in Figure 30. FASE clearly does detect such modulated signals though it
reports the clock as two separate carriers at the edges of the spread out clock signal.
The heuristic function provides a good indicator of the frequencies at which mod-
ulated carriers are likely to occur. The next step in automating FASE is to find the
peaks in the Hh(f) output. To do this, we sort the peaks by their prominence and
keep only those with prominence greater than 1.5dB. Except for the highest peak in a
spectrum, every peak sits within a valley bounded on the left and right by two higher
peaks. We calculate the prominence of a peak as the magnitude of the peak in the
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Figure 32: Output of the heuristic for the 1st and -1st harmonics of falt for two
carriers.
valley minus the magnitude at the lowest point in these valley. Ideally, finding the
peaks in the heuristic function would be sufficient to find all the modulated carriers.
However, for realistic spectra not all peaks are caused by unintentional modulation.
For example, a transient signal occurring in one of the 5 recorded spectra can cause
variation in Hh(f) which might be mistaken for a modulated carrier (i.e. a false
positive). In such cases, the output of the heuristic alone is not sufficient to reliably
report AM carriers, and some additional processing is needed.
Also, recall that we need to search for the spectral patterns created by FASE
for 10 different harmonics (h = −5, ... − 1, 1, ..., 5). Furthermore, the negative and
positive harmonics are “flipped.” In other words, each peak in Hh(f) is caused
by a set of N peaks in the spectra spaced evenly by hf∆ as shown in Figure 34.
This spectral pattern occupies a smaller or larger frequency range depending on its
respective harmonic. Also, the positive harmonics (right sideband) have the falt1 peak
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Figure 33: Output of the heuristic function for an SSC DRAM clock signal.






















Figure 34: Easy to detect spectral pattern at fc + falti caused by an AM carrier at
fc=1.6MHz on the Samsung Galaxy S5 smartphone.
on the left and the faltN peak on the right, but the order of the peaks is reversed for
the negative harmonics (left sideband). To simplify processing, when we find a peak
in the heuristic function, we create a “normalized frame.” This normalized frame flips
the signals for the negative harmonics so that the order of the peaks is the same as for
the positive harmonics, and also scales the x-axis so that we have the same number
of frequency points regardless of the detected harmonic h. After this normalization,
each frame can be processed the same regardless of its harmonic. To filter out false
positives, we extract relevant features from each frame and use a neural network to
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reduce the number of reported false positives. The extracted features and neural
network are described in [98].
We evaluated the effectiveness of this automated procedure by testing it on spectra
from the desktop, laptops, and smartphone systems in Table 12. The desktop and
laptop measurements used a magnetic loop antenna (AOR LA400) at a distance of
30 cm as shown in on the left of Figure 4.4. The generally weaker smartphone EM
emanations were recorded using a small loop probe with 20 turns and a 4 mm radius
shown on the right of Figure 35. The smartphone probe was placed directly above the
screen over the area where the induced baseband signal had the largest magnitude.
The smartphone spectra were measured from 0 to 10 MHz and the computer spectra
were measured from 0 to 4 MHz. We used falt1 = 43.3 kHz and f∆ = 500 Hz with five
alternation frequencies (i.e. falt1 through falt1 + 4f∆) and the LDM/LDL1 (DRAM
memory) and LDL2/LDL1 (processor) activities. The benchmarks were run on the
laptop and desktop systems as single-threaded Windows 7 32-bit user mode console
applications, and were run on the smartphones as normal Android applications. When
possible all unrelated programs and activities were disabled, CPU frequency scaling
was disabled, and screens were turned off. The spectra were recorded using a spectrum
analyzer (Agilent MXA N9020A).
Table 12: Devices for the automated FASE measurements.
Type Device Processor Carriers Found
Desktop Dell Intel i7 20
Laptop HP AMD Turion X2 7
Laptop Lenovo Intel Core 2 Duo 6
Phone Samsung Galaxy S5 Snapdragon 801 7
Phone LG P705 Snapdragon S1 6
Phone Motorola Moto G Snapdragon 400 2
We tested the six devices in Table 12, with two measurements per device (one
for LDM/LDL1 and one for LDL2/LDL1). To test the accuracy of the algorithm we
began by visually inspecting all the spectra and manually listing any detected signals.
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Figure 35: Setup for the automated FASE measurements.
Determining whether a falti spectral pattern for a given AM carrier is detectable is
subjective due to the noisy and crowded nature of the spectrum. For our testing, we
included only those spectral patterns where at least 3 of the 5 falti peaks were visible.
By this criteria, we found 149 spectral patterns in total by visual inspection. Nine of
these patterns did not create peaks above the heuristic function’s detection threshold.
The heuristic functions Hh(f) had 360 peaks above the prominence threshold (i.e.
360 indications of possible modulation). Frames were created for these 360 cases and
tested using the neural network. The neural network predicted whether the frames
corresponded to actual unintentional modulation with 91% accuracy.




















Figure 36: Distribution of the neural network scores.
Figure 36 shows distributions of the neural network’s score for the tested frames.
In this figure, the blue distribution contains the 140 frames which occurred at fre-
quencies where generated spectral patterns were caused by modulated carriers (i.e.
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actual positives), and the red distribution indicates the 220 frames that occurred at
frequencies where no modulation was found via visual inspection (i.e. actual nega-
tives). The dotted black line indicates the neural network threshold used. The neural
network predicted all the frames to the right of this line as positive, meaning that the
actual positives to the right of this line are true positives and the actual negatives to
the right of this line are false positives. Similarly, false negatives and true negatives
occur to the left of this line.
Many of the true positive frames resemble the example shown in Figure 34 and
were easily classified as positives. Similarly, many of the true negatives were caused by
random variations in the spectra and were easily classified as negatives. However, the
remaining 9% of the frames were incorrectly predicted. In some such frames, several
of the falti peaks were obscured or misshapen. For example, the frame shown in
Figure 37 was correctly predicted, but had a score near the neural network threshold.
As the spectral pattern’s peaks became further obscured and as the shapes of the
peaks became less regular, the frames were more likely to be incorrectly predicted
(i.e. false negatives). Similarly, false positives occurred where random variations
in the spectra create patterns that resemble the spectral patterns generated by AM
modulation.
The unintentional AM carriers found for the desktops and laptops were caused by
voltage regulators, memory clocks, and memory refresh commands. For the smart-
phones, several carriers were found to be caused by voltage regulators. The remainder
of the carriers found on the smartphones could be traced to particular IC packages or
modules and were determined to be modulated only by memory activities. However,
smartphones integrate many system components into System on Chip (SoC) modules
and often use Package on Package (PoP) technology to integrate both the processor
and memory into the same package and little information is publicly available describ-
ing these components. More information would be needed to definitively determine
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Figure 37: Difficult to detect frame at fc − falti for an AM carrier at fc=511kHz on
the Lenovo laptop.
the circuits and mechanisms modulating these carriers.
4.7 Summary
Efficient targeted mitigation of side-channel vulnerabilities requires finding information-
leaking signals and determining how information is embedded into these signals. In
this chapter we described FASE, a novel methodology for automatically finding which
EM-emanated signals from a computer system are amplitude-modulated by specific
program activities. FASE uses the SAVAT microbenchmarks to generate detectable
spectral patterns in the side-bands of all the carrier signals that are AM-modulated
by specific system activities, automatically processes measured spectra to identify
these patterns, and calculates the frequencies of the modulated carriers.
This approach has several advantages. First, it directly identifies the carrier fre-
quencies modulated by specific system activities, which goes a long way toward de-
termining the sources of compromising emanations. Second, it is robust against the
interference of unmodulated signals and noise inside and outside of the system, such
as AM-modulated signals and carrier-like signals which are not specifically modulated
86
by system activity. Third, it quantifies how strongly carrier signals are modulated,
which is useful for identifying how the carrier is generated, for quantifying informa-
tion leakage, and for evaluating the effectiveness of mitigation efforts. Fourth, it is
specifically designed to robustly detect unintentionally modulated signals, which have
several inconvenient features not found in ideal AM signals. Finally, each FASE eval-
uation requires only a few spectrum measurements while other techniques such as
DPA require thousands of spectrum captures with different keys and plaintexts [89].
To demonstrate FASE’s effectiveness, we applied it to several computer systems
and found activity-modulated signals generated by voltage regulators, memory re-
fresh activity, and DRAM clocks. Our results indicate that separate signals may
carry different information about system activity, potentially enhancing an attacker’s
capability to extract sensitive information. We also confirm that our methodology
correctly separates emanated signals that are affected by specific processor and/or
memory activity from those that are not.
We also presented an algorithm for automatically measuring FASE. We demon-
strated the algorithm’s performance on several different types of processors and sys-
tems (desktops, laptops, and smartphones) and compared the results to an exhaustive
manual search. We also verify that all signals identified by the algorithm can be traced
to plausible unintentional modulation mechanisms to illustrate that these signals can
potentially cause information leakage.
FASE can be used to find which parts of a system leak information about some
aspect of program activity. Once the source of the leak is found, the strength of
modulated signals can be reduced and the modulation can be weakened, i.e. we
can disrupt the connection between program behavior and the variations in activity
that modulate such signals. Using memory refresh signals as an example, this would
involve randomization of the interval between refresh commands, while modulation-
weakening efforts might involve careful scheduling of memory accesses to avoid their
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interaction with refresh activity.
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CHAPTER V
ZOP: ZERO-OVERHEAD PROFILING VIA EM
EMANATIONS
5.1 Overview
Program profiling is a type of dynamic analysis that measures some aspects of soft-
ware behavior. One of the most common instances of program profiling counts the
execution of instructions or sequences of instructions and uses that information to
identify heavily executed paths (also called hot paths). Knowledge of the hot paths
can guide other tasks such as code optimization and performance analysis. Profiling
is typically implemented by adding software probes (instrumentation) to a program’s
source code or binary executable and these probes either log events of interest or
update statistics about such events at runtime.
This approach is effective in many usage scenarios, but there are a few exceptions.
Adding instrumentation unavoidably adds runtime and resource overheads. Runtime
overheads can alter the timing of events, and so in real-time systems or cyber-physical
systems these timing changes can affect the path taken through the profiled program.
In fact, if overheads are high enough, these systems may fail (e.g. miss real-time dead-
lines) if they are profiled under “in the field” conditions. Profiling is also challenging
in already deployed software [59], where a deployed system that suffers performance
problems would ideally be profiled in situ to ensure that the profiling results capture
the actual program behavior in that deployment. Although hardware features can
reduce the software overhead required for detailed profiling, they can rarely elimi-
nate it completely. Moreover, these solutions are costly in terms of chip/PCB space
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and development time, and feature support varies between devices. Profiling embed-
ded controllers presents additional challenges, as these devices often lack sufficient
memory space to store the extra code (instrumentation) and profiling-related data
structures. They also sometimes lack the I/O interfaces to report the profiling results
back to the programmer.
An ideal profiling solution would be one that gathers (1) perfectly accurate infor-
mation about what is actually executed during profiling (2) without changing any-
thing about the profiled system: no code instrumentation, no data structures for
profiling information, no additional I/O activity, and no changes to the hardware of
the system. While instrumentation can provide perfectly accurate profiling informa-
tion, it is an inherently intrusive technique that—even when minimal and designed
so as not to affect the semantics of the instrumented code—changes some important
aspects of the code’s dynamic behavior.
These properties make program profiling an attractive target application for soft-
ware analysis via EM emanations. This chapter proposes ZOP (Zero-Overhead Pro-
filing), a technique that retains the second aspect of ideal profiling (no changes to
the profiled code or system) at the cost of less-than-perfect accuracy. ZOP com-
putes profiling information in a highly accurate and completely non-intrusive way by
leveraging electromagnetic (EM) emanations generated by a system as the system ex-
ecutes code. Because ZOP generates profiling information without interacting with
or modifying the profiled system, it offers the potential to profile a variety of software
systems for which profiling was previously not possible. In addition, the ability to
collect profiles by simply placing a profiling device next to the system to be profiled
can provide advantages over traditional instrumentation-based approaches in many
traditional contexts as well.
ZOP first measures the EM emanations produced by the system to be profiled as
the system processes inputs whose execution path is known (training phase). This
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allows ZOP to build a model of the waveforms produced by different code fragments.
ZOP then collects emanations from a new, unknown execution and infers which
parts of the code are being executed at which times (profiling phase). This inference
is accomplished by matching the observed unknown emanations to emanations from
the training phase that are known to be generated by particular code fragments.
This chapter presents:
• ZOP, a completely non-invasive profiling approach, where profile information
is inferred from EM emanations of the (unmodified) system as it runs the (un-
modified) to-be-profiled software.
• A proof-of-concept implementation of ZOP that shows that our approach is
practically feasible.
• Experimental results that (1) show that ZOP can achieve high profiling accu-
racy and (2) provide insight into the performance of ZOP that suggest direc-
tions for further research.
In the rest of the chapter, Section 5.2 describes at a high level how program exe-
cution can be related to EM emanations, Section 5.3 describes how ZOP generates a
training model and uses EM emanations along with this training model to generate
profiling data for new program executions, and Section 5.4 describes an implementa-
tion and experimental evaluation of ZOP.
5.2 Relating Time Domain EM Emanations to Program
Behavior
As demonstrated by the work done for SAVAT and FASE, computing devices generate
electromagnetic (EM) emanations when they operate. While previous research has
demonstrated that useful information about a system’s behavior may be embedded in
these emanations (e.g. [4, 24, 41]), it also suggested that such information extraction
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on devices with highly optimized microarchitecture can be difficult in practice. Nearly
all existing techniques for extracting information from EM emanations are used for
side channel analysis in cryptography, and are thus focused on extracting information
about a specific value used by the program, such as a cryptographic key. Furthermore,
these techniques operate in an adversarial context; that is, they must overcome pro-
gram and hardware features (countermeasures) that are specifically designed to mask
or obfuscate the impact that the desired data values have on EM emanations.
Profilers have a few advantages over side-channel attackers. First, the profiled
system is cooperative, so there are no countermeasures in place, and the profiler may
position probes wherever needed to get the best EM signal. Also, program profilers
record statistics about when and how often parts of a program execute and are not
primarily focused on data values. Sequences of instructions and control flow decisions
affect EM emanations more strongly than changes in data values, potentially making
profiling information easier to extract than data values.
While the details of how computing devices generate EM emanations are com-
plex, a brief example describing the EM emanations produced by a processor’s clock
may provide some helpful insight into the connection between EM emanations and
program behavior. At each cycle of a processor clock, the processor state is updated,
generating a current at the clock’s frequency. Conceptually, the amplitude of this
current depends on how much of the processor state changes at each cycle; that is,
the current depends on which instructions are active or have been recently executed.
As a program executes, the processor executes different instructions based on control
flow decisions, and this variation in instruction execution modulates the amplitude
of the processor clock current. EM emanations from the processor can be directly
related to the current drawn by the processor. These phenomena together create a
direct link between the processor clock EM emanations and program behavior. ZOP
uses this link to determine which code executes and how frequently.
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If a program executes several times with the same inputs, the waveforms of the
EM emanations recorded during program execution may vary significantly between
program runs. EM noise from other devices, radio broadcasts, or communication
signals can cause these run-to-run variations. However by demodulating the signal
at the frequency of the processor clock, one can filter out any noise outside of the
narrow band of the RF spectrum around that clock frequency. Furthermore, spe-
cially designed EM probes and signal processing can be used to filter out noise with
properties distinguishable from our signal of interest (e.g. eliminate noise and signals
not generated by the processor). In addition to external noise, system activity un-
related to the program and the accumulation of small timing differences caused by
the complexity of the system (e.g. cache and memory behavior) can also create run-
to-run variations between repeated executions with the same inputs. However, these
variations are usually smaller than the waveform differences created by execution of
different paths through the program. Therefore, by observing a sufficient number of
dynamic instances of the same static path, it is possible to later recognize this path by
matching it against one of its dynamic instances. For example, if a short path has two
dynamic instances, one with a cache miss and one with a cache hit, it is possible to
recognize this path as long as there are examples of both possible dynamic instances.
We will explain in Section 5.3.3 how the ability to recognize short paths can be used
to predict complete paths through a program.
Figure 38 shows several waveforms recorded during a short fragment of program
execution. All of these waveforms start at the same static location in the program,
and each follows one of two paths depending on whether the true or the false path of
a conditional statement is followed. In particular, the dashed waveforms correspond
to execution along the true (conditional branch instruction is “taken”) path, whereas
the two dotted waveforms correspond to execution along the false path (branch

























Figure 38: Examples of waveforms collected by measuring EM emanations produced
by several executions.
the branch is taken for these cases. It is clear from Figure 38 that while there are
some differences between these “training” waveforms that correspond to the same
path, these differences are smaller than those between the true and false paths. To
determine which path was taken in the “unknown” (solid) waveform without doing
any dynamic analysis, we calculate the correlation coefficient between that unknown
waveform and each of the candidate recorded waveforms. By observing correlation
coefficients, we are able to determine with high confidence that the branch was taken
in the unknown execution, as the branch-taken examples correlate much better with
it than the branch-not-taken examples.
5.3 The ZOP Approach
In this section, we (1) introduce the ZOP approach, (2) describe how we can create
a model that encodes training waveform features and (3) use this model to predict
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the path taken during an unknown execution using only the waveform produced by
this execution without using any runtime instrumentation.
The goal of ZOP is to compute code profiling information without any instru-
mentation. Figure 39 shows a high-level overview of our approach. As the figure
shows, ZOP has two main phases. In the training phase, ZOP runs instrumented
and uninstrumented versions of the program against a set of training inputs, records
EM emanations for these executions, and builds a model that associates the recorded
waveforms with the code subpaths that generated them. In the profiling phase, ZOP
records the EM waveform generated by an execution of a vanilla (i.e. completely unin-
strumented) version of the program, finds the closest match between sections of this
waveform and the waveforms in the training model, and uses the matching subpaths
to predict the overall path taken by the execution being profiled. ZOP implements
these two high-level phases in the steps and substeps shown in the workflow portrayed
in Figure 40. In the next sections, we explain the different steps and substeps in this
workflow in detail.
5.3.1 Training 1
The left part of Figure 40 shows the Training 1 phase of the ZOP approach. During
Training 1, ZOP runs an instrumented version of the system against a set of training
inputs. This step is needed to reconstruct a graph model of the program’s states, to
determine the timing of each subpath, and to establish the correspondence between
subpaths and the EM waveforms they generate. We refer to the instrumentation
points as “markers” since they are used to “mark” the time of each executed instru-
mentation point in the EM waveform. In order to ensure optimal placement of these
markers for generating accurate profiling information, the level of granularity of the
inserted instrumentation points (markers) is critical.




























































































































Figure 39: High-level view of our approach.
path to example waveforms for known execution paths is not a simple task. Matching
complete program executions is clearly not an option, as it would require observing
all possible executions to build a model. An ideal model would, in fact, be one that
learns the waveform for each processor instruction independently, as this would make
path recognition easiest. Some recent research matches waveforms on an instruction
by instruction basis [67,88] for non-profiling applications, but this technique has only
been applied to the simplest of processors and has not yet been successfully applied
to path profiling.
Based on our experience and preliminary investigation, we contend that longer
subpaths must be considered for this matching to be successful in more complex pro-
cessors, where superscalar out-of-order microarchitecture and variable latency mem-
ory interfaces make instruction by instruction recognition impractical. Therefore, in
our approach, we consider acyclic paths, as defined by Ball and Larus [11], as the
basic profiling unit. (Intuitively, acyclic paths are subpaths within a procedure such
that every complete path in the procedure can be expressed as a sequence of acyclic
paths.) In other words, ZOP learns the waveforms generated by the execution of
acyclic paths exercised by the training inputs and then tries to recognize these paths
based on their waveforms during profiling. The acyclic paths provide a level of the












































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 40: Workflow of ZOP. (Note that we repeat some elements to reduce clut-
ter, improve clarity, and better separate the different steps of the approach; that is,
multiple elements with the same namerepresent the same entity.)
that a reasonable number of training examples can represent all the possible marker
to marker waveform behaviors and (2) keeps the training instrumentation overhead
low enough that the instrumentation itself does not drastically affect the execution
waveforms.
The Instrumenter module starts by computing the acyclic paths in the code [11].
For every identified path in the source code, it adds markers in the source code to
identify such paths. (Typically, the markers are placed at the beginning and end of
each path.) The instrumentation locations are similar in spirit to those of lightweight
program tracing approaches, such as [69].
The example code shown in Figure 41 consists of a C function called putsub,
which is a slightly simplified version of a function present in one of the programs we
used in our evaluation (see Section 5.4). Marker positions for this example function
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are shown in Figure 42. Each time a marker() is encountered, the marker ID (e.g.
A,B,C, etc.) and the time elapsed since the start of the program are recorded in an
array. To illustrate with an example, consider an execution of putsub() that takes
the path ABDEF. The recorded values would show the time when A was encountered,
followed by the time when B was encountered, and so on. For each training input,
ZOP runs the instrumented code and records the EM waveform. It then “marks” the
EM waveform with the current program location each time a marker is encountered.
With this information ZOP could find, for instance, all the start and end times for
the instances of the AB subpath in the training executions and extract the portions
of the EM waveforms for these times. It is important to stress that instrumentation is
only used during the Training 1 phase, and the program profiled during the Profiling
phase is unmodified and uninstrumented. It is also worth noting that, while the
location of the instrumentation points for putsub() results in a unique basic block
subpath between each pair of instrumentation points, this is not a requirement for
our approach.
1 void putsub(char* lin , int s1 , int s2 , char* sub) {
2 int i = 0;
3 while (sub[i] != ENDSTR) {
4 if (sub[i] == DITTO) {
5 int j = s1;
6 while (j < s2)
7 fputc(lin[j++], stdout );
8 } else




Figure 41: Uninstrumented putsub() function.
The Markers Graph models the possible paths between marker code locations.
As an example, Figure 43 shows a graph derived from the putsub() function in
Figure 42. The graph’s nodes are the markers for putsub(), and a directed edge
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1 void putsub(char* lin , int s1 , int s2 , char* sub) {
2 int i = 0;
3 marker(A);
4 while (sub[i] != ENDSTR) {
5 marker(B);
6 if (sub[i] == DITTO) {
7 int j = s1;
8 while (j < s2) {
9 marker(C);
10 fputc(lin[j++], stdout );
11 }
12 } else {
13 marker(D);







Figure 42: Instrumented putsub() function.
occurs from marker X to marker Y if the program can reach Y from X without
reaching another marker in between. While this graph shows a single edge between
X and Y, there may be thousands of training examples for each such two marker
subpath. Therefore, to predict the whole execution path, we need to not only predict
the next marker but also the time the execution took to get from X to Y.
The Waveforms and Timing block of Training 1 contains the recorded wave-
form examples for subpaths in the program for which the correspondence between
an execution’s waveform and the code path taken is known. These waveforms, how-
ever, are affected by the computations done by the instrumentation, so they will not
directly match uninstrumented code during profiling. ZOP’s next step is thus to
collect waveforms for the same training inputs, this time without instrumentation,
and identify the times in these instrumentation-free waveforms that correspond to








Figure 43: Marker graph for the putsub() example.
5.3.2 Training 2
The middle part of Figure 40 shows the Training 2 phase of the ZOP approach.
In this phase we run an uninstrumented version of the code with the same set of
inputs used in Training 1, collect the waveforms for these executions, and perform
matching to determine the points in these new waveforms that correspond to marker
positions in the corresponding waveforms from Training 1. This results in waveforms
generated by uninstrumented execution, but in which we do not know which part
of the waveform corresponds to which marker-to-marker part of the program code.
These waveforms must be compared to those observed during profiling to infer which
part of the code is executing at each point in the profiling run. To do this, we
must infer the timing of the uninstrumented code, i.e. we must determine which
part of the instrumentation-free (Training 2) signal corresponds to which part of the
instrumentation-marked (Training 1) signal and thus, transitively, to determine which
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portions of the waveforms collected during profiling correspond to which subpaths in
the instrumentation-free program code.
This two-phase training approach has the key property that, while the device/en-
vironment used for Training 2 must be similar to that used for Profiling, the de-
vice/environment used for Training 1 can differ from that used for Training 2 and
Profiling. For example, ZOP could perform Training 1 on a development board with
more resources and flexibility, to facilitate the required instrumentation, and then
perform Training 2 and Profiling on a production system that does not have the re-
sources or flexibility to handle instrumentation (since neither of these phases requires
instrumentation). Training 2 could then be done on a production system by software
developers, whereas Profiling could be done directly on a deployed system, while real
users interact with it.
5.3.2.1 Inferring Timing for the Uninstrumented Code Using Time Warping
The key to identifying which uninstrumented (Training 2) waveform corresponds to
which part of the code is that, for each training input, we have executed the code
twice, once with the instrumented program and once with the uninstrumented pro-
gram. This means that the path through the code is the same for both executions, and
that the EM signals for the two executions will tend to be similar at points that corre-
spond to execution between markers, but one of the signals (the one from Training 1)
has additional (marker instrumentation) activity inserted, along with some distortion
of the signal at the transitions between instrumentation and “real” program activity.
An example matching between instrumented and uninstrumented execution wave-
forms for the same training inputs is shown in Figure 44. The longer red waveform
(at the top of the figure) corresponds to an execution of the instrumented code, and
the vertical solid black lines show the (known) timing of the markers as recorded by
instrumentation. The shorter waveform (at the bottom of the figure) corresponds to
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an uninstrumented execution, where timing of the markers is not known because the
code is not instrumented. Note that the instrumented and uninstrumented waveforms
share many of the same features, but there are also significant differences (see, for in-
stance, the DE and BC paths). These differences are often larger than the differences
between two unique dynamic instances of the same subpath, so profiling accuracy
would be poor if ZOP simply used (instrumented) waveforms from Training 1 to
match to signals collected during (uninstrumented) profiling.
To systematically determine which part of the Training 1 signal corresponds to
which part of the Training 2 signal for the same input, a technique such as dynamic
time warping [84] can be used. In general, time warping between two signals can
cut out parts of the top signal (shifting later samples of this signal to fill the gap
made by the cut-out) in such a way that the remaining samples of the top signal are
as similar as possible to the bottom signal. After time warping, ZOP knows which
points in the instrumentation-free waveform correspond to the marker points in the
instrumented-run waveform, as shown by the dotted lines in Figure 44.
5.3.3 Profiling
The right column of Figure 40 shows the Profiling phase of ZOP. In the Profiling
phase, we run the uninstrumented program with the to-be-profiled inputs, record the
EM waveforms produced, and compare these waveforms to the waveforms collected
(and annotated with marker information) in Training 2.
5.3.3.1 Path Predictor
The Training 1 and 2 phases of ZOP yield waveforms and marker timing information
for the set of training inputs used in the uninstrumented program as well as the
markers graph. When a particular short subpath occurs during the profiling program
execution, the resulting waveform will be similar to a training waveform of that same
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Figure 44: Estimating path timing in uninstrumented training executions using wave-
form time warping.
function, we run the uninstrumented version of putsub() with a to-be-profiled input
and record the waveform shown at the bottom of Figure 45.
To illustrate how our Path Predictor works, here is one example. For the profiling
waveform shown in Figure 45, we start with no information about the path taken.
According to the markers graph, the profiling execution must start with marker A
at the beginning of the waveform. The next marker encountered can be either B or
F according to the marker graph. We use the Pearson correlation coefficient [101]
to compare the profiling waveform with the three training waveforms in Figure 45.
All three training waveforms start with an AB subpath which very closely matches
the start of the profiling waveform. Although it is not shown, assume that we have
another training example with the AF path and this AF waveform does not match
the profiling waveform. Then we can infer that the profiling execution starts with
the AB path and that B occurs at the same time in the execution as it does in the
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Figure 45: Predicting an execution path through putsub() by matching training
waveform segments to an execution waveform.
training executions. There are two possible next subpaths from B, either BD or BC.
Examining all the training waveform sections for BD and BC, it is clear that the
profiling waveform matches the BD section in the top training waveform more closely
than it does the BC section in the third training waveform. Therefore we can infer
that the profiling execution takes the BD path. From D the only possible next marker
is E, so we find the most closely matching DE waveform and update our predicted
path to ABDE. From E the code encounters either F or B next. Comparing the EF
and EB waveforms, it is clear the profiling execution has taken the EB path next.
We repeat this waveform matching and path updating process until we reach the exit
marker F. This process predicts the ABDEBCEF path.
Figure 45 and its description captures the essence of the training and path pre-
diction algorithm but some refinements are needed to achieve adequate performance.
Consider what happens when an incorrect prediction is made. For example, assume
we incorrectly selected ABCE at the start of the profiling waveform instead of the
correct path ABDE. In such a case not only is the subpath through C wrongly pre-
dicted but in addition even though we have predicted D correctly as the next marker,
the time of the D marker is too early. When we match the training subpaths starting
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at D assuming this incorrect time for D, the training waveforms may no longer match
the profiling waveform well. Blindly selecting the most closely matching next subpath
is not guaranteed to result in the most closely matching waveforms for the entire exe-
cution. Such errors tend to compound and the predicted execution path may diverge
from the actual execution path indefinitely. This issue may be even worse when an
incorrect marker is predicted and the predicted path and the actual path diverge for
a long time following the incorrect decision. To address these issues we need to model
the search for the optimal execution path more precisely.
5.3.3.2 Path Prediction as a Tree Search
When we reach a marker X at a particular time t in the profiling waveform we com-
pare all the training subpath waveforms starting at X against the profiling waveform
starting at t and assign a score to each training example. We use the correlation coef-
ficient as the similarity metric between the section of the profiling waveform starting
at t and the training subpath waveform. Therefore for each training example we get
a correlation value, a next marker, and the time of the next marker (i.e. the start
time t plus the duration of the training subpath).
We can think of the search for the optimal execution path through the program
as a tree search. The root node is the entry marker (marker A in Figure 42) and each
child node has an edge for each training subpath example starting at that node’s
marker. Each node in this tree has a marker (e.g. A, B, C, etc.) and a starting
time t in the profiling waveform. Each edge corresponds to a single training subpath
example waveform and has three properties: a duration (the duration of the train-
ing example), a correlation between the training subpath waveform and the profiling
waveform starting at time t, and the marker at the end of the subpath in this train-
ing example. According to these definitions a search tree for an example execution
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Figure 46: Example of path prediction through tree search.
denotes a training example subpath and its waveform. The edge weights shown are
the correlation values for each edge’s training example (only the highest correlated
subpath edges are shown).
The branching factor for these trees is large because each node may have thousands
of training examples. To simplify the search, we employ the following heuristic. The
goal of the heuristic is to find a root-to-leaf path whose edges all have correlation
greater than a chosen value Cth. To evaluate a node, we calculate the correlation of
each next edge and sort the nodes in order of decreasing correlation. If the edge with
the maximum correlation is greater than Cth we continue searching along this edge.
Otherwise, we indicate this node as rejected and backtrack along our path so far (i.e.
toward the root node). As we backtrack we stop at the first node that has an edge to
an unevaluated node with correlation greater than Cth and search forward along this
edge. In Figure 46, Cth = 0.75, and the search algorithm follows the red dashed nodes
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from A to B to C to E along the top-most edges. No edge from this E node exceeds
Cth, so the algorithm backtracks to C and then continues forward to the E node
with Cth = 0.8. Again, no edge from here exceeds Cth, so the algorithm backtracks
along C to B to A and moves forward along the accepted blue path. Because ZOP
identifies paths by matching short subpaths between marker pairs and backtracks
when unsuccessful, it can recognize paths that it never observed during training.
This heuristic clearly results in a path where each edge is greater than Cth, if such a
path exists, since ZOP only follows edges with correlation greater than Cth. However,
it is not guaranteed that all paths that meet our selection criteria correspond to the
correct whole program execution path. It is also not guaranteed that a path meeting
the selection criteria exists. It is worth noting that many sophisticated heuristic
algorithms exist for searching through trees with similar properties [16, 19, 58, 80],
so we believe that future research in this area can greatly improve the overall path
prediction accuracy.
Two minor refinements are required to make this algorithm practical. First, when
correlating the training examples against the profiling waveform it is necessary to
correlate the waveforms several times with slight misalignments between the training
waveforms and the profiling waveforms and use the best result of all the alignments.
This is because the current position in the program is always an estimate, so by trying
several different alignments and selecting the best alignment, ZOP can keep track of
the current program location with better accuracy. The second refinement is that the
training waveforms for each edge are extended beyond the time position of the next
marker so that all the training waveforms starting at a given marker have the same
length. This is done by finding the training example for each marker with the longest
duration and extending the other training example waveforms for this marker to the
same length. This is required to allow fair comparisons between training examples
which would otherwise have different lengths (shorter signals are more likely to be
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more highly correlated due to random chance than longer signals). This approach
has the added benefit that (with some preprocessing) all the training waveforms for a
given starting marker can be correlated (with several different alignments) against a
profiling waveform using a single matrix multiplication which greatly reduces runtime.
5.3.3.3 Pruning Search Paths
Removing nodes before they are evaluated can greatly decrease runtime because the
evaluation of each node in this tree is expensive and the tree branches quickly. Some
nodes can be rejected quickly without sacrificing much accuracy. For example, sup-
pose two edges W and Z start at a node B and represent BD training waveforms with
nearly identical durations. This repetition is common because executions of the same
subpath often have roughly the same runtime. Suppose W has higher correlation to
the profiling waveform than Z. We can immediately reject Z without evaluating it
because the D node following W and the D node following Z occur at the same time
in the profiling waveform (since W and Z start at the same time and have the same
duration). If W is evaluated and rejected, evaluating Z would just re-evaluate an
identical D node with nearly the same start time.
We can eliminate more edges by observing that many marker sequences do not
correspond to valid execution paths. To see this, recall that the path prediction
execution paths are interprocedural and that we allow an edge from any marker X
to a marker Y if an X to Y transition is possible in the profiling program. Then
consider a function which contains a single marker F. This function is called from
two points A and B in the program, returning at points C and D respectively. Then
the only valid marker sequences for this function call would be AFC and BFD. The
algorithm described so far would however also evaluate the impossible paths AFD and
BFC. Ideally, a fully constrained grammar of all possible paths would be generated
to limit the search to possible marker sequences. This grammar could enumerate the
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set of valid next markers from any node in the search tree. This grammar would
be difficult to generate, so instead we keep a function call stack for the currently
evaluated execution path and any next marker which would be inconsistent with the
call stack is rejected. Note this is a very weak constraint and only eliminates the
impossible AFC and BFD sequences when A and B are in different functions.
5.3.4 Profiling Information
In the final step of ZOP, we construct the paths for the profiling inputs from a set of
predicted markers provided by the previous steps. Every consecutive pair of predicted
markers represents a set of basic blocks that are executed between two markers by
a training input. First, for every training input and every two consecutive pair of
markers we extract the basic blocks that are executed between them. Once ZOP
collects the basic blocks between each pair of markers, it uses this information to
generate the predicted whole program basic block path from the sequence of predicted
markers. The profiled acyclic paths can be easily identified and counted from this
whole program path.
5.3.5 Usage Scenarios
Describing the usage scenarios where ZOP presents an attractive alternative to exist-
ing solutions, we must first be more specific about the requirements for using ZOP.
First, and most obviously ZOP requires hardware for demodulation, waveform record-
ing, and signal processing. It is expected these requirements can be met by existing
software defined radio receivers. Second, ZOP also inherits most of the requirements
of existing profilers such as instrumentation insertion. Third, ZOP requires a set of
inputs to be used for training. These training inputs must have a coverage of the
short subpaths in the program most similar to branch coverage. In most scenarios
where an application is to be extensive profiled such a set of inputs exists. The next
and final requirement is more subtle. During training the program is instrumented
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and run to record waveforms and timing information. This raises the question “If it
is possible to run the program with instrumentation, why go through all the trouble
of recording and processing waveforms just to count the executed paths?”
There are several reasons for this. First, in many applications it may be feasible
to run a program with several short inputs that provide good branch coverage in a
testing environment but may not be feasible to instrument the system in a production
environment or in the field. This is likely the case for code with realtime requirements
or operating system code. In other cases it may be possible to record the profiling
information but there may be no easy way to get the profiling information off the
device. Second, ZOP is unique in that it can provide profiling information with no
hardware support or direct interaction with the system while it is being profiled.
Some computing systems have hardware support for profiling (performance counters,
instruction traces, etc.) but these methods require hardware support (both logic
on-chip and in some cases large connectors on the PCB) and do affect some system
properties such as power consumption. Third, we believe the approach used by ZOP
will find applications beyond profiling such as malware detection and debugging where
functioning without instrumentation is desirable for other reasons.
5.4 Experimental Results
To assess the usefulness and effectiveness of our approach, we developed a prototype
tool that implements ZOP and performed an empirical evaluation on several software
benchmarks. (For simplicity, in this section we use the name ZOP to refer to both
the approach and its implementation, unless otherwise stated.) In our evaluation,
we quantified (1) the accuracy of the profiling information computed by ZOP and
(2) how the training inputs used affect ZOP’s accuracy. In the rest of this section,




For our evaluation, we used a NIOS II processor on an Altera Cyclone II FPGA. This
processor has many of the features of modern complex computer systems (e.g. a 32 bit
RISC MIPS-like architecture, a large external DRAM, separate instruction and data
caches, dynamic branch prediction) while also providing features that were extremely
useful for developing our understanding of how program execution affects the system’s
EM emanations (e.g. programmable digital I/O pins, access to programmable logic,
and cycle-accurate program tracing). For the evaluation, we did not use any FPGA-
specific features.
We leveraged LLVM [61] to detect the acyclic paths in the code, identify instru-
mentation points, and insert instrumentation. We then used LLVM’s C backend to
generate instrumented C source code. GCC then compiled this source code to a
NIOS binary. Both the original and instrumented source code are standard C code
and could be compiled and run on any modern architecture.
The software parts of ZOP are built using freely available software (i.e. compiler,
code analysis framework, and FPGA tools). To observe EM emanations, we used a
magnetic field probe (a small inductor in series with a tuning capacitor) that was
placed directly over the processor’s decoupling capacitors. The EM probe was assem-
bled by hand by one of the authors from components that can be bought for less than
$10. Finally, we used a spectrum analyzer (which can be a fairly expensive piece of
equipment) to demodulate and record EM emanations so as to have more control and
flexibility in our investigation, but numerous software defined radio receivers, which
are available for less than $1,000 have sufficient capability and precision to reproduce
our measurements.
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Table 13: Statistics for the SIR benchmark profiled by ZOP.
Benchmark LOC Markers Training Set Size Profiling Set Size
print tokens 571 48 240 400
schedule 415 36 284 400
replace 563 54 299 400
Total 1549 138 823 1200
5.4.2 Evaluation Setup
We selected three programs in the SIR repository [1] to profile: replace, print tokens,
and schedule. Table 13 shows, for each benchmark, its name, its size, the number of
markers added during training, and the number of inputs we used during the training
and profiling phases.
The decision to use only a few relatively small benchmarks was largely due to
limitations of the system we used and of our measurement setup. The runtime we
used in our evaluation, for instance, does not have an operating system. To automate
measurements, we thus had to modify the standalone programs we profiled so that
their main() function was called repeatedly from a wrapper executable. Because
standalone programs tend to depend on data memory being initialized to zero when
main() is called and typically do not clean up memory before exiting, this introduced
issues that required manual effort for each program. Furthermore, we had to use
LLVM’s C backend to generate instrumented C code that was recompiled on the target
system (in a real application ZOP would directly instrument binaries), which also
created problems and required extensive manual checking. In addition, our general
purpose measurement setup resulted in long measurement times, which favored the
use of shorter executions of smaller programs. In general, avoiding larger programs
allowed us to perform fairly extensive manual checks of our results, which helped
us gain confidence in their correctness and, most importantly, let us get a deeper
understanding of the issues involved in our approach and how to address them.
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We selected the inputs for profiling and training as follows. For profiling, we
selected inputs that achieved high path coverage, so as to demonstrate that ZOP can
accurately profile a large number of different paths. As for the training set, ideally
we would want an input set that exercises all the possible behaviors (in terms of
EM emissions) of marker-to-marker subpaths; ZOP would then be able to identify
complete paths by concatenating these short subpaths. As a more realistic proxy for
this set, we selected training inputs that achieved branch coverage and then added a
random set of extra inputs (see next paragraph). It is worth noting that production-
quality software often already provides test suites with high branch coverage. Most
importantly, for the purpose of training, much-easier-to-create unit tests for individual
procedures could also be used.
Specifically, we performed our input selection by starting with the existing set
of inputs in the SIR repository [1]. For each benchmark, we randomly split the
inputs for that benchmark into two equally-sized disjoint sets: training superset and
profiling supersets. This guarantees that the inputs used for training are completely
independent of those used for profiling. From the training superset, we randomly
selected a minimal subset of inputs that achieved the same branch coverage as the
complete set. We then added 150 extra inputs randomly selected from the superset
to increase the chances of having different paths covered by different numbers of
inputs, so as to be able to study how the characteristics of the training inputs affect
ZOP’s accuracy and determine how the training inputs affect profiling accuracy. We
selected 150 as the number of extra training inputs based on earlier experiments, as
that number is not excessively large and yet can provide a higher variety in coverage.
We call the resulting set the training set. To determine the set of inputs for profiling
(i.e. the profiling set), we randomly selected a subset of the profiling superset that
achieved the same acyclic-path coverage as the complete set and then added random
inputs to get to 400 inputs, which was the largest number of inputs we could measure
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Figure 47: Average accuracy per benchmark.
5.4.3 Results
To quantify ZOP’s accuracy, we first determined the path taken for each profiled
input (i.e. the ground truth) by measuring the correct profiling information for each
benchmark and each input in the profiling set. Because ZOP estimates profiling at
the acyclic-path level, we used the approach by Ball and Larus [11] to compute this
information. Next, we performed ZOP’s Training 1, Training 2, and Profiling phases.
For each benchmark and each profiled input, ZOP predicted the number of times each
acyclic path was executed, and we compared this value with the previously computed








n = number of acyclic paths per benchmark.
gi = actual number executions of acyclic path i(ground truth).








= accuracy for acyclic path i.
Therefore, when ZOP underestimates the number of executions of a path, the
accuracy is computed as ai =
zi
gi
, whereas when ZOP overestimates the number of
executions of a path, the accuracy is computed as ai =
gi
zi
. ai = 0 when zi = 0. To
give equal weight to each path execution, each ai is weighted by gi.
Figure 47 shows the path profiling accuracy results. As the table shows, ZOP’s
estimates are fairly accurate. On average, ZOP correctly predicts 94.7% of the paths
for replace, 97.9% for print tokens, and 95.1% for schedule. In other words, the
profiling information computed by ZOP without any instrumentation is always over
94% accurate.
Determine how the coverage of training inputs affects ZOP’s accuracy, we com-
puted how the accuracy of ZOP’s path count estimates is affected by the number of
times each path is exercised by the training set. We show these results in Figure 48.
Each data point in this figure represents the accuracy of ZOP’s estimate for a single
static acyclic path in the indicated benchmark (i.e. a single ai value). For each bench-
mark, the figure also shows a fit for a saturating power curve1 for each benchmark
and the curve’s goodness of fit (i.e. R2). We chose this type of curve because, among
all simple curves we tried, including linear, quadratic, exponential, etc. it produces
(by far) the best goodness-of-fit. A logarithmic scale is used for the x-axis to more
1The curve is y = a − bxc where x is the number of dynamic instances, y is accuracy, and a, b,



























































Figure 48: Number of training examples vs accuracy for print tokens, schedule, and
replace.
directly show the effect of increasing the number of training path instances by an
order of magnitude.
For the print tokens and schedule benchmarks in Figure 48, the accuracy is poor
when the acyclic path is executed less than 100 times, but greatly improves beyond
this point. In fact, the vast majority of paths with more than 100 occurrences during
training have nearly perfect accuracy. This is promising, as it implies that paths
can be identified accurately by a relatively small number of inputs that cover them.
Moreover, it also implies that accuracy can be improved by adding more training
inputs. Finally, as we said in Section 5.4.2, even executions of individual procedures
by means of unit tests (which are easier to create) should be sufficient for training.
The replace benchmark manifests a slightly different behavior. While the accuracy
does increase with the number of times the paths are covered during training, there
are several paths with more than 100 training examples that have accuracy below
80%, and even a few below 50%. In general the accuracy for replace does not improve
as quickly as for the other two benchmarks as a function of the number of executions
of a path during training.
We investigated this difference in behavior and found several possible explanations.
First, whereas we expect most paths to have only so many variations in terms of the
EM emanations that they can generate (see Section 5.2), some paths may vary more
widely based on the context in which they are executed. Alternatively, some paths
may simply have more possible contexts under which they can be executed (e.g. if
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the structure of the program or some parts thereof contains especially high levels of
nesting).
Second, the path prediction algorithm traverses a program’s marker graph as
shown in the example in Figure 46. This traversal results in the evaluation (and
possibly selection) of many impossible paths. The technique that we use to navigate
the graph is context sensitive but does not distinguish between different call sites that
invoke the same callee from within a procedure. Therefore, the algorithm could reach
a callee from a given call site within a procedure and return to a different call site
within the same procedure. This is particularly problematic in programs in which
this situation occurs frequently and may lead to imprecision and poor predictions.
Finally, for 3 of the 400 inputs in replace’s profiling set, the path prediction algo-
rithm got “lost” while exploring the marker graph. As we mentioned while describing
our approach, if the waveforms collected during training do not closely match the
waveform collected during profiling for more than a short time, the predicted and
actual control flows can diverge beyond recovery. Once this happens, the remainder
of the prediction for that input is completely incorrect. This condition only happened
for the replace benchmark and only for three inputs. This is likely an indication that
there is something different about replace and that more training inputs were needed
for certain parts of this benchmark. Also in this case, we will perform further in-
vestigation to better characterize the peculiarities of replace and use our findings to
improve ZOP.
5.5 Summary
This chapter presented ZOP, a system for zero-overhead profiling which is non-
intrusive and requires no hardware modifications or support. In exchange for the
ability to profile software without any overhead, ZOP makes a small sacrifice in ac-
curacy (> 94% accurate compared to a technique based on instrumentation on the
117
benchmarks tested), and requires a training phase.
ZOP uses unintentional EM emanations generated by the profiled system to track
a program’s execution and to generate profiling information. In ZOP’s training phase,
the program is instrumented and EM waveforms are recorded while running a set
of inputs on both instrumented and uninstrumented code, and the instrumentation
records which part of the EM signal corresponds to which part of the code. The profil-
ing phase consists of running the original (uninstrumented and unmodified) program
with the inputs to be profiled and recording the system’s EM emanations waveforms.
The waveforms from training, and their waveform-to-code mapping, are used to pre-
dict the execution path taken by the profiled run. Our experimental results show
that ZOP can predict profiling information with greater than 94% accuracy for the
benchmarks considered in our evaluation.
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CHAPTER VI
DETECTION OF UNKNOWN CODE ON INTERNET OF
THINGS DEVICES AT A DISTANCE
6.1 Overview
One of the emerging applications that makes use of the information embedded in
EM emanations is the verification of control flow through a program, specifically the
detection of previously unseen (i.e. zero day) malware. A rapidly growing number of
embedded devices with internet connectivity are used in consumer electronics, Inter-
net of Things devices, as well as industrial control and data acquisition applications.
Securing these devices presents new and unique challenges due to their very limited
software and hardware resources, the difficulty of applying software updates in the
field, and the lack of standardization among the many hardware and software plat-
forms used across devices. Techniques that make use of EM emanations to secure
these devices may be a good fit for this application because such techniques do not
require intrusive access or modification to the devices, and because remotely mon-
itoring the devices in an air-gapped manner makes it impossible for an attacker to
hide malicious activity by disabling security measures on the compromised device.
Another advantage of using EM emanations to detect malware is that this detection
can be done “wirelessly,” since it does not require a physical connection between the
monitor and the monitored device. A single monitor could potentially observe the
EM emanations from all the computing devices in a room and simultaneously secure
all of them. Therefore we need to determine how strong the relevant EM emanations
from the monitored devices are and how much distance can separate the monitor and
the monitored devices while still accurately detecting malware.
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This chapter adapts ZOP for detecting malware, characterizes the effects which
degrade ZOP’s performance when monitoring devices from a distance, and shows re-
sults for detecting malware using ZOP at distance of 3 meters. Section 6.2 describes
how we can apply the algorithms developed for ZOP to detect malware. Section 6.3
examines the effect that microarchitectural events have on prediction accuracy by
presenting a comparison of ZOP’s whole program path prediction accuracy between
NIOS and PIC32 processors. Section 6.4 presents measurements that describe the
effect on ZOP performance of using EM emanations at different clock harmonics, as
well as the impact of using different antennas, signal bandwidths, and measurement
distances, and defines a signal quality metric for ZOP. Section 6.5 presents mea-
surement results for detecting unknown code in executions of a known program at a
distance of 3 meters, and Section 6.6 summarizes this chapter.
6.2 Adapting ZOP to Detect Malware
In Chapter 5, ZOP profiled devices using a small EM probe very close to the device
being profiled. This chapter builds on ZOP and addresses two new requirements: (1)
in addition to predicting the most likely control flow path through a program, predict
whether “unknown” code (e.g. malware) executed, and (2) do this prediction from
a distance of 3 meters. Chapter 5 measured the average accuracy of counts of all
the dynamic occurrences of acyclic intraprocedural paths in a program across a set
of inputs. That metric is only useful for path profiling, but for other applications
such as malware detection, we will need a new metric which can be used to measure
whole program path prediction accuracy. When determining whole program path
prediction accuracy, we have two paths to compare. The first path is the sequence of
basic blocks that the program actually executed for a given input (call this sequence
S), and the second is the sequence of basic blocks that ZOP predicts for that same
execution (call this sequence T ). One efficient method of comparing two sequences
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of symbols is the string edit distance which we will call d(S, T ). The string edit
distance is a single number which is the total edits necessary to transform sequence
S into sequence T . This transformation consists of a sequence of edits where each
edit consists of deleting a single symbol from S or adding a single symbol to S. The
edits are applied iteratively to sequence S until the sequence T is produced, and the
edit distance is defined as the minimum number of edits necessary to transform S
into T . In this formulation, each unique basic block is a symbol. In this chapter we
will use the unique markers as symbols for convenience and because we only have
the timing of the markers (not the basic blocks) in the observed waveforms. This
“marker edit distance” can be converted to a fraction by calculating d(S,T )|S| . This
fraction indicates the percentage of the program whose path was mispredicted, and
the whole program path prediction accuracy will be calculated as 1 − d(S,T )|S| . This
metric is useful for summarizing whole program path prediction accuracy for a given
execution and for isolating the time periods where the predicted path is incorrect
in a particular execution. Both of these are important tools for understanding path
prediction accuracy.
To understand how ZOP can be adapted to detect malware, consider how ZOP
would behave when it attempts to predict the control flow path through a program
when unknown code (malware) is present. For our purposes, we will focus on unknown
code, i.e. any code which we haven’t observed as part of the monitored program during
training. This unknown code could be part of any type of malware that results in
the execution of code not present in monitored program, such as a buffer overflow
attack or a clandestine malicious modification to the program. When we use ZOP
to predict the path through a program where unknown code is present, ZOP will
accurately predict the path through the program for the portions of the execution
where the known code is active. For the portions of the program where unknown
code is active, ZOP attempts to match the EM emanations waveforms generated by
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the unknown code to the training waveforms for the known program. If the unknown
code is active for a long enough period of time, the execution of this unknown code is
virtually guaranteed to generate EM emanations waveforms which match the training
waveforms quantifiably worse than any valid execution of known code in the monitored
program. In other words, when malware is present the received signal will not match
any training examples resulting in low confidence in the path prediction results since
the malware will not correspond to any valid program path. Therefore high accuracy
malware detection requires ZOP to not only predict the execution path correctly, but
also requires that the training and execution waveforms match (e.g. correlate) with
high confidence when known code executes.
6.3 ZOP Whole Program Path Prediction Accuracy on NIOS
and PIC32 Processors
In this section, we will use ZOP to predict the whole program path on the NIOS
processor (used in Chapter 5) and also on a simpler PIC32 processor. The NIOS pro-
cessor uses an external memory and has on-chip data and instruction caches which
introduce microarchitectural event differences (such as cache hit/misses) among dy-
namic instances of a given static path. The Microchip PIC32MX795F512L is a 32 bit,
80 MHz processor with similar architecture to NIOS, with the main difference being
that it uses neither external memory nor on-chip instruction and data caches. This
difference is important, as the lack of a cache and external memory greatly minimizes
the effect of processor microarchitectural event differences when executing a given
static path. On the PIC32 processor, repeated executions of a given static path will
execute in nearly the same number of clock cycles and the EM emanations waveform
for each dynamic instance of a single static path are highly correlated to one another.
To remove any effects caused by differences in processor/memory clock rates between
the processors, for all the measurements in this chapter we set the NIOS processor and
memory clock rate to 83.333 MHz (this is the closest FPGA PLL frequency available
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near the PIC32’s 80 MHz clock rate). Any difference in ZOP’s performance between
these two processors is likely due to microarchitectural event variations present only
in the NIOS processor, since this is the key difference between the two processors.
Other signal effects (noise, signal propagation, etc.) will be minimal and equivalent
between the two processors because they will be measured under the same conditions.
Table 14: A comparison of ZOP’s whole program path prediction performance on the
PIC32 and NIOS processors for the replace benchmark measured using the marker
edit distance ratio.
PIC32 NIOS
0.00 0.01 388 318
0.01 0.05 5 45
0.05 0.10 0 10
0.10 0.15 0 6
0.15 0.20 0 0
0.20 0.25 0 2




Number of Executed Inputs
Total
To evaluate the difference in ZOP’s whole program path prediction performance
on the NIOS and PIC32 processors, the replace benchmark was run using the same
sets of training and evaluation inputs and same measurement setup (i.e. a small
tuned LC probe very close to the monitored processor) as described in Chapter 5.
Table 14 shows a performance comparison using the marker edit distance ratio metric
described in Section 6.2. The whole program path was predicted exactly or almost
completely correctly for vast majority of the inputs (those with marker edit distance
ratio less than 0.01). For 6 evaluation inputs on the PIC32 and for 18 evaluation
inputs on NIOS, the marker edit distance was very large (> 0.25). The performance
on these inputs was investigated, and it was found that for almost all such inputs the
execution was very short (> 10 markers long), so that missing only a few markers
resulted in a large marker edit distance ratio. For 3 of the executions with a large
marker edit distance ratio the executions were, however, sufficiently long that we can
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conclusively say that ZOP completely failed and lost track of the actual execution
path. After investigation, it was determined that these inputs all got lost in the
function shown in Figure 49.
1 int omatch(char *lin , int *i, char *pat , int j) {
2 char advance = -1;
3 bool result;
4 mark(A);
5 if (lin[*i] == ENDSTR) result = false;
6 else if (! in_pat_set(pat[j])) {
7 return false;
8 } else {
9 switch (pat[j]) {
10 case LITCHAR:
11 if (lin[*i] == pat[j + 1]) advance = 1;
12 break;
13 case BOL:
14 if (*i == 0) advance = 0;
15 break;
16 case ANY:
17 if (lin[*i] != NEWLINE) advance = 1;
18 break;
19 case EOL:
20 if (lin[*i] == NEWLINE) advance = 0;
21 break;
22 case CCL:
23 if (locate(lin[*i], pat , j + 1)) advance = 1;
24 break;
25 case NCCL:
26 if ((lin[*i] != NEWLINE) && (! locate(lin[*i], pat , j + 1))) {







34 if (( advance >= 0)) {
35 *i = *i + advance;
36 result = true;
37 } else {





Figure 49: A function which had poor static path coverage in the replace benchmark.
The function in Figure 49 only has two markers, one at the start and one at the
end of the function. Without the basic block sequence information for each dynamic
path, it is impossible to determine the path coverage of the training set. However, the
number of possible paths through this function is large, and given the criteria used
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to select the training inputs in Chapter 5, it is expected that many of the marker-
to-marker paths through this function are not present in the training set. Based on
this comparison, we propose that this training set has mostly adequate coverage of
the marker-to-marker static paths with a few such exceptions. Furthermore, it was
observed that repeated executions of replace with the same inputs and initial cache
state showed very little variability in the EM emanations waveform (see Section 6.4
for more information), so the effects of signal propagation, noise, and other distortions
was negligible for this measurement setup. We conclude therefore that the decreased
performance on NIOS (compared to PIC32) is due to microarchitectural variation
(e.g. variation introduced by the external DRAM and on-chip caches), since all other
effects should be the same between the NIOS and PIC32 measurements.
6.4 Quantifying Signal Quality as a Function of Antenna,
Frequency, and Distance
In Chapter 5 we used a tuned LC circuit placed directly above the processor’s bypass
capacitors as a probe to receive the modulated processor clock signal at fc = 50
MHz. In this chapter we use a processor clock frequency of fc = 83.333 MHz. The
signal received with this setup is very strong and essentially free from noise and
interferences. However, at this frequency and distance, the probe is in the near field
and so the received signal decays quickly as the distance is increased, so that at
a distance of a few centimeters the signal amplitude is too low to be used. At the
processor frequency (83.333 MHz), our target distance (3 meters) is still not in the far
field and so a sophisticated (and likely very large) near field probe would be needed
to provide a strong enough signal. The processor and memory clocks are roughly
square waves, and so EM emanations are generated at the harmonics (multiples)
of the processor clock frequency. As the frequency increases the minimum far field
distance decreases and compact high gain antennas can be used, so we will attempt
to demodulate and characterize these clock harmonics.
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Before using ZOP at a distance, we characterized the signals ZOP uses, focusing
on the signal effects which change as a function of the distance, antenna, and the
harmonic used. First, we characterized the strength of the carriers and modulated
signals generated at the harmonics of the processor clock. To do this, we first need
a modulation signal (i.e. system activity) which is easy to control and measure.
The LDM/LDL1 (Load from Memory vs Load from L1 Cache) SAVAT benchmark
generates a narrow peak in the sideband of all the carriers modulated by this activity.
In this experiment, modulated carriers exist at all the harmonics of the processor clock
(e.g. the first harmonic at 83.333 MHz, the second harmonic at 166.666 MHz, etc.).
For each of these carriers, we made 6 measurements. First we measured the power
of the signal generated at the carrier, where the carrier occurs at frequency fh = hf1
where f1 = 83.333 MHz. Then we measured the power of the SAVAT modulation
signal occurring in the right and left sidebands at fh± falt where falt = 100 kHz (the
SAVAT alternation frequency). The power is integrated across a 10 kHz band centered
at the frequency of interest to allow for any spread or variation in the frequency of
the generated sidebands. First we do each of these measurements with the FPGA
powered on and SAVAT running. Next, we power off the FPGA and remeasure the
signal power at fh, fh − falt, fh + falt again to get an indication of the ambient noise
at these frequencies. We performed each of these measurements at the harmonics
from h = 1 (83.333 MHz) to h = 43 (3.5833 GHz). We use a Com-Power AH-118
broadband double ridge horn antenna, which has a relatively flat frequency response
from 700 MHz to 18 GHz and 10 dBi gain over this frequency range. The signal was
recorded using the same N9020A MXA spectrum analyzer as in previous experiments.
The distance between the FPGA board and the antenna was 60 cm.
In Figure 50, each line shows the power measured at the carrier and sideband
frequencies with SAVAT active minus the power at these same frequencies with the
FPGA powered off. Note that we can only measure these quantities at the frequencies
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that are harmonics of the clock, so for each trace, there are 43 evenly spaced data
points (for harmonics h = 1 to h = 43). A line is drawn connecting these points to
indicate the general trend in power as a function frequency. As shown in the figure,
the left and right sidebands have comparable powers. This is expected because the
distance between the right and left alternation frequency is only 2falt = 200 kHz and
the frequency response of the channel is expected to be flat over such a narrow span.
The power of the SAVAT signals is approximately 20 dB above the noise floor for
most frequencies, indicating a strong (usable) signal exists at many harmonics. Most
interestingly, the power of the carriers and sidebands does not decay significantly
as frequency increases. While the higher order harmonics of an ideal square wave
decay quickly as a function of frequency, the signal received in this setup is affected
by several additional factors. First, the currents and voltages generated within the
FPGA, DRAM, and PCB at the carrier and modulation frequencies will vary greatly
as a function of frequency. Also, for a current of a given magnitude flowing through a
wire on a PCB, a stronger EM field will be generated as the frequency of the current
increases.





















Figure 50: Magnitude of processor clock harmonics 1 through 43 as carriers and as
modulated by 100 KHz SAVAT LDM/LDL1 activity.
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To reliably receive the signals ZOP uses, we need to pick a frequency range where
antennas with high gain can be found. We chose the 2.3 GHz - 2.7 GHz frequency
range because it is widely used for wifi and other wireless protocols, and so many
high gain commercial antennas are available. For several antenna types and carriers
(harmonics) in this range we measured the EM emanations while executing the replace
benchmark repeatedly with the same inputs. In Chapter 5 we found that simple AM
demodulation (i.e. simply taking the magnitude of of the IQ signal for the 8.333
MHz band around the carrier) resulted in a very strong signal with very little noise
when using the tuned LC inductor probe at 83.333 MHz. Repeated executions of the
benchmark for this setup resulted in demodulated waveforms with almost no noise, so
that there was very little signal variation between repeated executions of a program
with the same inputs. However, when we demodulated the harmonics similarly with
several different types of antennas and frequencies in the 2.3 GHz - 2.7 GHz band,
we found that there was little relation between the SAVAT power in Figure 50 and
the signal strength in demodulated waveforms for a given frequency and antenna.
This variation in the signal strength relative to SAVAT power was determined to
be caused by the nature of the unintentional modulation of signals within computer
systems. In modern communications systems, the transmitter minimizes the power
wasted on the continuous wave carrier to order to maximize the power available to
modulate the carrier and transmit information. Furthermore, the phase and mag-
nitude of the transmitted signals are carefully controlled to maximize data transfer
rates. Unintentionally modulated computing signals (such as processor clocks) are
not designed as carriers, and so do not have either of these two properties. First, a
large portion of the transmitted power is not modulated. For example, the power
consumed by a processor as it executes a program may vary during different portions
of a program, but there is a non-zero minimum amount of power consumed by the
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circuitry on the processor clock, and this minimum can be on the order of the vari-
ations in power usage over the execution of a program. Second, different circuitry
driven by the same clock may not all share a common phase (for example there may
be a phase difference between the processor and memory activities even when they
share the same clock), and similarly it is plausible that delays through the power dis-
tribution network could result in phase variation in the current drawn (and therefore
cause phase variations in the EM emanations).
Previously we used asynchronous AM demodulation, but to understand these
modulation effects we first applied carrier recovery to compensate for the small fre-
quency offset between the receiver (the spectrum analyzer) and transmitter (the com-
puting device under test). After this, the unexplained variation in the signal strength
was obvious and can be explained by Figure 51. We hypothesize that the EM em-
anations from a computing device can be modeled as s(t) = Cejwt + M(t)ej·(wt+φ)
where the first component Cejwt is a sinusoid at the carrier frequency w with real
magnitude C and the second component M(t)ej·(wt+φ) is at the same carrier frequency
w but has modulated magnitude M(t) and a phase offset φ relative to the first com-
ponent. Based on these assumptions, after carrier recovery (e.g. in the simplest form,
multiplying s(t) by e−jwt) we would expect the AM modulated component to be offset
from the origin by C and rotated by φ in an IQ plot. Figure 52 shows IQ plots for
demodulated signals after carrier recovery for the 31st harmonic at 2.58 GHz with
several antennas and antenna orientations. The upper left plot shows the demodu-
lated data for a H field probe placed directly on top of the FPGA. The remaining
plots were measured at a distance of 60 cm. The bottom left plot shows results for a
helical antenna. The other plots show results for the same 10 dBi horn antenna used
before, and an L-com HG2418P 2.4 GHz 18 dBi directional panel antenna, with two
plots each showing two orthogonal orientations. For each of these measurements, a
low noise amplifier with a 1 dB noise figure and 20 dB of gain was placed between
129
the antenna and spectrum analyzer. Each dot in a plot represents an IQ sample
in the demodulated waveform recorded during execution of the replace benchmark
with the same inputs after carrier recovery. The large red X marks the origin (i.e.
I = 0, Q = 0). The mean IQ value across all the samples for a given plot is different
in each plot, and the dominant variation axis is rotated by varying angles between
the plots. These results agree with the hypothesis that the EM emanations at the
processor/memory clock frequency consists of two components: one unmodulated,

























Figure 51: A diagram illustrating an IQ plot for an unintentionally modulated signal
with two synchronous components (one modulated, one not modulated) with the
same frequency but different phases.
Based on these measurements and analysis it is clear why the demodulated signal
strength is not directly related to the measured SAVAT power. Depending on the
phase offset φ, more or less of the signal is captured by AM demodulation. For
example, as shown in Figure 52, if we demodulate by simply taking the magnitude
of each IQ sample we will capture a small fraction of the signal when using the H
field probe signal but will capture a much larger (though still not optimal) fraction




















































































Figure 52: IQ plots for the modulated 31st clock harmonic with several antennas
and orientations.
signal is present in the variation orthogonal to the main axis of modulation. In other
words the signal is phase modulated in addition to being AM modulated. Regardless
of the choice of offset and axis for AM demodulation, repeatable patterns are present
in the phase of the IQ samples as a function of time across repeated executions of the
same program and inputs. Therefore AM demodulating the signal throws away some
usable signal. This repeatable phase variation might be explained by the fact that
there are many small circuits drawing current with slightly different phases when they
are active resulting not only a continuous range of amplitudes but also a continuous
range of possible phases. It is also likely that the channel’s frequency response is not
completely flat. This can contribute to repeatable phase variation even for purely
AM modulated signals.
It is also interesting to compare IQ plots for multiple harmonics of the same
processor clock signal. Figure 53 shows IQ plots for several such harmonics using the
same panel antenna at a distance of 60 cm. In terms of the demodulated waveform
shape in the time domain, from theory we would expect the demodulated signals
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Figure 53: IQ plots for several harmonics using the 18 dBi panel antenna with
horizontal orientation.
from different harmonics of the same clock to have the same shape. Figure 54 shows
that this is largely true. This is significant because it suggests signals from multiple
harmonics can be combined together to increase the signal strength and to overcome
interferences in individual harmonics.
Finally, we are interested in how the signal decays with distance. Figure 55
overlays the demodulated time domain signal for 10 repeated executions of the same
benchmark with the same inputs for the 31st harmonic, comparing the waveform
shape at 60 cm and 300 cm. While the signal magnitude is slightly lower at 300 cm,
the overall waveform shape is similar for these two distances.
In order to begin to understand how signal quality for a given environment (i.e.
antenna, amplifier, distance, etc.) can affect ZOP’s performance, we first need a met-
ric to quantify the “usable” signal strength. Some methods for quantifying average
signal strength require significant control over the signals generated by the transmit-
ter, or theoretical assumptions about the transmitter. It is not obvious how to apply
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Harmonic 28, 2.333 GHz
Harmonic 29, 2.417 GHz
Harmonic 30, 2.500 GHz
Harmonic 31, 2.583 GHz
Harmonic 32, 2.667 GHz
Harmonic 33, 2.750 GHz
Figure 54: Demodulated and normalized time domain signals for several harmonics
using the 18 dBi panel antenna with horizontal orientation.











#10-4 Panel Antenna, Harmonic 31, 2.58 GHz, 60cm









#10-4 Panel Antenna, Harmonic 31, 2.58 GHz, 300cm
Figure 55: IQ plots for 10 repeated runs of the same benchmark and inputs for the
31st harmonic at 60 cm (top) and 300 cm (bottom) using the 18 dBi panel antenna
with horizontal orientation.
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these methods to our scenario, as the only control we have is the ability to generate
the same pattern repeatedly by executing the same benchmark with the same inputs
and observing variation in this signal. Any feature of the received signal which is
common between all the repeated executions (i.e. present in the mean across all the
executions at a given time point) will be referred to as “positively correlated” since
these features contribute to higher correlation between any two waveforms measured
during repeated execution of the same code (assuming the waveforms are normal-
ized). Any feature in the signal which is present in a single execution but not present
in the mean across all repeated executions will be considered “negatively correlated”
since such features tend to contribute to lower correlation between two waveforms
measured during repeated execution of the same code.
We next define a single value that represents the average strength (magnitude) for
a newly defined signal consisting of the sum of all the positively correlated features in
a given set of waveforms measured during repeated executions of the same code (call
this value P ), and similarly define a single value for the average magnitude of the
signal consisting of the sum of the negatively correlated features (call this value N). If
x[r, t] is the (demodulated) signal value at time t of the rth repeated execution, then
we can estimate P by first taking the mean among all the repeated waveforms x[r, t]
at each time instant t to create an average signal p[t] and then taking the standard
deviation of p[t] across all time t:
p[t] = meanr x[r, t]
P = std p[t].
(5)
P is then a single value that estimates of the magnitude of the signal that is common
between executions. Similarly, we can estimate N as
n[t] = stdr (x[r, t]− p[t])
N = mean n[t].
(6)
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Then a given program execution r has a waveform x[r, t] which can be decomposed
into two signals: p[t] (the signal consisting of the positively correlated features which
are common between all executions) and x[r, t] − p[t] (the signal consisting of the
negatively correlated features present in x[r, t] but in present among all the other
executions).












Harmonic 28 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 28 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 29 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 29 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 30 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 30 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 31 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 31 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 32 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 32 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 33 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 33 Neg Corr Mag
Figure 56: A plot of the magnitudes of the positively and negatively correlated
signal features as a function of distance using 18 dBi panel antenna with horizontal
orientation.
One usage of the P and N values is to estimate the decay of the signal as a
function of distance. This is shown in Figure 56. In the figure, the magnitude of
the negatively correlated features, N , is constant for a given harmonic, as would be
expected for a fixed level of ambient noise. This figure also confirms that simple
AM demodulation captures only a varying portion of the total signal depending on
the complex offset C introduced by the non-modulated component in the IQ plot
together with the phase rotation φ. For example, in Figure 53, the 28th harmonic
has a complex offset C and phase φ that results in the least fraction of the total signal
being captured by simple AM demodulation, and also has the lowest signal level in
Figure 56. Similarly, the 31th harmonic’s complex offset C is the smallest, resulting
the strongest signal level in Figure 56. In the IQ plots in Figure 53, the area with
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Harmonic 28 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 28 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 29 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 29 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 30 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 30 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 31 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 31 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 32 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 32 Neg Corr Mag
Harmonic 33 Pos Corr Mag
Harmonic 33 Neg Corr Mag
Figure 57: A plot of the magnitudes of the positively and negatively correlated signal
features as a function of demodulation bandwidth using 18 dBi panel antenna with
horizontal orientation.
the highest concentration of samples corresponds to the point where the modulation
signal M(t) is at its minimum. For these signals subtracting this offset before AM
demodulating would yield the strongest signal, i.e. the signal with the largest P/N
value.
Figure 57 shows the magnitudes of the positively and negatively correlated sig-
nal features as a function of the demodulation bandwidth (i.e. the width of the
frequency band around the carrier that is demodulated) for the same demodulated
harmonics and measurement setup used for Figures 53 and 56. This figure shows
that the ratio P/N is in fact lower at higher baseband frequencies, meaning that as
we increase the demodulation bandwidth, we would expect the correlation between
the training waveforms and the to-be-predicted waveforms to decrease. We confirmed
this by using ZOP with different demodulation bandwidths and observing that if the
bandwidth was too high, the performance suffered. The fact that P/N decreases as
frequency increases suggests that there is increasing time and/or amplitude variation
in the waveform features generated for very rapid changes in processor activity. One
explanation for this phenomenon is that for repeated executions of the same program
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with the same inputs, the variation in microarchitectural activity occurs on small
timescales, generating high frequency features in the signal, but that it is much more
difficult for microarchitectural activity to cause low frequency features. This makes
intuitive sense because it is extremely unlikely that microarchitectural variation alone
could cause a program to take 1 second for one execution and 2 seconds for another
run of the same program, but it is plausible that microarchitectural activity could
cause a section of code to take 100 clock cycles in one execution vs 200 clock cycles
in another execution.
6.5 Detecting Unknown Code at a Distance
This section applies the knowledge gained in the previous section to detect the pres-
ence of unknown code at a distance of 3 meters. We used the antenna with the highest
gain (the 18 dBi panel antenna) and the same replace benchmark with the same train-
ing and evaluation inputs as used in Chapter 5. As we determined in Section 6.3,
this training set has poor coverage of some portions of this benchmark. While it is
expected that better input generation will improve ZOP’s performance, but gener-
ating inputs with thorough coverage of large programs is challenging. Therefore we
will continue to use this training input set because ZOP needs to be robust against
training inputs that do not provide perfect coverage.
In this measurement we will evaluate whether ZOP can predict when unknown
code is present in a given program execution. For this purpose, we will not use any of
the training waveforms which describe a particular function (the putsub function) in
the replace benchmark. Therefore, when ZOP encounters calls to this function, it will
attempt to match the unknown waveform to only to training waveforms for the valid
known code paths, but not to the putsub function. These waveforms will not match
well against the unknown waveform because the unknown waveforms were recorded
during different program activity (i.e. the putsub function). In other words, the
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waveform matching is expected to be good when ZOP encounters known code (i.e.
code for which it has training examples), and poor when ZOP encounters unknown
code (i.e. code with no training examples). Therefore, if we look at the matching
between to-be-predicted waveform and the training example waveforms ZOP picks
as the best matches to the to-be-predicted waveform during a period of time where
code is executing for which we have no training examples, we would expect that the
matching will be very poor (i.e. have a low correlation).
We can use the fact that the best matching training examples will have low cor-
relation to unknown code to determine whether a given execution contains unknown
code. To do this, for a given execution, for each predicted marker in the predicted
marker sequence, we look at the correlation between the highest correlated training
example waveform (which was used to selected this marker in the final prediction) and
the to-be-predicted waveform. This gives us a list of correlations between the highest
correlated training waveform and the to-be-predicted waveform for short sections of
the waveform recorded for the entire duration of the program’s execution. Then, for
each executed input, we find the minimum correlation in this list, and assign that
value to that executed input. This gives us a score that is likely to be lower when
unknown code is present for a particular executed input.
We ran ZOP for the same set of 400 evaluation inputs described in Chapter 5 with
the same training input set, removing only the training examples which correspond
to the unknown code. Out of 400 evaluation inputs, 69 inputs contained at least
one call to the putsub function. Figure 58 shows histograms of the results. The x-
axis shows the minimum correlation of each input as described above and the y-axis
shows the number of evaluation inputs which had that minimum correlation. The
red distribution shows the inputs that executed some unknown code and the blue
distribution shows the inputs that contained no unknown code.
In order to determine a final performance metric (e.g. the number of false positives
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s Unknown Code Present
No Unknown Code Present
Decision Threshold
Figure 58: Histograms of the number of executions with a given minimum correlation
for the executions with unknown code (red) and containing only known code (blue).
and negatives) a decision threshold must be chosen. To predict whether unknown
code was executed for a given input we look at the minimum correlation over that
input. If this correlation is below the decision threshold, we predict unknown code is
present and if the correlation is above the threshold, we predict unknown code is not
present. While there is some overlap between the distributions, they are separated
enough that a decision threshold can be chosen to accurately determine whether a
given input contains unknown code. For example, if we pick a decision threshold of
0.5 (as shown by the dotted black line in Figure 58), we will correctly classify 92%
of the executed inputs with 6% false positives (inputs that don’t actually execute
unknown code but are predicted to execute unknown code) and 2% false negatives
(inputs with unknown code predicted to not contain unknown code). This prediction
threshold gives the optimal accuracy for this particular measurement but a user may
wish to set a different decision threshold (e.g. to reduce the number of false positives).
Furthermore, the optimal decision threshold will depend on the signal quality for a




This chapter demonstrated that ZOP can be adapted to detect unknown code on an
IoT device at a distance of 3 meters. Chapter 5 presented ZOP, which counts the
number of short acyclic intraprocedural paths executed during a computer program.
For more general control flow verification, we needed a metric which gives a single
value for each execution input indicating how much the predicted execution path
differs from the actual execution path. For this purpose we adapted the string edit
distance, using markers as string symbols.
To adapt ZOP for detecting unknown code, we needed to identify the effects
which can degrade accuracy, such as waveform variations in dynamic instances of
a given static path (due to micro-architectural events) and signal effects such as
demodulation, bandwidth, path loss, and antennas. To examine the effect of micro-
architectural events, we implemented ZOP on a simpler PIC32 processor which did
not have significant variations in dynamic behavior along a given static path. We
compared ZOP results on NIOS vs PIC32 and found some sections of the tested
benchmarks which have poor static path coverage, resulting in poor accuracy when
these sections are encountered (on both PIC32 and NIOS). In addition, we found
that the accuracy was measurably worse overall on NIOS, indicating that coverage of
variations in dynamic behavior of a given static path (e.g. the effects of cache misses
on NIOS) do significantly affect accuracy.
We next characterized the properties of the demodulated time domain signals
used in ZOP, especially those properties which affect signal quality. We described
how the demodulated signal varies with the antenna and harmonic used, and dis-
covered that the presence of multiple synchronous clock components (modulated and
unmodulated) can result in reduced signal levels when simple AM demodulation is
used. We also described a metric for measuring the signal quality for demodulated
signals generated by program execution. We used this metric to summarize the decay
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of signal strength as a function of the distance between the monitored device and
the monitor, and presented measurements showing that for the execution of a given
execution path, higher frequency components of the demodulated signal have greater
variation, resulting in a reduced signal quality as more baseband bandwidth is used.
Finally, we presented a measurement showing that ZOP can detect the presence of
unknown code in a program execution with 92% accuracy at a distance of 3 meters.
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CHAPTER VII
RESEARCH CONTRIBUTIONS AND FUTURE WORK
7.1 Research Contributions
This research developed methods for identifying, quantifying, and using the uninten-
tional EM emanations from computing devices. These unintentional EM emanations
were previously studied for security purposes, for example to study how EM emana-
tions can potentially be used to extract secret keys in cryptography. We have demon-
strated that it is viable to automatically identify and quantify EM emanations, and to
use EM emanations to profile programs and detect unknown code. These techniques
may present a good solution for embedded processors such those used in IoT devices.
The research contributions of this work are:
1. SAVAT, a new metric that quantifies the side channel signal caused by differ-
ences in code execution at the instruction level [21,23,24]. SAVAT can be used
by computer programmers to quantify the effect of single instruction differences
in programs, and can be used by hardware designers to pinpoint leaking circuits.
We presented a practical methodology for measuring SAVAT on real machines
that uses specially designed benchmarks to generate a signal at a known alterna-
tion frequency where it can be isolated from the rest of the EM emanations from
the device under test and can be measured reliably with inexpensive equipment.
We also proved that the methodology does measure SAVAT given a simplified
yet realistic processor and emanations model. Finally, we measured SAVAT for
the EM emanations side channel for a small set of instructions for laptops, desk-
tops, and an FPGA-based processor demonstrating SAVAT’s utility, reliability,
and repeatability.
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2. FASE, a method for finding amplitude modulated side channel signals in com-
puting devices. FASE uses the SAVAT microbenchmarks to generate detectable
spectral patterns in the sidebands of all the carrier signals that are AM-modulated
by specific system activities [25]. We also presented an algorithm to automat-
ically process FASE spectra and calculate the frequencies of modulated carri-
ers [98]. To demonstrate FASE’s effectiveness, we applied it to several computer
systems and found activity-modulated signals generated by voltage regulators,
memory refresh activity, and DRAM clocks. We confirmed that FASE correctly
separates emanated signals that are affected by specific processor and/or mem-
ory activity from those that are not. FASE can be used to find which parts
of a system leak information about some aspect of program activity. Once
the source of the leak is found, the strength of modulated signals can be re-
duced and the modulation can be weakened, i.e. we can disrupt the connection
between program behavior and the variations in activity that modulate such
signals. Furthermore, other uses of EM emanations (such as profiling and mal-
ware detection) also require automatically finding and characterizing carriers
modulated by system activities.
3. ZOP, a system for zero-overhead profiling which is non-intrusive and requires
no hardware modifications or support [22]. In exchange for the ability to profile
software without any overhead, ZOP makes a small sacrifice in accuracy (> 94%
accurate compared to a technique based on instrumentation on the benchmarks
tested), and requires a training phase. ZOP generates profiling information
based on unintentional emanations alone. ZOP runs the to-be-profiled pro-
gram with instrumentation over a set of training inputs while simultaneously
recording the EM emanations. This allows us to match the execution of code
fragments to the EM emanations they generate. To profile a program with zero
software and hardware overhead, ZOP uses the waveforms from training, and
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their waveform-to-code mapping, to predict the execution path taken by the
profiled run. Our experimental results show that ZOP can predict profiling
information with greater than 94% accuracy for the benchmarks considered in
our evaluation.
4. A demonstration extending ZOP to detect unknown code at a distance of 3 me-
ters. In order to detect unknown code at a distance, we first created a metric
to summarize the accuracy of whole program path prediction by adapting the
string edit distance metric to compare the actual and ZOP-predicted sequences
of markers. Then we implemented ZOP on a PIC32 processor to determine how
microarchitectural events affect ZOP’s accuracy. Next we characterized the de-
modulated signals used by ZOP. We observed that the choice of antenna can
greatly affect the demodulated signal. We showed that simple AM demodulation
only captures a portion of the available information in the signal, particularly
when the unintentionally modulated signals generated by computing devices
contain multiple synchronous components with different phases (some modu-
lated and some unmodulated). We also described a signal quality metric, and
used this metric to quantify the effects distance and demodulation bandwidth
have on signal quality. Finally, we demonstrated that ZOP can be adapted to
detect the execution of unknown code in a known program with 92% accuracy.
7.2 Future Research Directions
The largest opportunity for future work is the improvement and extension of the ZOP
approach to predicting the path through programs. This approach can be adapted to
several applications, such as profiling, performance optimization, debugging, detect-
ing malware, and the extraction of secret information from programs. With the ZOP
approach, all of these applications can be implemented with zero hardware support,
and with zero software and hardware direct hardware interaction while being used.
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There are several research directions to pursue to make ZOP feasible under more
conditions. First, ZOP must be scaled to larger programs and different devices. The
largest challenge with scaling ZOP to larger programs is input generation. ZOP’s
accuracy is strongly affected by how well the training input set covers the profiled
program. For larger programs, it can be intractable to generate inputs automatically
that cover the entire program and some method is needed to decompose the program
into smaller pieces (via unit testing for example) which are small enough for auto-
matic input generation. Furthermore, to enable this automatic input generation, we
need a coverage metric which captures ZOP’s marker-centric coverage requirements.
In addition to the future research possibilities for ZOP in the field of software
engineering, there are many opportunities in signal processing. For example, better
algorithms for time warping, tree search, using program structure/statistics to guide
tree search, and waveform matching, as well better probing and noise cancellation
will all improve ZOP’s performance. Furthermore, running ZOP on more complex
systems and on devices with operating systems presents other opportunites for further
research. When a program is run on a device with an operating system, the program
will be periodically interrupted and occasionally the processor will switch contexts
and run a completely unrelated program. This switching needs to be tracked and
dealt with by ZOP and this will require further research. In addition, more complex
processors present additional signal processing challenges as it is likely that more
bandwidth will be needed (resulting in the need for interference cancellation). High
frequency processors also generally employ spread spectrum clocking to spread the
processor and memory EM emanations over a wide range of frequencies. Demodu-




THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SIDE CHANNEL
ENERGY AND MICROBENCHMARK SPECTRAL
POWER
As discussed in Section 3.2, we need to quantify the difference in energy available to





and relate this SAVAT to the spectral power, P (falt), observed while running each
A/B alternation benchmark.
To simplify our analysis, we use the following model:
1. All processor instructions have execution time TI .
2. sa(t) and sb(t) are voltages sampled at frequency 1/TI to create the sequences




3. The frequency content of sa(t) and sb(t) above
1
2TI





4. sa(t) and sb(t) are voltages measured across a resistance R.
5. The discrete time SAVAT(sa, sb) is then






6. If the only difference between sa and sb is that instruction B is executed instead
of instruction A at a single time sample ne, then we define
SAVAT(A,B) ≡ SAVAT(sa, sb) =
TI
R
(av − bv)2 (9)
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where av = sa[ne] and bv = sb[ne].
7. For two sa(t) and sb(t) that differ by many instructions at many different time
points, SAVAT(sa, sb) can be calculated by adding all the SAVAT(A,B) values
for each instruction difference. In other words, a single SAVAT(A,B) for each
type of A and B instruction is sufficient to model SAVAT(sa, sb) regardless of
instruction ordering and the number of instructions changed between sa and sb
(i.e. differences are additive and time invariant).
The micro-benchmarks described in Section 3.2 create an alternation signal at
frequency falt by repeatedly executing instruction A ninst times, followed by ninst
executions of instruction B. We then measure P (falt), the spectral power at frequency
falt. To relate our measurements to the discrete time SAVAT(A,B) defined above,







The signals generated by the SAVAT benchmarks can be represented as a specific
mixture of two periodic signals with period N . For n = 0, ..., N − 1, the first signal is
a[n] = [o0, o1, ..., oN−2, av]. a[n + N ] = a[n] since a[n] is periodic. The second signal
is b[n] = [o0, o1, ..., oN−2, bv]. av is the single sampled voltage at the time point where
instruction A is active, bv is the sampled voltage at the time point where instruction B
is active, and on represent the other instructions in the benchmark necessary to make
the benchmark practical (e.g. to create a loop around instruction A or instruction
B).
To relate a[n] and b[n] to our benchmarks, we define a square wave w[n] with a
50% duty cycle such that
w[0 ≤ n < Nninst] = 1
w[Nninst ≤ n < 2Nninst] = 0.
(11)
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w[n], a[n], and b[n] are then all periodic with period 2Nninst, and so we can take
the discrete Fourier series of these signals over 2Nninst samples. Call A[k], B[k], and
W [k] the discrete Fourier series (DFS) of a[n], b[n] and w[n] respectively, defined for
0 ≤ k < 2Nninst. Below we use several discrete Fourier series results presented in
Appendix B.
We next define
v[n] = w[n]a[n] + (1− w[n])b[n] (12)
which represents the signal created by the sequence of instructions executed by the
microbenchmarks.
Observe that V [k] (the DFS of v[n]) is
V [k] = W [k] ∗ A[k] + (1−W [k]) ∗B[k]
= B[k] +W [k] ∗ (A[k]−B[k])
(13)
where ∗ denotes periodic convolution, defined in Appendix B.
Now we consider V [1], the 2nd Fourier coefficient (first harmonic) of the v[n]
sequence:













The second equation follows since A[k] and B[k] are non-zero only for k = 2ninstl for
l = 0, 1, ..., N − 1 by Equation 29.









+ . . .
(15)
The next few higher order odd harmonics are similar (W [k] = 0 for even k). For
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(16)
To approximate |V [1]|, we assume ninst is large (e.g. ninst > 100) which is true in
practice. W [k] is the kth coefficient of the discrete Fourier series for a square wave
with period 2Nninst where (by [70], Example 8.3)





























and noting that sinc(x)→ 1 as x→ 0 (i.e. large ninst).
For ninst > 100, |W [1]| > 100|W [1 − ninst]|, so the higher order terms in Equa-
tion 15 can be ignored, giving
|V [1]| ≈ |W [1]|
2Nninst
· |A[0]−B[0]|
π|V [1]| ≈ |A[0]−B[0]|.
(19)
We will next show that A[0]− B[0] = 2ninst(av − bv). To see this, we decompose
a[n] = o[n] + ad[n] where the first N samples of o[n] = [o0, o1, ..., oN−2, 0] and the first
N samples of ad[n] = [0, ..., 0, av]. We can decompose b[n] similarly. By the linearity
of the Fourier transform








ad[n] = 2ninstav. (21)
Similarly Bd[0] = 2ninstbv. Therefore
A[0]−B[0] = Ad[0]−Bd[0] = 2ninst(av − bv). (22)
Combining Equations 19 and 22,
2ninst|av − bv| ≈ π|V [1]|













since both sides of the first equation equal the number of A or B instructions executed
per second.







R · 2N2(ninst)2 · P (falt) = |V [1]|2.
(25)
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This shows that our model SAVAT(A,B) = TI
R
(av − bv)2 is closely approximated by
our measured SAVAT. In other words our hardware measurements record P (falt), the
power at falt (the fundamental frequency of v[n]), and we convert to SAVAT(A,B)




The discrete Fourier series as defined in [70], Equations 8.11 and 8.12, for a periodic














Multiplying two sequences x1[n] and x2[n] is equivalent to periodic convolution in










One other discrete Fourier series result is needed. Consider a signal x[n] which is
periodic with period L, so that x[n + L] = x[n] for all n. The discrete Fourier series
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kl for k = Mm
0 for k 6= Mm
(29)
The fourth step follows from the equivalence of two forms of the discrete time
periodic impulse train with period M ( [70], Example 8.1):
∞∑
m=−∞
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